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INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of our constitutional life, the Supreme Court
has articulated principles that structure the juridical relationship between international law and domestic law. These principles purportedly
offer rules of decision for resolving in domestic courts the potential inconsistencies between external and internal sources of law, and they do
so with the surface simplicity of axioms. Treaties, for example, cannot
trump constitutional norms.' Customary international law can provide
a rule of decision at least in the absence of controlling legislative or
1. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a statute protecting foreign diplomats in conformity with international treaties); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (1957)
(plurality opinion) (stating that "no agreement with a foreign nation can confer power on the
Congress, or on any other branch of Government, which is free from the restraints of the
Constitution").
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executive acts.2 In the case of an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty
and a statute, the latter-in-time prevails.3 When Congress incorporates
conventional or customary norms into a statute, those norms become
directly enforceable 4 and in the absence of any other applicable principle, United States statutes should be read "where fairly possible" so as
not to violate international law.5
These principles have been criticized variously as innocuous, anomalous, and asymmetrical.' But they also reflect the Court's insistence
2. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113,
163 (1895); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 133 (1795).
Customary international law has been defined as law "made over time by widespread practice
of governments acting from a sense of legal obligation." L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 33 (2d
ed. 1979).
3. Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 599-602 (1889) (The Chinese Exclusion
Cases); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S. 580, 597-99 (1884) (The Head Money Cases); South Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 121, 125-26 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987); cf. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (finding no clear intent to abrogate
treaty); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 119-20 (1933) (same).
No algorithm for resolving conflicts between statutes and customary international law has

been "authoritatively determined," according to the

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-

115 comment d (1986) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
There is no latter-in-time rule for customary international law and statutes, as there plainly is for
treaties and statutes. Lower court decisions strongly suggest that customary international law
bends to the will of Congress. See, e.g., Schroeder v. Bissell, 5 F.2d 838 (D. Conn. 1925); United
States ex rel Pfefer v. Bell, 248 F. 992, 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1918). Other cases, almost exclusively in the
law of the sea area, suggest that subsequent custom can modify a preexisting statute. As Professor
Jules Lobel has shown, the idea that statutes could derogate from international law was probably
not the original understanding. Lobel, The Limits of ConstitutionalPower: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and InternationalLaw, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1084-87, 1093-95 (1985).
4. Bilder, Integrating InternationalHuman Rights Law into Domestic Law-U.S. Experience, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 2 (1981).
5. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (quoting Murray v. The Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6. U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 114
(stating that "[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States"). The Restatement (Second) adopted a similar principle, including both customary and treaty law within
"international law" generally. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 3(3) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)] (stating "[i]f a domestic law of the United
States may be interpreted either in a manner consistent with international law or in a manner that
is in conflict with international law, a court in the United States will interpret it in a manner that
is consistent with international law"); see also id. comment j. For a discussion of these and other
authorities adopting the Charming Betsy principle, see infra Part III.
6. See, e.g., Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese
Exclusion and Its Progeny, 100 HARv. L. REV. 853, 875-76 (1987); Lobel, supra note 3, at 1130-37
(asserting peremptory norms, jus cogens, as a limit on the latter-in-time rule); Oliver, Problems of
Cognition and Interpretation in Applying Norms of Customary International Law of Human
Rights In United States Courts, 4 Hous. J. INT'L L. 59 (1981) (criticizing the application of customary international law of human rights in United States courts); Paust, Rediscovering the Relationship Between Congressional Power and InternationalLaw: Exceptions to the Last in Time
Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988) (criticizing the latter-in-time rule
with respect to customary international law); Potter, Relative Authority of InternationalLaw and
National Law in the United States, 19 AM. J. INT'L L. 315 (1925); Trimble, A Revisionist View of
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
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that domestic and international law be accommodated, not necessarily
as equals, but as two legitimate sources of norms binding on the United
States and enforceable in its courts. Doctrinal purity may have been
sacrificed, but the Court's accommodationist imperative has had the advantage of avoiding both dualist and monist extremes.'
As a result of the Supreme Court's approach, the debate persists
about the proper way to characterize the relationship between international and domestic law in the United States. The drafting and completion of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States" provided the occasion and the ammunition for renewing
this old controversy. Those deliberations show that, in the modern era,
the specific focus of the debate has moved from the Bricker Amendment 9 and the Sei Fujii litigation1 ° to the proper interpretation of the
Customary InternationalLaw, 33 UCLA L. REv. 665 (1986) (stressing the asymmetry of custom
and treaties as law of the United States).
7. Monism and dualism refer to contrasting perspectives on the relationship between international and domestic law. L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 140 (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS]. In the monist paradigm, the international and municipal legal systems comprise a single universal order, with inter-,
national law as the normative superior. Under a monist view, therefore, international law is not
subject even to the constitutional limitations of municipal law. Id. at 41; see also H. KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

553-88 (2d ed. 1966); Kunz, The "Vienna School" and International

Law, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. 370, 399-402 (1934). In the dualist perspective, the two systems are radically
separate, and the effect of a rule of law in one system is unrelated to its effects in the other.
Rather, international law becomes relevant domestically only to the extent that it is recognized or
incorporated in a state's constitutional order. The doctrinal consequences of the dualist perspective include the orthodoxy within the United States that treaties do not necessarily create rights
that are enforceable in domestic courts, see, e.g., Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir.
1976), and that treaties in violation of the Constitution are void, see supra note 1.
Critics have suggested the inadequacy of the traditional distinction between monism and dualism. See, e.g., J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 68-90 (6th ed. 1967); Borchard,
The Relation Between InternationalLaw and MunicipalLaw, 27 VA. L. REV. 137 (1940); McDougal, The Impact of International Law Upon National Law: A Policy-Oriented Perspective, 4
S.D.L. REv. 25 (1959). The distinction seems especially vulnerable to the deviationist hermeneutics

of the new critical school. See, e.g., D.

KENNEDY, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STRUCTURES

14 n.6 (1987)

(criticizing Kearney, Internal Limitations on External Commitments: Article 46 of the Treaties
Convention, 4 INT'L LAW. 1 (1969)).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3. For the dominant debate surrounding the Restatement (Third), see infra note 13.
9. Between 1952 and 1957, in an era of carefully circumscribed federal power, a conservative
Senate viewed with some alarm the evolution of international human rights treaties. In order to
assure that these covenants were not used as a pretext for federal interference in states' prerogatives, Senator John Bricker of Ohio introduced a series of constitutional amendments limiting the
treaty power generally and the domestic effects of international agreements. The proposals
sparked a heated debate. See Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights: U.S. Policy and Priorities, 14 VA. J. INT'L L. 611, 612-14 (1974); MacChesney, The Bricker Amendment: Treaty Law vs.
Domestic ConstitutionalLaw, 29 NOTRE DAME LAW. 529 (1954).
As Professor Henkin has pointed out, the Brickerites lost the constitutional battle when the
amendment failed to pass, but they seem to have won the political war, in that the human rights
treaties, with the exception of the Genocide Convention, still have not been approved by the Sen-
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Alien Tort Claims Act,'1 the extent to which the political branches can
violate international law, 2 and the propriety and consequences of classifying international law as federal common law.'3 But the essential and
common issue remains unchanged: Under what circumstances and according to which rationale 14 will international law provide the rule of
decision in domestic courts?'
This debate is about supremacy and politics: those who reject the
determinative power of international law principles-or some substanate. The visceral resistance to the human rights covenants has outlived Senator Bricker's original
agenda. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 147 n.71 (1972).
10. Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952) (holding the human rights
provisions of the United Nations Charter non-self-executing). For a description of the controversy
that followed this decision, see L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 944 (1973).
11. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982). This obscure provision of the First Judiciary Act has elicited
extensive academic commentary since the Second Circuit's decision in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), but few cases have sustained jurisdiction under the Act. See Bilder, supra
note 4; Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdictionover InternationalHuman Rights Claims: The
Alien Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 53 (1981); Casto, The
Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdictionover Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations,
18 CONN. L. REV. 467 (1986); Hassan, Panaceaor Mirage? Domestic Enforcement of International
Human Rights Law: Recent Cases, 4 HoUs. J. INT'L L. 13 (1981); Randall, Federal Jurisdiction
over InternationalLaw Claims: Inquiries into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1 (1985); Rogers, The Alien Tort Statute and How Individuals "Violate" InternationalLaw, 21
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 47 (1988); Sohn, Torture as a Violation of the Law of Nations, 11 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 307 (1981).
12. See Essays, Agora: May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw?, 80 AM. J.
INT'L L. 913 (1986); Essays, Agora: May the President Violate Customary InternationalLaw?
(Cont'd), 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 371 (1987).
13. See Goldklang, Back on Board The Paquete Habana: Resolving the Conflict Between
Statutes and Customary InternationalLaw, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 143 (1985); Henkin, International
Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1555 (1984); Lillich, Invoking International
Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 367 (1985); Randall, Federal Questions
and the Human Rights Paradigm,73 MINN. L. REV. 349 (1988); Schneebaum, The Enforceability
of Customary Norms of Public InternationalLaw, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289 (1982); Trimble,
supra note 6.
The most pointed debate on this subject arose out of the evolution of the Restatement
(Third). See Goldklang, Customary International Law and U.S. Laws, INT'L PRAC. -NOTEBOOK,
Apr. 1983, at 16; Murphy, Customary InternationalLaw in U.S. Jurisprudence-A Comment on
Draft Restatement I, INT'L PRAc. NOTEBOOK, Oct. 1982, at 17; Paust, When Customary International Law Clashes With a Domestic Statute, INT'L PRAc. NOTEBOOK, July 1983, at 10; Paust,
Reply to John Murphy's Comment on IncorporatingCustomary InternationalLaw in U.S. Jurisprudence, INT'L PRAC. NOTEBOOK, Jan. 1983, at 18.
14. Sprout, Theories as to the Applicability of InternationalLaw in the Federal Courts of
the United States, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1932).
15. The persistence of the scholarly debate in this century is evident from C. PicclorrO, THE
RELATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW TO THE LAW OF ENGLAND AND OF THE UNITED STATES

105 (1915);

Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 260
(1932); Wright, Conflicts of InternationalLaw with National Laws and Ordinances, 11 AM. J.
INT'L

L. 1, 2 (1917).
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tial subclass of them 1 6-in domestic litigation argue that the coercive
power of law can be justified only if it reflects the political will of those
to whom it applies. By assertion, international law fails this test because it arises out of a relatively vague and varying diplomatic process
among states, not the consent of the governed as expressed through
constitutional politics. 17 This failure is especially true with respect to
customary international law, which is created not by majority votes in a
bicameral, representative legislature and presentment to the executive,
but by a nondemocratic and subjective interpretation of state practice
and opinio juris.15 As a result, issues of both political legitimacy and
practical application arise. Treaties, being written and having an explicit constitutional pedigree, 9 are somewhat less suspect as a source of
dispositive rules. But the interpretation of treaties, not to mention less
formal international agreements, raises analogous problems of legitimacy. The courts' very act of interpretation "gives rise to law," a quasilegislative function not expressed in article III of the Constitution and
potentially in derogation of the political branches' foreign affairs powers. Those who advocate the broader application of international law in
United States courts reject these positivist and majoritarian positions,
note the adequate participation of the political branches in the creation
of both treaty and customary law, and attribute the variousness of the
lawmaking processes to the genius of the Framers.20
16. Lane, Mass Killing by Governments: Lawful in the World Legal Order?, 12 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 239 (1979); Trimble, supra note 6; Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy and Validity in
the Development of Human Rights Norm in InternationalLaw, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 609 (1979);
Weisburd, Customary InternationalLaw: The Problem of Treaties, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1

(1988).
International law scholars have invoked the Lockean ideal that legitimacy is a function of
THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 134-142, at 75-82 (T. Peardon
ed. 1952); see also Trimble, supra note 6, at 718-23.
18. Customary international law comprises two elements: a reasonably consistent state practice combined with opinio juris sive necessitatis or "a sense of legal obligation." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD), supra note 3, § 102(2); see Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
17.

accountability. J. LOCKE,

I.C.J. 14; North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v. Den.; FRG v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4. For what
has become a standard account of the process by which customary international law is made and
proved, see generally A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 47-166 (1971).
19. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (the treaty-making power); id. art. VI, § 2 (the supremacy
clause).
20. Article I of the Constitution refers to "the legislative Powers herein granted." Id. art. I, §
1 (emphasis added). As noted repeatedly, there is no similar limitation on either "the executive
Power," id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1, or "the judicial Power of the United States," id. art. III, § 1; see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 224 (1978). This textual difference might support an expansive conception of executive power. But the distinction also might be used to support the notion of
multiple legitimate "legislative powers," only some of which are "herein granted." Examples would
include the common-law powers of the courts and the ability of the executive branch to contribute
to the creation of customary international law. These legislative powers exercised by the other
branches obviously are not plenary because each is subject to congressional override through the
mechanics of article I. But in the absence of such an override, the lawmaking inherent in the
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All sides of this debate exhibit what might be called a "rule-ofdecision purism," referring to the shared fixation on the supremacy veI
non of international principles in classes of domestic cases. The debate
is driven by the attempt to define respective spheres for the dominant
operation of international and domestic law. It is, therefore, strongly
reminiscent of the constitutional controversy over the separation of
powers within our own government:21 in both cases, law is invoked to
resolve claims to power by competing sovereignties. Not surprisingly,
these two controversies merge when "rule-of-decision purism" escalates
into a debate about executive or congressional supremacy in matters of
international law22 or the power of one branch or the other to make or
3

2
violate international law.
Useful as that theoretical debate may be, it is a pathology. 24 Out-

right repudiation of international law by legislation or by executive act
is the exceptional case, both because the political branches are generally
unwilling to be perceived as violating international law25 and because
the courts are reluctant to find a conflict that triggers the supremacy
axioms. 28 Domestic courts typically are not asked to resolve the separa-

tion-of-powers and supremacy concerns implicit in rule-of-decision purism, and the extensive commentary on this issue fixes necessarily on a
judicial and executive functions would be authoritative.
21. See, e.g., Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers Disputes, 64
B.U.L. REV. 109 (1984); Lobel, supra note 3, at 1115-30.
22. See, e.g., C. CRABB & P. HOLT, INVITATION TO STRUGGLE: CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT, AND
FOREIGN POLICY (1984); L. HENKIN, supra note 9, at 39-66, 77-79; Franck, After the Fall: The New
ProceduralFramework for Congressional Control Over the War Power, 71 Am. J. INT'L L. 605
(1977); Koh, Why the President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the IranContra Affair, 97 YALE L.J. 1255 (1988); Lobel, Covert War and CongressionalAuthority: Hidden
War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035 (1986); Sparkman, Checks and Balances in
American Foreign Policy, 52 IND. L.J. 433 (1977).
23. Compare Paust, Is the President Bound by the Supreme Law of the Land?-Foreign
Affairs and National Security Reexamined, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 719 (1982) (arguing that international law applies to the executive branch) with Goldklang, supra note 13 (arguing that the
president and Congress can override customary obligations).
24. In this setting, "pathological" refers to legal analysis that fixates on the relatively rare
case, or abnormality, in which the court must choose between international and domestic rules.
The image suggests that the more probable concern ought to be those normal but difficult cases
that attempt to harmonize international and domestic norms.
25. The eagerness to avoid such a perception may be greater than the eagerness to avoid
violating international law. See, e.g., Malawer, Reagan's Law and Foreign Policy 1981-1987: The
"Reagan Corollary" of InternationalLaw, 29 HARV. INT'L L.J. 85 (1988).
26. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984); Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. 658, 690, modified, 444 U.S. 816 (1979).
Judicial reluctance to find a sufficient conflict can take ingenious, even tortured, form. See
United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); see also infra note
275 and accompanying text.
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handful of relevant cases and their opaque dicta."
By contrast, the courts frequently are requested to fulfill the traditional common-law function of accommodating international standards
in interpreting domestic statutes. In these cases, the more characteristic
judicial concern is the seemingly residual rule, the interpretive guideline captured in Chief Justice John Marshall's classic statement in
Murray v. The Schooner CharmingBetsy: the statutes enacted by Congress "ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains. ' ' 2 8 The Charming Betsy principle
has been reaffirmed without much reflection or analysis by the federal
courts since it was announced in 180429 and, like other canons of construction, is dismissed easily by some critics as innocuous s° or meaningless.3 1 It is plain, however, that the interpretive role of international law
is more common than its controlling role. Indeed, in cases arising under
federal statutes that implicitly or explicitly incorporate international
law,32 courts rarely suggest that international law alone provides a controlling rule of decision. Rather, the fact of incorporation itself makes
the international standard controlling. Even in cases in which there is
no such incorporation, the Charming Betsy principle nonetheless appears frequently, if not specifically by name.33
27. The dominant Supreme Court texts for scholarly controversy have been The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815), and Brown v. United

States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814). Compare Paust, The President Is Bound by International
Law, 81 Am.J. INT'L L. 377 (1987) with Charney, The Power of the Executive Branch of the
United States Government to Violate Customary InternationalLaw, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 913 (1986).
28. Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). In Charming
Betsy the Court held that the Nonintercourse Act of February 27, 1800, 2 Stat, 7, did not apply to
a former resident of the United States who had moved to St. Thomas and sworn allegiance to the
king of Denmark. The Court concluded that the Nonintercourse Act, which by its terms applied to
persons under the protection of the United States, did not include the former resident, declaring
that any other construction would depart from the customary international standards of diplomatic protection. The Court would not infer that Congress intended such a result. Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 8. For a more complete discussion of this case, see infra Part III(A).
29. See, e.g., Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32-33 (construing a statute prohibiting employment
discrimination against United States citizens by the military so as not to abrogate preexisting executive agreements); McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 21
(1963) (construing a labor relations statute so as not to violate customary rules of maritime jurisdiction); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953) (noting that the applicability of one statute
is determined by customary maritime law in the absence of clearly expressed congressional intent
to the contrary).
30. Lobel, supra note 3, at 1102 n.159.
31. See infra Part II.
32. See, e.g., Trade Agreements Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-39, 93 Stat. 144 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5, 13, and 19 U.S.C.); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94
Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); Neutrality Act, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1982); Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)).
33. See infra Part III(B).
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The consequences of a meaningful requirement that statutes be
construed consistently with international law largely are unrecognized,3 4
but they are far from trivial: it would be significant enough if the norms
of customary law determined only the extraterritorial applicability of
domestic statutes. In the era when international law was concerned primarily with jurisdiction and state responsibility, that is precisely what
Charming Betsy stood for.35 The apparent consequences of that principle become even more significant as the international legal system addresses substantive matters of our political and economic life
traditionally reserved to exclusive domestic jurisdiction. 6 As international law has moved in this century "from an essentially negative code
of rules of abstention to positive rules of cooperation, 3 7 its potential
overlap with domestic statutory regimes has become pronounced. Even
a partial list of recent international concerns-gender and race discrimination, restrictive business practices, environmental protection, and labor rights3S-suggests the extent to which the international community
may attempt to regulate matters that historically have been the exclusive subject of domestic legislation.
At the same time but for different reasons, domestic jurisprudence
has undergone a dramatic transformation with the gradual "statutorifi34. Since the nineteenth century, the standard treatises on statutory construction have given
scant attention to the Charming Betsy principle. The discussion almost invariably is limited to a
restatement of the holding in the case, followed by examples of cases either stressing the power of
Congress to override international law (especially treaty obligations) or limiting the extraterritorial
application of United States statutes. See, e.g., H. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS

90-91 (1896); G. ENDLICH, A

COMMENTARY ON THE INTERPRETATION OF

STATUTES 239-43 (1888); see also 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF STATUTORY CRIMES 1013 (1883); T. COOLEY, TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 18 n.2 (1890); T. SEDGWICK, RULES WHICH
GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 448-51

(1857). Some modern established works do not mention the CharmingBetsy principle at all. See
E. CRAWFORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES (1940); R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES (1975); J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Sands 4th

ed. 1973).
International law scholars similarly tend to restate the canon, when they do not ignore it altogether, but no one has attempted a sustained analysis of Charming Betsy and its pr6geny. See,
e.g., CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 7, at 209; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM (3d ed. 1988).

35. See infra Part III(B).
36. See infra Part IV(B).
37. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1964). The transformation in substantive international law has accompanied the addition of new, authoritative
processes by which international law may be made. Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 11, at 72-75.
38. The move from norms of abstention to more substantive standards of international law
was identified at least as early as 1931. See Garner, Le D~veloppement et les Tendences Rcentes
du Droit International, 35 RECUEIL DES COURS 605, 641 (1931) (referring to an emerging international law in labor, economics, communications, intellectual property, air transportation, and other
fields of cooperation).
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cation" 9 of United States law. In an historic shift, legislation, rather
than the common law, has become the dominant expression of legal
norms in United States society. The "orgy of statute making ' 40 has justified a renewed examination of the discipline of statutory construction
by courts and commentators. 41 This examination in turn has spawned
new approaches in legal scholarship, as theories of literature, economics,
linguistics, and politics assume roles in legal interpretation.
At the intersection of these otherwise unrelated developments lies
the Charming Betsy principle. Taken at face value, it suggests that the
transformation in substantive international law may penetrate domestic
law through the presumption that Congress intends to conform its statutes to international standards. This Article suggests that Charming
Betsy and its progeny offer a potentially potent, though admittedly
nondeterminative, adversarial principle under which courts, advocates,
and scholars faced with issues of statutory construction are obliged to
consult international sources, culling norms from aspirations and interpreting a variety of texts and state practices. In addition, if international law does provide authoritative guidance in the interpretation of
controlling domestic statutory rules, the CharmingBetsy principle has
a profound theoretical aspect as well: it raises for international lawyers
the issues of hermeneutics and judicial legitimacy that contemporary
jurisprudence addresses in a more general and largely domestic context.
Indeed, the Charming Betsy principle provides a useful test case for
assessing some of the competing theories of interpretation that have
come to dominate legal theory.
Of course, there are alternative analyses of the Charming Betsy
principle. One of these would deny the asserted demise of exclusive domestic jurisdiction, which gives the Charming Betsy principle its sudden apparent relevance. Another account would view skeptically any
claim that a mere canon of construction actually affects the substantive
interpretation of domestic legislation. A third would doubt the practical
workability of such an interpretive principle or its legitimacy if applied
in controversial cases. A fourth alternative might distinguish between
requirements and prohibitions, and stress that the Charming Betsy
principle requires only that violations of international law be avoided,
not that substantive international norms be incorporated. Each of these
perspectives has its own jurisprudential costs and may not be persuasive on its own terms, as shown below.42
39. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982); see also Traynor, Statutes Revolving in Common-Law Orbits, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 401, 401-02 (1968).
40. G. GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 95 (1977).
41. See infra Part II.
42. See infra Parts IV & V.
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In sum, the apparent simplicity of CharmingBetsy's canon of statutory construction hides a deep and characteristic complexity that goes
to the heart of how international law should be applied in the courts of
the United States. Rule-of-decision purism also focuses on this problem
but seeks as answers only those principles that are determinative and
hierarchical when international law conflicts with domestic law. Charming Betsy, by contrast, seeks principles of accommodation and interpretation, with the implicit acknowledgment that an irreducible or
unavoidable conflict between international and domestic norms will be
resolved by a "purist" rule. Its power lies in the requirement that such
a conflict be avoided in the first place.
Part II addresses an overarching objection that has nothing to do
with Charming Betsy or international law specifically. It arises out of
the deep suspicion that canons of construction are no more than rhetorical tropes used to rationalize rather than to inform a decision. This
objection presumes that judges simply "do not seriously believe themselves bound or even guided by general principles of interpretation beyond the vaguest adages about respect for legislative intent. ' 43 By the
postrealist scholarly standards implicit in this objection, canons of construction do not qualify for serious doctrinal treatment because principles of construction, at best guidelines of law in the interpretation,
resist meaningful generalization, assessment, or criticism. Part II, drawing on a pattern of contemporary responses to this skepticism, suggests
that the so-called "public values" approach to interpreting statutes is
also useful in understanding canons of construction like the Charming
Betsy principle.
Part III outlines the history of the Charming Betsy principle and
demonstrates that international norms inform the substantive interpretation of United States statutes and not just their territorial reach as
courts and commentators usually assume." The point is to show the
range of federal statutory subjects 45 potentially affected by such an in43. Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutes and the New Legal Process, 35
L. REv. 213, 214 (1983). See generally Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common
Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 892 (1982).
44. See infra Part III.
45. This Article does not address the potential impact of the Charming Betsy principle on
the courts' interpretation of nonstatutory forms of federal law. See, e.g., Japan Whaling Ass'n v.
American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (executive orders); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981) (congressional acquiescence to executive practices); Christenson, Using Human
Rights Law to Inform Due Process and Equal ProtectionAnalyses, 52 U. CIN. L. Ray. 3 (1983)
(constitutional provisions); Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV.
L. REv. 883 (1986); Hartman, The "Unusual" Punishment:The Domestic Effects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 655 (1983) (constitutional provisions); Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International
Law, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939) (federal common law); Schachter, The Charterand the ConstiSTAN.
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terpretive principle.
Part IV identifies three types of exemplary difficulties that arise in
applying the Charming Betsy principle: (i) the problem of inferring
when Congress intends to exercise its power to override international
law and when the CharmingBetsy principle should operate instead, (ii)
the problem of determining which domestic statutes are appropriate for
interpretation under international norms, and (iii) the problem of defining a state's international obligations in a given case when international law rests on what commentators have described as a gradient of
relative or varying normativity. In other words, courts attempting to
apply CharmingBetsy will encounter the difficulty that meaningful international norms are not always either entirely binding or utterly irrelevant. Part IV suggests that the values served by the Charming Betsy
principle offer preliminary guidance in the resolution of these problems
and that none of these difficulties erects a prophylactic barrier to the
reappreciation and revitalization of this long-standing doctrine of federal common law.
Part V addresses a class of objections to the legitimacy of any approach that takes the Charming Betsy principle too seriously.46 This
task requires a sustained defense of the rebuttable presumption of congressional compliance with international law against the objection that
interpreting statutes in light of international norms is countermajoritarian and inherently political, and thus inappropriate for adjudication. The opposing ideological standpoint of critical legal theory
raises a related objection: the Charming Betsy principle potentially
tution: The Human Rights Provisionsin American Law, 4 VAND. L. REv. 643 (1951) (constitutional
provisions).

Nor does this Article address the interpretation of state or municipal statutes in light of international law, except to observe that the supremacy clause of the Constitution and the federal
interest in relatively uniform interpretations of international law should support a Charming
Betsy norm in these local contexts. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126 (1938)

(construing treaty to avoid conflict with state statute); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929)
(finding the latter-in-time rule inapplicable in conflict between state statute and treaty); Ware v.
Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 220 (1796); ef. Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,
641-42 (1981) (recognizing that the unique federal interest in admiralty displaces state law);

United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 590-93 (1973) (same with respect to
federal regulatory program); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943)

(same with respect to commercial obligations of the United States). Professor Thomas Merrill's
insistence that principles of federalism limit the common-law powers of the federal courts would
seem for that reason inapplicable in the foreign affairs context. See Merrill, The Common Law
Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CH. L. REv. 1, 16-27 (1985); cf. Maier, Cooperative Federalismin
International Trade: Its ConstitutionalParameters,27 MERCER L. REv. 391 (1976). See generally
Hill, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L.
REv. 1024 (1967).
46. Professor Ronald Dworkin has addressed the analogous argument that nontextual legal
principles have significant meaning in the judicial process. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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shares the illegitimacy of any hermeneutical technique that views a particular interpretation of legal text as a function of proof rather than
power. Part VI concludes, however, that none of these arguments displaces the mandate that statutes be construed in light of international
law whenever possible.
II.

THE RECOVERY OF MEANING: PERSPECTIVES ON STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION

This Part first reviews a contemporary account of legal interpretation that offers a plausible and constructive alternative to the orthodoxy 4 7 that canons of statutory construction are largely meaningless in
legal analysis and decision-making. Grounded in legal realism, that
skeptical view has been sharpened by critical legal scholarship, which
has applied deconstructive literary theory to the texts of law. Subpart A
concludes, however, that the "public values" approach to statutory interpretation offers an attractive middle ground between skepticism and
formalism.
Subpart B argues that public values analysis can be extended usefully from particular statutes to particular interpretive canons, especially those few canons that attempt to accommodate multiple sources
of law, such as the maxim that a statute should be construed to preserve its constitutionality whenever possible. The CharmingBetsy principle requiring statutes to be construed consistently with international
law has a similar function. These and other canons of accommodation
can be distinguished from the more numerous and more controversial
canons that try to reconstruct statutory meaning or legislative intent,
precisely because of the recurrent, concrete, and generalizable public
values served by accommodation.
Addressing the public values of the CharmingBetsy principle, Subpart C shows that two separate but largely reinforcing rationales exist
for disapproving implicit repudiations of international law by statute:
the value of compliance with the law of nations, which only exceptionally bases state liability on inadvertence; and the judiciary's respect for
coordinate branches of government, to avoid the embarrassment of declaring a statute in violation of international law in the absence of a
clear statement of repudiation by Congress. As shown below, these twin
rationales, drawing on values implicit in monist and dualist paradigms,
both shape and legitimize the application of the Charming Betsy principle, but neither rationale is adequate alone to capture the full impact
of the canon.
47.

See infra note 48 and accompanying text.
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Public Values Discourse As a Response to Skepticism

Scholarly disregard for the discipline of interpretation was perhaps
inevitable after Karl Llewellyn's corrosive demonstration that for every
principle of statutory construction there is an equal and opposite
counter-principle. 48 Deconstruction theory has added a self-consciousness about ambiguity in the law and the intrinsically political act of
interpreting texts. It has reemphasized the open texture of language,
the impossibility of pretextual communication, and the contingency of
doctrine. 49 The deconstructionists have exposed the fiction that distin-

guishes between "making" and "finding" the law, 50 on which the legitimacy of adjudication traditionally has rested."1
Within the field of statutory construction, the new critical school
has contributed a rhetoric or a methodology for exploring legisprudential riddles. How can legislatures phrase statutes to make them simultaneously comprehensive, well-tailored, and comprehensible?5" Is it
48. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395 (1950). Professor T. Alexander
Aleinikoff has shown that Llewellyn's dialectic reveals a tension between intentionalist and textualist tendencies in the law of statutory interpretation. Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 20, 24 n.22 (1988); see also K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 52135 (1960). The vulnerability of interpretation as a discipline was suggested long before Llewellyn's
critique. See, e.g., Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). Like any systematic skepticism about language, it can be traced ultimately to the Greeks. See, e.g., P. DE MAN, THE
RESISTANCE TO THEORY 12 (1986); Schmitt, The Rediscovery of Ancient Skepticism in Modern
Times, in THE SKEPTICAL TRADITION 225 (M. Burnyeat ed. 1983); Tompkins, The Reader in History: The Changing Shape of Literary Response, in READER-RESPONSE CRITICISM: FROM FORMALISM TO POST-STRUCTURALISM 201, 226 (J. Tompkins ed. 1980).
49. See, e.g., Hoy, Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Post-StructuralPerspectives,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 136 (1985); Kennedy, Legal Formality, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 351 (1973); Levinson,
Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 821-24 (1983).
50. See Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A Question of Judicial Responsibility,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 533, 535 (1977); see also T. PLUCKNETT, STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN
THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY Vii (1922). Plucknett states that
[t]he more one examines the historical processes by which the judicature interprets the written and the unwritten laws, the laws that are enacted and the laws that are unenacted, the
more clearly one sees that the office ius dicere, to interpret law, involves also the office ius
dare, to make law.
Id. (emphasis in original).
51. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 314 (1986); Frank, Words and Music: Some Remarks on
Statutory Interpretation,47 COLUM. L. REV. 1259 (1947); Hazard, Rising Above Principle,135 U.
PA. L. REV. 153 (1986); Jones, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 957
(1940); Kennedy, supra note 49.
52. Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dimensions of Legislative Meaning, 36 IND.
L.J. 414 (1961); Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
528 (1947); see also 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 61. Blackstone observes:
[S]ince in laws all cases cannot be foreseen or exposed, it is necessary, that when the general
decrees of the law come to be applied to particular cases, there should be somewhere a power
vested of excepting those circumstances which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself
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plausible to construct a unified theory of statutory interpretation when
statutes assume a variety of forms and address a bewildering range of
issues? 5s How can a court weigh legislative intent in the interpretation
of a statute, when that intent is or must be utterly inaccessible except
as a retroactive construct of the court itself? 54 How can one account for
the common practice of applying a statute analogically to transactions
or persons beyond its explicit scope? 55 What weight should a court give
the generalizations about human and legislative experience that have
emerged as canons of construction?5 6 Certainly if text is vulnerable to
would have excepted.
Id.
53. J. HuRsT, DEALING WITH STATUTES 2 (1982) (referring to the "open-door jurisdiction of the
legislature").
54. Public choice theorists have been especially critical of intentionalist interpretation to the
extent that it relies on the legislative history of a statute. See, e.g., Macey, Promoting PublicRegarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation:An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L.
REV. 223 (1986); Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 761, 774 (1987). Professors Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey have demonstrated that skepticism is not necessarily the most balanced response to public choice theory as applied to statutory
interpretation. Farber & Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 435
(1988) (offering "strong reasons, both empirical and theoretical, for believing that actual legislatures do not suffer from the instability and incoherence some public choice theories have
predicted").
But the skepticism has a long history behind it. See Radin, supra note 48, at 870 (noting that
"[a] legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words which some two or
three men drafted, which a considerable number rejected, and in regard to which many of the
approving majority might have had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs");
accord R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 313; Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533,
547 (1983); Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987); MacCallum, Legislative Intent, 75 YALE L.J. 754 (1966); Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L.
REV. 151, 246-70 (1981); see also DeLong, New Wine for a New Bottle: Judicial Review in the
Regulatory State, 72 VA. L. REV. 399, 405 (1986) (observing that "[t]he 'congressional purpose' that
lawyers and judges so solemnly analyze is always a tricky beast and frequently a mythical one").
Of course, the power of this academic insight has not stopped the courts from viewing legislative intent or statutory purpose as the touchstone in statutory interpretation cases. See Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); Monell v.
Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 664-89 (1978); United States v. United Continental
Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164, 169-81 (1976).
55. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation:A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARnozo L. REV. 799, 823-26 (1985) (discussing the history of analogical interpretation); Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARV. LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934) (discussing the equity-of-thestatute doctrine); Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 385-86 (1908) (discussing analogical interpretation).
56. Judge Richard A. Posner believes that canons of statutory construction cannot be defended as mere flexible guidelines which constrain judges or limit the courts' legislative powers,
though his critique has little in common with critical hermeneutics. Posner's one exception is that
statutes should be construed to avoid conflict with the Constitution. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CH. L. REV. 800, 806-07 (1983). In his view,
the most common canons-the "plain meaning" rule, the use of postenactment materials, and the
deference generally given the interpretation offered by the "expert" administrative agency-are
the most vulnerable. These canons share a common weakness: they impute omniscience to Con-
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the new critique, then such texts about texts should be especially
suspect.
As a result of these difficulties, scholars who have attempted a
modern reconstruction of the interpretive discipline in law have been
forced to confront the suspicion that there is no doctrine to criticize or
resurrect; that the "rules [of statutory interpretation] have weakened
into quaint and naive homilies"; 57 and that the attempt to deduce a
general theory of legislation would be considered "otiose, impractical,
and pretentious." 58 Perhaps in response to the contemporary dispute
within the Supreme Court over approaches to statutory construction,
competing theories of legislation have proliferated in spite of the Realists' orthodoxy. Professor Anthony D'Amato, for example, has offered a
distinctly nonskeptical account of the discipline based on the distinctly
skeptical premise that there logically cannot be a definitive theory or
set of rules governing the interpretation of statutes.6 0 Professor Guido
Calabresi is more complex; he has abandoned the narrow notion of judicial interpretation and has supported a broad judicial warrant for the
reimagination of obsolete statutes." This approach simply may trade
the rhetoric of statutory interpretation for the rhetoric of common lawmaking, but it responds to the skeptical account of the canons and tries
to contain the more corrosive elements of the Realists' theory. Professor
Ronald Dworkin would make the sow's ear of subjectivism into the silk
purse of integrity, positing a community of principle from which judges
derive public values for the interpretation of statutes,62 a theme
sounded by other commentators as well.63
Two interwoven strategies unify these otherwise disparate defenses
of statutory interpretation as a meaningful enterprise. One common
front against the critical or skeptical attack is the notion that no proof,
gress, especially with respect to the presumption against implicit repeals. See id. at 812.
57. Weisberg, supra note 43, at 213.
58. Posner, supra note 56, at 800.
59. See, e.g., K Mart Corp. v. Cartier, Inc., 486 U.S. 281 (1988). The Supreme Court's internal debate on statutory construction may be viewed as a controversy about the relevance of public
values in the interpretation of statutes and especially in the determination that a statute is ambiguous in some relevant regard. Eskridge, Public Values in Statutory Interpretation,137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1007 (1989); Farina, Statutory Interpretationand the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989).

60. D'Amato, Can Legislatures Constrain Judicial Interpretation of Statutes?, 75 VA.L.
REV. 561 (1989).
61. G. CALABRESI, supra note 39.
62. R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 313-54.
63. Eskridge, supra note 59; Lyons, Justificationand Judicial Responsibility, 72 CALIF. L.
REV. 178 (1984); Macey, supra note 54, at 227 (observing that "the very act of statutory construction often transforms statutes designed to benefit narrow interest groups into statutes that in fact
further the public interest"); Newman, Between Legal Realism and NeutralPrinciples:The Legitimacy of Institutional Values, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 200 (1984).
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however rigorous, that demonstrates the impossibility of common experience is plausible. The second strategy denies the positivist premise
that the law consists exclusively of rules-plus-discretion and shows that
the law responds in more or less predictable patterns to nondeterminative but authoritative principles. The argument is that both positivism
and the radical critique underestimate the descriptive and normative
power of these principles.
These two strategies require brief elaboration. First, elegant argumentation showing that Congress cannot really pass meaningful legislation or that courts cannot really know congressional intent resembles
other forms of skepticism in the history of philosophy.6 4 Not surprisingly, similar skepticism has provoked similar responses, primarily in
the form of ordinary-knowledge or common sense defenses of conventional understanding.6 5 David Hume's philosophy, for example, seemed
to demonstrate the impossibility of common experience: knowledge of
cause and effect may be in some sense impossible as he argued, but no
one walks in front of an oncoming train musing, "We never really
know." Immanuel Kant accepted Hume's premise that cause and time
and other "unknowables" were beyond direct experience but Kant rejected the skeptical conclusion that "unknowables" were beyond analysis. To the contrary, these "unknowables" were essential to make sense
of experience. The mind must be structured by these concepts to give
structure to the experiential world: objects in the world conform to our
understanding or our intuition.6 6 As a result, cause and time are con64. See generally THE SKEPTICAL TRADITION (M. Burnyeat ed. 1983). Skepticism about the
meaning of statutes or about the interpretive enterprise itself is in the tradition of David Hume's
epistemological conclusion that "all the rules of logic require a continual diminution, and at last a
total extinction of belief and evidence." D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 183 (L. SelbyBigge ed. 1978). In part, Hume's argument was that all knowledge degenerates into probabilities
because the very basis of knowledge, cause-and-effect, is a relation beyond experience. Nothing in
the experiential or phenomenal world could demonstrate causal relations. The entire superstructure of knowledge, therefore, must collapse into custom and belief, rather than reason. Id. Analogically, the canons of interpretation are textual reductions of customary inferences in multiple and
conflicting situations.
For the history of interpreting Hume as a naturalist instead of as a skeptic, see T. PENELHUM,
GOD AND SKEPTICISM: A STUDY OF SKEPTICISM AND FIDEISM 120-45 (1983).
65. G.E. Moore, in particular, advanced a self-styled "common sense" response to the skepticism of Hume, Descartes, and modern adherents. See G. MOORE, PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES 228
(1959); G. MOORE, SOME MAIN PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 119-20 (1953); Moore, A Defense of Common Sense, in CONTEMPORARY BRITISH PHILOSOPHY (J. Muirhead ed. 1925). Other common sense
responses to skepticism are analyzed in M. FERREIRA, SCEPTICISM AND REASONABLE DOUBT (1986).
66. . KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 3 (W. Schwarz trans. 1st ed. 1982).
If the object of the senses must conform to qualities of our faculty of intuiting, and if the
concepts by which intuitions are determined conform to rules of the understanding expressed
in concepts a priori, the possibility of cognition a priori is conceivable. . . . [W]e cognize a
priori of things only what we have put into them ourselves.
Id. Professor Barry Stroud summarizes the "Copernican revolution" worked by Kant in these
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ceived not as something "out there" that all persons experience but as
something presupposed and analyzable as a necessary element of
experience.
The power of the skeptical insight, when applied to statutory construction, is likely to be dismissed as merely technical and outweighed
by its imputed impracticability. If the-courts actually invoke the plainmeaning rule in interpreting statutes, 7 for example, neither courts nor
advocates likely will adopt the skeptical perspective. The Realists'
skepticism may be valuable to the extent that it forces otherwise inert
legal analysis onto a rhetorical, psychological, political, or even metaphysical plane, but it is not likely to be taken as some final or useful

truth.
Mainstream responses to the deep skepticism about canons of construction follow this ordinary-knowledge paradigm, though not necessarily by name. These responses stress the dialogic quality of
interpretation, and they suggest that the legitimacy of the canons of
construction lies not in their authority as doctrine-not, by analogy, in
the Humean world of the "unknowable"-but in their necessity. They
are necessary to make sense of judicial and legislative experience, even
if they deconstruct into indeterminacy and incoherence when analyzed
in isolation. The canons of construction, in other words, are common
presuppositions that make communication possible (or meaningful) in
the first place.6 8
terms:
What we perceive must be in some way dependent on our own sensibility and understanding ....
We can never explain how our knowledge of the world is possible on the assumption
that our perception and knowledge of things simply conform to the constitution of the objects
known, so we must adopt the revolutionary idea that "objects conform to our knowledge" or
to "the constitution of our faculty of intuition."
Stroud, Kant and Skepticism, in THE SKEprcAL TRADITION, supra note 64, at 413, 419 (citations
omitted).
67. Compare, e.g., United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985) (following the plain-meaning
rule) with Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986) (departing from the plainmeaning rule). See generally Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The "Plain-MeaningRule" and
Statutory Interpretationin the "Modern" Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299 (1975).
68. D'Amato, supra note 60, at 565. Professor D'Amato states that
[b]ecause each person (judges, attorneys, the public) who reads or hears the legislative message necessarily interprets it, the legislator may conclude that the more she knows about the
interpretive processes of her audience, the more she can tailor the words of the statute so that
the audience will interpret it the way she wants it to be interpreted.
Id.
Judge Posner presumably would object to such a suppositional technique on the ground that
the imputation of knowledge to Congress is not justified empirically:
I do not think that any of the canons of statutory construction can be defended on the theory
that they are keys to deciphering a code. There is no evidence that members of Congress, or
their assistants who do the actual drafting, know. the code or that if they know, they pay
attention to it. . . . We should demand evidence that statutory draftsmen follow the code
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This metaphor of communication or dialogue,69 which recurs
throughout the modern reconstruction of interpretation as a discipline,
portrays the maxims of interpretation as ground rules for meaning. The
metaphor typically comprehends a "conversation" between the legislature and the judiciary, in which the courts are empowered variously to
remand statutes to the legislature for clarification, 70 or to "develop" the
statutory scheme envisioned by their legislative coauthors, 71 or to "discuss" with the legislature the "state of legal principle" in the context of
a particular statute,72 or to "give meaning to our public values" or
"community consensus" in the process of interpretation." The conversation may be one in which the legislature is aware of the courts' interpretive rules7 4 or one in which both the legislature and the judiciary are
constrained by the "professional grammar" of the broader "interpretive
before we erect a method of interpreting statutes on the improbable assumption that they do.
Posner, supra note 56, at 806.
69. The metaphor is indebted philosophically to Bakhtin and Gadamer. See M. BAKHTIN,
ESSAYS AND DIALOGUES ON HIS WORK (G. Morson ed. 1986); H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 33031 (2d ed. 1986).
70. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills
Case, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1957) (urging the courts to adopt jurisdictional practices that would force
the legislature to acknowledge and correct the discrepancy between the language of its statute and
the legal principles).
71. R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 313.
72. G. CALABRESI, supra note 39, at 166; Weisberg, supra note 43, at 245.
73. Several commentators have urged the use of public values in this process, though there is
little agreement about the content of those values or the relationship between these putative values and specific canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in
Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1281, 1315-16 (1976); Easterbrook, supra note 54 (recognizing the public value of private compromise); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword:
The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 17 (1979); Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541, 585-87 (1988). The evidence that judges would embrace
such a view of their own power is mixed at best. See Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1079-82.
74. See D'Amato, supra note 60, at 595 (expressing the author's position that "if an audience
believes a given jurisprudential theory, that audience has forfeited a few of its degrees of interpretive freedom, and ... if the legislature knows this fact about its audience, it may be able to use
jurisprudence to its advantage"). Professor D'Amato does not address canons of construction, only
"a jurisprudence;" he might not attribute the same dialectical power to the comparatively vague
adages of interpretation. His point would seem equally applicable, however, to canons of construction: if a legislature is aware of the courts' interpretive rules, "it may be able to use [them] to its
advantage." Id. Plainly, the Supreme Court is willing on occasion to attribute such knowledge to
Congress. See, e.g., Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953), when, with respect to a provision of
the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C § 688, the Court stated:
Congress could not have been unaware of the necessity of construction imposed upon courts
by such generality of language and was well warned that in the absence of more definite
directions than are contained in the Jones Act it would be applied by the courts to foreign
events, foreign ships and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law.
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 581; see also Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1065-66 (arguing that Congress is
on notice that statutes will be interpreted by the courts in light of public values).
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communities."75 Each of these versions offers a new and refined formalism, informed by the legal realists' attack on the distinction between
making and finding law, but committed to the perspective that the language used by courts and legislatures is neither meaningless nor infinitely manipulable.76
This view necessarily entails an abandonment of the flat distinction
between binding and nonbinding sources of law, a distinction traceable
in positivist terms to the notion that the legal system consists exclusively of rules plus unbounded discretion. Since Brown v. Board of Education7 and the heyday of Legal Process jurisprudence, s it has been a
mainstream though controversial proposition that extra-textual limits
on governmental power exist, and that these limits take the form of
public values or principles. Although no unifying definition of these cultural constructs has emerged, Professor William Eskridge has suggested
that "public values. . are legal norms and principles that form fundamental underlying precepts for our polity-background norms that contribute to and result from the moral development of our political
community. '" Although it is apparent that these public values or principles are not themselves rules and do not operate as rules, s0 they can
channel the interpretation of constitutional s l or statutory 2 rules. When
Congress has directed a fairly determinate or unambiguous result, the
courts follow the legislative will, and public values play no important
75. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation,34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 745-47 (1982); cf. Brest, Interpretation and Interest, 34 STAN. L. REV. 765 (1982).
76. Judge Easterbrook has suggested the affinity of this perspective with the analytics of
Wittgenstein, who
showed that no system of language can be self-contained and that meaning thus must depend
in part on logical structure and understandings supplied by a community of readers, but this
does not establish that words contain no meaning or that judges may disregard such meaning
as most readers would find. There is no 'private language'; meaning lies in shared reactions to
text. If readers have a common understanding of structure they may decipher meaning
accurately.
Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 533 n.2 (emphasis in original). The theory of intersubjectivity and
its impact on recent jurisprudence are explored in 1 J. HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE
ACTION (1981); Kennedy, The Turn to Interpretation,58 S. CAL. L. REV. 251 (1985).
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78.

H.

HART

TION OF LAW

& A.

SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICA-

1148-79 (tent. ed. 1958).

79. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1007-08.
80. H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 78; Kennedy, supra note 49, at 395-98 (discussing a
"Third Way").
81. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-41 (1980); M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION,
THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 118 (1982); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the

Constitution,93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984); Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 2), 42 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1929); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution:
FundamentalLaw in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 (1978).
82. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 313-54; Eskridge, supra note 59; Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1581-89 (1988).
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interpretive role. But in close or ambiguous cases, these public values
influence and rationalize the court's construction of statutory text. The
claim is that public values discourse offers an account of the Supreme
Court's legisprudence that is more pragmatic and more attractive than
any competing paradigm-critical, natural, or positivistic."
Public values discourse is an ambitious program, articulating values
potentially as varied as the body of statutory law itself. For each statute, it is plausible to articulate multiple, potentially inconsistent values,
which can by assertion guide the interpretation of ambiguous statutory
text.
Professor Dworkin has argued, however, that it is meaningful to
identify fewer and more inclusive principles at work in the legal culture."' Dworkin's legal principles also are not "binding" or rule-like in
any positivist sense; they are standards to be observed because "justice
or fairness or some other dimension of morality"8 5 requires it, and they
may "incline a decision one way, though not conclusively. '86 Even the
test of a principle's validity has nothing to do with the positivists' pedigree of a rule: when the latter may depend on its conformity with a rule
of recognition 7 or a grundnorm, s the validity of a principle is a cultural and historical determination based on the "sense of appropriateness developed in the [legal] profession and the public over time." 89
Professor Dworkin has argued that the inevitable controversy over the
content of such principles does not render them beyond criticism; indeed, the fact that decisions based upon those principles are controversial implies the existence of some higher order perspective that gives
meaning to the dispute. These principles set the standard against which
a decision may be criticized, not on the ground that it violated obligatory principles of law, but on the ground that it gave those principles
inadequate weight or respect. Whether or not these principles are sim83. The proponents of this perspective acknowledge that it is flawed: there is at least a superficial tension between public values interpretation and the ideal of legislative supremacy, individual members of the Court seem deeply ambivalent about the legitimacy of public values
discourse, and the indeterminacy of the method allows the ascription of public values to almost
any decision, a fact that undermines the explanatory power of the insight. See Eskridge, supra
note 59, at 1061-91; cf. Hazard, supra note 51, at 187. The defense is that principles discourse by
judges in hard cases better serves the public than nominalist nonsense about legislative intent.
84. Professor Dworkin's notion of principle operates at both the level of specific legislation,
see Dworkin, How to Read the Civil Rights Act, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 316 (1985), and at the
level of societal commitments to a public morality, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 313-54.
85. R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 22.
86. Id. at 35.

87. H.
88. H.

HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 92-99 (1961).
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE

111 (1945). Kelsen posited the notion of

a grundnorm, or basic norm for determining the validity of all other norms in a legal system.
89. R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 40.
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ply fictions in the service of a judicial activism or contemporary manifestations of natural law theory,9" Professor Dworkin's position on the
power of principle in statutory interpretation now "probably represents
a conventional consensus on the problem."9 1
B.

Canons of ConstructionAs Expressions of Public Values

The reliance on principles and public values should not be limited
to the interpretation of particular statutes and constitutional rules: Canons of construction can be understood and defended as expressions of
public values as well. The validity and the power of the canons are directly proportional to the consistency and weight of the public values
that they serve. Canons of statutory construction, to the extent that
they give voice to Dworkin's principles or to some other form of public
value, cannot be dismissed as easily as Llewellyn and Radin and their
modern counterparts might have thought.9 2
Of course not every canon of statutory construction can be viewed
usefully or plausibly as an instance of principle or public value, and the
public values approach will not justify or clarify the reach of every
maxim of interpretation. To the contrary, only those canons that presume the consistency of statutes with some other form or source of law
rest on the kind of broad normative commitment which Dworkin and
others have emphasized. In particular, those canons which presume the
consistence of statutes with some form or source of law: that statutes
are to be construed to preserve their constitutionality;9 3 that federal
statutes are to be construed not to preempt customary state functions;"'
90. Some commentators have criticized Professor Dworkin's jurisprudence on the ground
that it provides virtually unlimited license for idiosyncratic interpretations by courts. Others find
in this account an essentially naturalist, even evangelical perspective. See Steinhardt, Believers
Inside the Tent: Ronald Dworkin's Evangelism and Law's Empire, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 431
(1988).
91. Weisberg, supra note 43, at 234.
92. In Legal Process terms, the Charming Betsy canon, like a rule, presumably has purposes
and values that courts and advocates use when applying it in any given case. H. HART & A. SACKS,
supra note 78, at 166-67. As shown below, the opinion in Charming Betsy itself offers little or no
guidance in the effort to articulate these values. See infra Part III(A).
93. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a serious doubt
of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.
Id.; accord New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs,
402 U.S. 363, 368-70 (1971); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 26-27 (1968); Machinists v. Street,
367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
94. The courts" 'start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.'" Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator
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that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be construed narrowly;95 and, most important for current purposes, that statutes are to
be construed consistently with international law.
Each of these canons of accommodation maximizes the scope of operation for sources of law in potential friction with one another, or is
necessary to reconcile a norm in one legal order with norms of another
legal order. Each reflects the legitimacy of pluralism in the law-giving
institutions in our society and attempts to coordinate their interaction
in a pragmatic way, even though the level of apparent political commitment to these sources of law varies generally and from time to time.96
As a class of guidelines for selecting, interpreting, and enforcing
rules, the canons of accommodation should be distinguished from semantic canons of construction, which attempt to preserve meaning on
the basis of linguistic rules or practices,97 and from historical canons,
which attempt to reconstruct congressional intent. 98 Both semantic and
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). The Supreme Court's recent use of this canon of interpretation
indicates that federalism constrains the national government's power to preempt state functions
beyond the narrow conception of states' police powers recognized in Rice. See, e.g., Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 183-85 (1988) (addressing state workers' compensation laws);
Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 47-49 (1986) (upholding state conditions on probation); Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256-58 (1984) (refusing to preempt state remedies for victims of
nuclear accidents); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 220-23 (1983) (upholding state safety regulations for nuclear power plants).
95. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S. Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 568 (1986); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 174 (1949); Shaw v. Railroad Co., 101 U.S. 557, 565 (1879). See generally 2A J.
SUTHERLAND, supra note 34, § 53.02, at 344. The contemporary dominance of statutory law has
undermined the original force of this canon. See Isbrandtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783
(1952). But Professor Eskridge correctly states:
An updated version of the old meta-rule is that the common law can be used to fill in statutory gaps, unless it is inconsistent with the overall statutory policy. Additionally, the common
law is the source for a number of presumptions and clear statement rules that remain important to statutory interpretation, and in some cases common law background exerts a decisive
influence on statutory developments.
Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1051.
96. Professor Calabresi, for example, demonstrates the displacement of the common law by
statutes over time. See Calabresi, supra note 39. Similarly, scholars have traced the rise, fall, and
rise again of international concerns in domestic law. See supra note 27. Among these various
sources of rules, the Constitution is obviously supreme, see THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 468 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (stating that "where the will of the legislature, declared in its
statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought
to be governed by the latter rather than the former"), but the consequences of this axiom are
disputed, see Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of Statutory Interpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541
(1988) (criticizing the ideal of legislative supremacy under the Constitution).
97. Examples of these semantic canons would include the ordinary language rule, Nix v.
Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893), and the presumption against absurdity, Hepburn v. Griswold, 75
U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1869); see also J. HURST, supra note 53, at 57-59.
98. It is not uncommon for some canons to be used as indexes to legislative intent even when
there is no explicit reference to intent in the canon itself, as for example in the rebuttable presumption against implicit repeals. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468
(1982); Regional Rail Reorganization Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133-34 (1974); Posadas v. National City
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historical canons may seem especially vulnerable to the criticism that
they are radically indeterminate and incoherent because they presume
that statutes are static texts, invested with determinate meaning at the
canonical moment of passage."' A court that attempts to resurrect a
past understanding, therefore, encounters all the interpretive problems
associated with intentionalist interpretation. 100 In addition, the historical canons impute to Congress a level of knowledge or consciousness
that is unrealistic and post hoc.' 0 '
The accommodation canons seem less vulnerable to these objections. They do not attempt to reconstruct an understanding or intention from the history of a statute, and they do not involve the counterintuitive imputation of omniscience to Congress. Rather they offer only
a general and rebuttable presumption of a commitment to plural
sources of law, and the values they serve are relatively easy to articulate. For example, the canon requiring the courts to construe statutes to
preserve their constitutionality reduces the frictions inevitably associated with judicial review. 02 It preserves the appearance of legislative
supremacy without allowing a statute to rise above its constitutional
source. It avoids separation-of-powers disputes that ultimately could
undermine the courts' institutional power, and it maximizes flexibility
Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 503 (1936). The principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, (the expression of one is the exclusion of another), is similar. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442
U.S. 560, 571-72 (1979); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 188 (1978). The obligation to
construe remedial statutes broadly also may reflect assumptions about congressional intent. See,
e.g., Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Ass'n, 425 U.S. 1, 12 (1976). A final example
is the deference owed to the construction adopted by the expert administrative agency, on the
grounds either that the legislature, being presumptively aware of the agency's interpretation, did
nothing to alter it, e.g. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), or that the agency's intimate involvement
with the drafting of the legislation gave the agency an accurate perspective on congressional intent,
e.g. Hart & Miller Islands Area Envt'l Group, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 621 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1003 (1980).
At a sufficiently high level of abstraction, of course, virtually every canon of construction can
be portrayed as an index to intent. See 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 468 (13th ed.
1884) (stating that "the great object of the maxims of interpretation is to discover the true intention of the law"); see also SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350 (1943); Palma v.
Verdeyen, 676 F.2d 100 (4th Cir. 1982). This trait is also true of the Charming Betsy principle. See
Maier, Interest Balancing and ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,31 AM. J. COMp. L. 579, 593-94 (1983).
The question addressed in the text is whether the Charming Betsy canon serves some more defined and characteristic function than the vague supremacy of legislative intent.
99. R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 348.
100. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204
(1980).
101. Posner, supra note 56. Posner argues that the canon of construction under which courts
avoid ruling a statute unconstitutional does not presume legislative omniscience and therefore may
have greater validity. Although Posner does not mention Charming Betsy, the principle of that
case presumes congressional omniscience no more than does the constitutional canon. See infra
Part IV(C).
102. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 181 (1962).
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within broad and widely-shared notions of legitimacy. This set of values
and the canon'built upon it are hardly determinative,'"3 but if the principles and values approaches are persuasive, the legal culture is not limited to the choice between "determinative" and "irrelevant."
A similar justification applies to the maxim that federal statutes
should be interpreted to preserve state powers whenever possible. The
public value of federalism requires that the courts limit the preclusive
or preemptive effect of national legislation on traditional state functions. The fact that this canon can be overridden by a clear constitutional or statutory statement hardly undermines its significance. To the
contrary, that the courts should impose on Congress such a requirement
of explicit consciousness in an overall scheme of legislative supremacy is
plain evidence that the canon expresses values which act as a meaningful constraint on interpretation.
C.

Articulating the Public. Values of the Charming Betsy Canon

It is considerably more complex to articulate the consensus values
served by a canon of construction that directs the court to interpret
statutes consistently with international law whenever possible. In part,
the difficulty of defining a "public values" rationale for the Charming
Betsy principle is attributable to the perception that the principle has
played only a marginal and inconsistent role in the interpretation of
statutes. No orthodox justification has had the opportunity to evolve.
Even a fresh effort to define these public values encounters characteristic difficulty: the formulation of the values "inside" the Charming
Betsy principle seems to vary with the perceived role of domestic courts
in the international and constitutional orders. In particular, the public
values approach to Charming Betsy replicates the classical tension between the monist and the dualist paradigms of international law.
In a simple monist model, the values served by the Charming
Betsy canon of domestic statutory construction coincide with those
served by international law itself. In this view, domestic courts may be
conceptualized as "agents of the international order as well as constituent institutions of the national order."' 1 4 They apply international law,
like domestic law, whenever it is relevant. The monist model views the
Charming Betsy principle as an obligation to respect international
norms for their own sake and minimizes the role of the Congress or the
103. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). It seems tendentious to presume
the values and the canons rigorous in order to denounce their "delusive rigor." Posner, supra note
56, at 817.

104.

R. FALK,

(footnote omitted).

THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER

72 (1964)
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executive as a necessary incorporator of international norms. In other
words, the monistic supremacy of international law implies that the
norms operate without the mediation of a political branch. Moreover,
monism, because it recognizes a gradient of norms rather than the passfail system of dualism, arguably takes an expansive view of what constitutes relevant international law in the first place.
Monism offers a plausible if partial perspective on Charming
Betsy's disapproval of sub silentio violations of international law by
Congress. It is an established principle in both United States 0 5 and international'0 s jurisprudence that domestic statutes, even domestic constitutional provisions, cannot be a defense to a violation of international
law. A state's domestic law that breaches an international obligation
exposes that nation to international liability. The CharmingBetsy principle places the courts of the United States in a position of oversight to
avoid the possibility of international liability for the country as a whole.
Congress and the executive branch have a similar power, but the courts
are not excluded from the process. The courts scrutinize statutes to assure that violations of international law by legislation are not merely
implied or reckless. 10 7 The presumption of compliance reinforces the
general reluctance of the international legal system to impose liability
08
or responsibility for state acts that are unintended.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 3. As summarized by Secretary of State Bayard:
"It has been consistently maintained and also admitted by the Government of the United States
that a government cannot appeal to its municipal regulations as an answer to demands for the
fulfillment of international duties." 3 F. WHARTON, DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES 969 (2d ed. 1887).
106. See, e.g., Advisory Opinion on Treatment of Polish Nationals and Other Persons of Polish Origin or Speech in the Danzig Territory, 1932 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 44, at 23-25; Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27,
1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, art. 27 (1969), reprinted in 8 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 679 (1969)
[hereinafter Vienna Convention]; The Greco-Bulgarian Communities Case, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 17, at 4, 32; cf. Vienna Convention, supra, art. 46 (limiting the circumstances under which a
state may invalidate a treaty on the ground that its consent was expressed in violation of its internal law); J. MOORE, HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 653, 655 (1898) (discussing The Alabama Claims Arbitration).
107. The potential consequences of construing a statute to allow a violation of international
law have led other states to adopt an interpretive preference strongly reminiscent of the Charming
Betsy principle. See, e.g., Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-Television
Comm'n, 81 D.L.R.3d 609, 30-31 (Can. 1977). See generally Morganstern, Judicial Practice and
the Supremacy of InternationalLaw, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 42, 91 (1950) (recognizing that "[i]n
order to prevent violations of international law . . . courts have strained their powers to the utmost in refusing to recognize that a violation of international law was intended [by legislative
organs] unless such intention was expressed in the most unequivocal terms").
108. The purest statement of this traditional position is 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW:
A TREATISE 343 (H. Lauterpacht ed. 1954) (stating that "[an act of a State injurious to another
State is . . . not an international delinquency if committed neither willfully and maliciously nor
with culpable negligence"); see also B. CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW As APPLIED By INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 231 (1953) (noting that "the principle of fault and its corollary,

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

1990]

1129

The monist account of international law also fits well with the public values approach to statutory interpretation generally. As noted
above, that approach presupposes a variety of sources to which courts
can turn in search of principles to guide the interpretation of statutes.
It necessarily downplays the requirement that Congress explicitly recognize or incorporate those principles into statutory form: a principle
need not have received the explicit approval of Congress to be relevant
in the values-based interpretation of federal statutes. The monist view
of international law in domestic courts similarly denies that international conduct or emerging norms of law can be relevant only if recognized and adopted by Congress. As a result, in the monist view
"[i]nternational law, in particular, is a rich source of public values in
statutory interpretation, because its precepts are formulated slowly,
through a process of academic consensus and transnational debate."' 10 9
Is the Charming Betsy principle then a monist doctrine? By its
terms, that principle operates only "wherever possible," implying that
irreconcilable conflicts between statutes and international law are to be
resolved according to some other formula. This implication leaves the
irony that the strictly hierarchical notion of monism operates only interstitially and that in case of conflict the domestic law can prevail, a
result hardly consistent with monist tenets. Indeed, the Charming
Betsy principle is often twinned with doctrines that resist the monist
gloss altogether, such as the discretion of Congress to override preexisting treaties and customary law. 1" 0 Although, as shown below, it is inaccurate to reduce Charming Betsy to a restatement of this congressional
power of repudiation, monism standing alone cannot offer a complete
account of the values behind that interpretive principle or guide its
application.
In the dualist model, by contrast, the Charming Betsy principle is
the concept of vis major, are general principles of law governing the notion of responsibility in the
'very nature of law'[and that] their application in the international legal order is abundantly confirmed by international judicial practice"). Contra J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL
LAw 260 (1963).

The rhetoric of "fault" and "negligence" and "intent" may he obsolete in those pockets of
liability arising out of acts not prohibited by international law. See Akehurst, InternationalLiability for Injurious Consequences Arising out of Acts Not Prohibited by InternationalLaw, 16
NgrH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (1985); Handl, Liability as an Obligation Established by a Primary Rule of
International Law: Some Basic Reflections on the InternationalLaw Commission's Work, 16
NETH.

Y.B.

INT'L

L. 49 (1985).

109. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1027. Of course from the dualist perspective, the transnational origin of the law of nations is precisely what undermines its legitimacy even for the limited
purpose of statutory construction. Trimble, supra note 6 (arguing inter alia that customary international law is antimajoritarian and therefore has diminished constitutional status as law of the
United States).
110. See infra Part IV(A).
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not an expansive warrant for the application of international norms by
domestic courts, but a restrictive and prophylactic doctrine protecting
the separation of powers. In this view, the admonition to read statutes
conformably with international law assures that the United States is
not compromised or embarrassed in its foreign relations. Dualism views
narrowly the process by which international norms become authoritative in the United States,1 11 and the impact of the Charming Betsy
principle is accordingly more modest. In essence, the public value of
dualism is respect for Congress rather than for international law.
The Supreme Court articulated the dualist rationale late in the history of that principle, and even then, the Court's reference to Charming
Betsy appears on its face to be a miscitation. In NLRB v. Catholic
Bishop of Chicago,"2 a case utterly without international dimension,
the Court faced the issue whether Congress intended the National Labor Relations Board to have jurisdiction over teachers in church-operated schools. A narrow majority concluded that it did not, in part on
the ground that the opposite conclusion would raise serious constitutional problems under the free exercise clause of the first amendment.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger noted: "In a
number of cases the Court has heeded the essence of Mr. Chief Justice
Marshall's admonition in Murray v. The Charming Betsy, by holding
that an Act of Congress ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution if any other possible construction remains available."' 113 The
Charming Betsy principle was thus viewed in "essence" as a constitutional matter, rather than as an injunction to reconcile two non- or
quasi-constitutional orders of law: statutes and the law of nations. This
use of the Charming Betsy principle is seriously flawed," 4 not least be111. See supra note 7.
112. 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
113. Id. at 500 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
114. As an example of the revisionist gloss of constitutionalism, Chief Justice Warren Burger
offered McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10 (1963), a modern
incarnation of the Charming Betsy principle. In McCulloch, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Board did not have jurisdiction over the maritime operations of foreign vessels
own d by foreign subsidiaries of a United States corporation. Id. According to the majority in
Catholic Bishop:
[T]he Court [in McCulloch] declined to read the National Labor Relations Act so as to give
rise to a serious question of separation of powers which in turn would have implicated sensitive issues of the authority of the Executive over relations with foreign nations. The international implications of the case led the Court to describe it as involving "public questions
particularly high in the scale of our national interest." Because of those questions the Court
held that before sanctioning the Board's exercise of jurisdiction "there must be present the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed."
Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 500 (quoting McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 17, 21-22).
Contrary to the majority's suggestion in Catholic Bishop, McCulloch is doubtful support for
the revisionist view of Charming Betsy as a constitutional case. McCulloch involved the applica-
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cause Charming Betsy itself is silent on such issues as constitutional
rights, federalism, justiciability, the separation of powers, and any other
explicitly constitutional matter. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of Catholic Bishop, academicians115 and courts" 6 commonly have cited Charming Betsy as a directive to avoid constitutional issues.
Flawed as that use may be, it is possible to construct a post hoc
rationale for Charming Betsy as a prophylactic protection of the separation of powers in foreign affairs, a view that has received fresh support from the Supreme Court. In Weinberger v. Rossi," 7 in the course
of describing its work in McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros
de Honduras,"' the Court noted that the Charming Betsy principle
tion of a statutory regime in a transnational setting, and the Court found international principles
of maritime comity controlling in the absence of a clearly expressed intent by Congress to override
them. The issue was the narrow one of intent, not power; all parties conceded the ability of Congress to depart expressly from international norms. Finding no evidence of an intent to apply the
statute to disputes between foreign shipowners and foreign crews, the Court followed the international principle. It does not follow that courts are to avoid first amendment issues arising under
the same statute in a wholly domestic setting as in Catholic Bishop. The legislative history recited
in McCulloch is irrelevant to the intent of Congress to extend the National Labor Relations Act to
teachers, who are not aliens, in domestic, religiously-affiliated schools. Even if such an intent were
discerned, the power of Congress to preclude the adjudication of all claims under the free exercise
clause in all federal courts is doubtful. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPRIO & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 379-87 (3d ed. 1988); Hart,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdictionof Federal Courts:An Exercise in Dialectic, 66
HARv. L. REV. 1362 (1953). Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872) and
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948) with Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506 (1869) and Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The Court's analogy between
constitutional and international norms of comity must fail as a result.
115. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1021 n.42; Estreicher & Revesz, Nonacquiescence
by FederalAdministrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 760 n.357 (1989); Goldstein, The Failure of
ConstitutionalControls over War Powers in the Nuclear Age: The Argument for a Constitutional
Amendment, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1543, 1554 n.60 (1988); Note, Church-Affiliated Universities and
Labor Board Jurisdiction:An Unholy Union Between Church and State?, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
558, 570 n.62 (1988); Comment, ConstitutionalLaw-Universidad Central de Bayamon v. National
Labor Relations Board, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 255, 256 n.11 (1987).
116. See, e.g., DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988); Alexander v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 766 F.2d 630, 643 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v.
Pappas, 613 F.2d 324, 329 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1083 (3d Cir.
1979) (en bane), aff'd, 447 U.S. 10 (1980); Federal Election Comm'n v. Sailors' Union of the Pac.
Political Fund, 624 F. Supp. 492, 496 (N.D. Cal. 1986), af'd, 828 F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1987).
During the same term in which the Court decided Catholic Bishop, Justice John Paul Stevens
cited Charming Betsy and McCulloch as evidence of a "tradition of interpreting statutes to avoid
constitutional issues." Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 265 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
Even if Charming Betsy were reconceived as a separation of powers case in foreign affairs, this
result is not what most courts have in mind when they cite that case as authority for avoiding
unconstitutional constructions of statutes. None of the decisions that avoid a statute's unconstitutionality on the strength of the Charming Betsy principle involves the separation of powers in
international affairs.
117. 456 U.S. 25 (1982).
118. 372 U.S. 10 (1963). For a detailed discussion of the McCulloch case, see infra notes 171-
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"was applied to avoid construing the National Labor Relations Act in a
manner contrary to State Department regulations, for such a construction would have had foreign policy ,implications." 119 In other words, a
contrary interpretation of the statute in McCulloch would have violated
the maxim that the United States must "speak with one voice" in matters of foreign relations. Under the one voice maxim, the courts will not
presume to revisit political decisions taken by the executive branch or
articulate principles of international law that might place the United
States in breach of its international obligations or embarrass the conduct of its diplomacy. Under the dualist gloss, the Charming Betsy
principle presumptively tilts every question of statutory interpretation
away from any such possibility: courts presume that Congress and the
executive branch do not violate international law sub silentio because
any other presumption might usurp a nonjudicial function. 1 0
Does this presumption mean that the Charming Betsy principle is
a dualist doctrine? The Weinberger decision suggests that it is not, for
the Court did not rest the analysis of McCulloch solely on considerations of the separation of powers. Instead it declared: "The McCulloch
court also relied on the fact that the proposed construction would have
been contrary to a 'well-established rule of international law.' ,,"2 The

Court did not explain the significance of this observation, but it clearly
distinguished two separate, reinforcing rationales for the result in McCulloch: the prospect of embarrassing the executive branch and the independent prospect of giving inadequate respect to international
norms. Under Weinberger, the weight to be given international law in
the interpretation of domestic statutes is not a simple function of the
separation of powers.
It could hardly be otherwise. Although the embarrassment rationale is a strong theme in the domestic resolution of many issues arising
74 and accompanying text.
119. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32.
120. See Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such
decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people
whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary
has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in
the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.
Id. at 111; see also Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (referring to the "classical deference
[owed by the judiciary] to the political branches in matters of foreign policy"). For a critique of the
one-voice maxim, see Steinhardt, Human Rights Litigation and the "One-Voice" Orthodoxy in
ForeignAffairs, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND DOMESTIC COURTS (Gibney ed. forthcoming
1990).
121. Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32 (emphasis added) (quoting McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 17).
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under international law,122 it is far from determinative in all of them.
Especially outside the disputed range of the president's war powers, 23
the courts never have relinquished the authority to interpret and apply
international law, in spite of the potential chaos that their pronouncements might cause. Recent judicial decisions on the merits have overridden the deference urged by the executive branch and its academic
25
apologists 2 4 in such sensitive matters as the protection of diplomats,'

bilateral aviation relations, 26 asylum determinations, 27 and commercial-strategic relationships with a NATO ally.

28

With respect to jus-

ticiability, the separation of powers in foreign affairs plainly does not
require a blanket rule of abstention.'29
These decisions deny that the interpretation of international law is
so inherently political as to require deference to the executive's most
recent pronouncement on an issue. In a clear display of the courts' common-law powers, 130 these decisions distinguish between "the application
122. Cases challenging foreign policy, for example, are generally nonjusticiable. See, e.g.,
Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding nonjusticiable
claims against the United States for property damage caused by its mining of Nicaraguan harbors),
aff'd mem., 819 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988); cf. Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (holding justiciable claims for damages and injunctive relief against the United States for the expropriation of land in Honduras for
the training of Nicaraguan resistance fighters), vacated, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985). In matters of treaty
interpretation, the executive's submissions also are entitled to great weight. See Sumitomo Shoji
Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982). And in recognition and boundary cases, the
courts generally do not depart from the executive's position. See United States v. Pink, 315 U.S.
203 (1942); Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852); cf. Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,
335 U.S. 377, 380 (1948) (noting that the recognition "that the determination of sovereignty over
an area is for the legislative and executive departments does not debar courts from examining the
status resulting from prior action").
123. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L. REv.
1379 (1988); Glennon, Two Views of PresidentialForeignAffairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5 (1988) (outlining contrasting models of executive and congressional powers in foreign relations).
124. See, e.g., Weisburd, The Executive Branch and InternationalLaw, 41 VAND. L. REV.
1205 (1988).
125. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (holding unconstitutional the statute implementing
convention for the protection of diplomats).
126. Wardair Can. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (upholding state tax on
aviation fuel bought in-state by foreign-based carrier in spite of United States government's representation that foreign relations would be compromised).
127. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (rejecting the government's interpretation
of an asylum applicant's burden of proof under refugee convention).
128. Rainbow Navigation Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, 699 F. Supp. 339 (D.D.C. 1988) (rejecting
government procurement practices and interpretation of governing treaty).
129. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1961). Compare Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
996 (1979) and Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) with Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
130. See infra Part IV(C).
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of law" and "the exercise of judgment" in international affairs,' requiring abstention or deference only when the latter is at issue. The
embarrassment rationale of the Charming Betsy principle, therefore,
must be broad enough to favor the adjudication of those cases in which
not applying or recognizing international law would be an embarrassing
violation of the separation of powers. A simple-minded dualism then is
also unlikely to provide an adequate guide for the application of the
Charming Betsy principle.
In summary, the public values approach to legislative interpretation generally applies well to certain types of interpretive canons, in
particular those canons that preserve scope for multiple sources of law.
Second, the monist and dualist paradigms separately offer powerful but
partial rationales for the Charming Betsy principle. In other words,
that principle is essentially bivalent: international law must be observed, and the United States must not be embarrassed in its foreign
affairs, suggesting the application of international law when that is tenable and the repudiation of such norms when that is inescapable. This
formulation offers some preliminary guidance to a court faced with a
claim that an international norm is relevant to the interpretation of a
domestic statute. First, the court should assess the meaning and status
of the putative norm using the traditional evidentiary standards for determining custom and the scope of an agreement. Strict dualism downplays this inquiry to the extent that it focuses on the freedom of
Congress to ignore international law and the impropriety of judicial interference with that power. Second, if the international norm is relevant
and nothing in the statute explicitly repudiates it, or if an inconsistency
between the norm and the statute can be resolved, the court should
adopt the interpretation that preserves maximum scope for both.
Third, if the conflict between the norm and the statute is unavoidable
and irreducible, the court should refer to the supremacy axioms, such as
the latter-in-time rule, and the doctrines of justiciability to resolve the
conflict. Strict monism downplays this possibility, because it conceives
international law as normatively superior to domestic law. This Article
next will show the historical interrelationship between these two rationales and suggest how they may work as international law changes
shape.
131. The distinction between these terms is expressed in Smith v. Reagan, 844 F.2d 195, 200
(4th Cir. 1988). The distinction is of more pragmatic than academic value. See Gordon, New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 281 (D. Kairys ed.
1982) (criticizing the distinction between law and politics).
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CHARMING BETSY. TOWARD THE SUBSTANTIVE USE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN DOMESTIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

III.

Cases about interpretation are subject to interpretation themselves,
and it is possible to discern distinct phases in the domestic courts' understanding of CharmingBetsy. As shown below, courts commonly cite
the case in disputes about the extraterritorial reach of domestic statutes, invoking the international norms of abstention or comity. The recent treatment of CharmingBetsy, however, suggests a more expansive
concept of relevant international standards. The substantive use of international, nonjurisdictional norms in the interpretation of statutes,
though rediscovered by the Supreme Court in the last decade, is inherent in Chief Justice Marshall's original disposition of Charming Betsy
in 1804. The case rewards a careful reading.
A.

Origins and Evolution

Though now perceived as a fountainhead, the opinion in Murray v.
The Schooner Charming Betsy'31 is surprisingly silent about the origin
of the principle that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains. ' 133

Arguably, such a demonstration would not have been necessary, 4 but
the Supreme Court's discussion of the applicable international standards in Charming Betsy remains only rudimentary and implicit. The
Court does not explain why international law should be given weight in
the first place." 5
The case arose under a federal nonintercourse statute, enacted in
1800, that prohibited all commercial transactions "between any person
or persons resident within the United States or under their protection,
and any person or persons resident within the territories of the French
132. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804).
133. Id. at 118.
134. See Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the NationalLaw of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952).
[T]he Constitution was framed in firm reliance upon the premise, frequently articulated, that
...the Law of Nations in all its aspects familiar to men of learning in the eighteenth century
was accepted by the framers, expressly or implicitly, as a constituent part of the national law
of the United States.
Id. at 55-56. Professor Lobel has outlined the intellectual origins of the Framers' placement of
international law within the constitutional framework, but the evidence is general and does not
address directly the interpretive setting of the Charming Betsy principle. Lobel, supra note 3, at
1088.
135. Such a discussion would have required the Court to address what Professor Maier has
called the "authoritative" as distinct from the "substantive" sources of customary law. Maier, The
Authoritative Sources of Customary InternationalLaw in the United States, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L.
450 (1989). Such a discussion might have seemed unnecessary, however, to eighteenth-century jurists. See supra note 134.
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Republic, or any of the dependencies thereof." 136 Vessels used in trade
between the United States and France were subject to forfeiture,
seizure, and condemnation under the statute. 137 These provisions were
supplemented by presidential instruction that directed United States
naval commanders to take a broad view of the statute. 3 '
In July 1800 Captain Alexander Murray of the United States frigate Constellation seized a ship in the Caribbean that appeared to violate the statute. His investigation revealed that the vessel had been
owned by citizens of the United States and, in April 1800, had sailed
with a cargo of flour from Baltimore. After the cargo had been discharged in St. Bartholomews, the vessel had sailed to St. Thomas,
where it was sold to one Jared Shattuck, who cleared the ship out as a
Danish vessel bound for Guadaloupe, a French dependency. 89 En route,
the Charming Betsy was seized as prize by French privateers, and soon
thereafter, Captain Murray recaptured the vessel on the ground either
that it was being operated by a United States citizen within the scope
of the Nonintercourse Acts or that its sale had been a ruse to evade the
law. Murray sold the cargo in Martinique and brought the vessel into
Philadelphia, where it was libelled by the Danish consul as the property
of a Danish subject.
The judge for the district of Pennsylvania declared the seizure illegal and directed that the vessel be restored to its owners with compensation for damages sustained. On appeal the circuit court sustained only
so much of the decree as directed the "restitution of the vessel, and
payment to the claimant, of the net proceeds of the sale of the cargo in
136. Act of February 27th, 1800, 2 Stat. 7, 8. This legislation was one of a series of war
measures designed to fight a limited war against France on the high seas. 6 ANNALs OF CONG. 50-62,
524-25, 527-32, 557-58 (1800).
137. The act provided in part that "[a]ny ship or vessel, owned, hired, or employed wholly or
in part by any person or persons resident within the United States, or any citizen or citizens
thereof resident elsewhere . . . shall be wholly forfeited, and may be seized and condemned." 2

Stat. 7-8.
138. The presidential instruction read as follows:
"[Y]ou are not only to do all that in you lies, to prevent all intercourse whether direct or
circuitous, between the ports of the United States, and those of France and her dependencies, in cases where the vessels or cargoes are apparently, as well as really American, and
protected by American papers only, but you are to be vigilant that vessels or cargoes really
American, but covered by Danish or other foreign papers, and bound to or from French ports,
do not escape you."
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 78-79 (emphasis in original). In a remark with startling
contemporary relevance to the debate over executive prerogative in the litigation of private rights,
Justice Samuel Chase opposed the reading of these executive instructions "because if they go no
further than the law, they are unnecessary; if they exceed it, they are not warranted." Id. at 78; see
also Presser & Hurley, Saving God's Republic: The Jurisprudenceof Samuel Chase, 1984 U. ILL
L. REv. 771, 796 (1984).
139. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 69.
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Martinique, deducting the costs and charges there, according to the account exhibited by captain Murray's agent.

' 140

Both parties appealed

to the Supreme Court. There, Murray argued that the vessel and its
cargo were fully confiscable under the laws of the United States. In the
course of addressing this argument, the Court articulated the principle
of construction quoted above, noting in addition that an act of Congress
"consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights, or to
affect neutral commerce, further than is warranted by the law of na1' 4 1

tions as understood in this country.

With this general canon in mind, the Court turned to the
Nonintercourse Act, noting that it covered both persons resident within
the United States or under its protection, and vessels owned, hired, or
employed by United States residents or United States citizens residing
elsewhere. The applicability of the Nonintercourse Act thus turned on
the residence and citizenship of Shattuck, the owner of the vessel at the
time of the seizure, and on whether he was "under [the] protection [of
the United States].' 42 Shattuck had been born in the United States
but had moved to St. Thomas in 1789 or 1790, suggesting the possibility
that he never had been a United States citizen under the Constitution.
Shattuck maintained his domicile at St. Thomas for a decade, had become a Danish burgher, and had sworn allegiance to the King of Denmark.1 43 On this basis, and applying international standards, the
Supreme Court reasoned:
He is not a person under the protection of the United States. The American citizen who goes into a foreign country, although he owes local and temporary allegiance to that country, is yet, if he performs no other act changing his condition,
entitled to the protection of his own government; and if, without the violation of
any municipal law, he should be oppressed unjustly, he would have a right to claim
that protection, and the interposition of the American government in his favor
would be considered as a justifiable interposition. 14

The Court then contrasted these circumstances, in which diplomatic
protection was proper, with Shattuck's position:
But his situation is completely changed, where by his own act he has made himself
the subject of a foreign power. Although this act may not be sufficient to rescue
him from punishment for any crime committed against the United States, a point
not intended to be decided, yet ... [his own act] certainly places him out of the
protection of the United States while within the territory of the sovereign to whom
he has
sworn allegiance, and consequently takes him out of the description of the
4" 5
act.
140. Id. at 70 (emphasis in original).
141. Id. at 118.
142. See supra note 136.

143. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 65.
144. Id. at 120-21 (emphasis in original).
145. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Finally after this minimalist discussion, the Court stated its
holding:
It is therefore the opinion of the court, that the Charming Betsy, with her
cargo, being at the time of her recapture the bona fide property of a Danish
burgher, is not forfeitable, in consequence of her being employed in carrying on
trade and commerce with a French island.14

The submissions and argumentation in the case demonstrate that
the parties viewed the relevance of the law of nations more expansively
than is suggested by this conclusory reference of the Court. 147 The opinion reveals no explicit consideration or assessment of the law of nations
standards governing admiralty, neutrality, or nationality, each of which
had been argued in some detail.148 Nor does it resolve the issue of construction by reference to the principles collected today under the rubric
of comity 149 or jurisdiction to prescribe. 150 Although avoiding a diplomatic controversy with Denmark and other neutral states may have influenced the Court's disposition, the reasoning on its face is instead an
early statement of general principles governing state responsibility for
the treatment of aliens as a guideline for interpreting the statutory
formula of a person "under [the] protection [of the United States]."
Only if the person as a matter of international law were within the diplomatic protection of the United States, would he or she be subject to
the Nonintercourse Act.
Thus, international law was not invoked in the opinion to resolve a
conflict of laws among sovereign states, nor was it used generally to delimit the United States' jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of nationality, nor even to incorporate international notions of comity into
federal common law. Other contemporary opinions of the Court did
these things explicitly.' 51 The unique aspect of Charming Betsy is its
146. Id. (emphasis in original)
147. The parties clearly had argued several international issues. See id. at 71, 93 (the right of
individuals to expatriate themselves); id. at 70-72, 80 (the limits on the right to search and seize
neutral shipping under the laws of war); id. at 73-75, 76-77 (the authority to recapture prize from
an enemy); id. at 85-86, 97 (the sufficiency of "purchased" nationality); id. at 87, 95 (the applicability of the norms governing salvage). Counsel for Murray argued in part that "Captain Murray's
authority ... was derived not only from our municipal law, and his instructions [from the president]; but from the law of nations." Id. at 80.
148. The Supreme Court was familiar with these topics, as its contemporaneous decisions
make clear. See, e.g., The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815); Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 1 (1801); Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 229 (1796).
149. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
150. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, §§ 401-404. Nothing in the Restatement addresses
which jurisdiction to prescribe on the basis of international standards of diplomatic protection or
the rights of neutrals.
151. United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818), is a clearer contemporary example of the Court's interpretation of a statute in light of international jurisdictionalprinciples. The
Court addressed a 1790 law, 1 Stat. 115, that punished certain acts committed on the high seas by
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reference to an international doctrine-diplomatic protection-to determine the application of a statute, the object of which-a selective
embargo-was unrelated to the doctrine itself.15 2 That Congress would
not have violated the norms of diplomatic protection sub silentio was
sufficient to justify the Court's determination of the intended scope of
the regulation.
Subsequent citations to Charming Betsy do not invariably clarify
the role of international law in construing domestic statutes; indeed,
most references focus on features of the decision other than the interpretive principle. 15 The case is cited variously for the proposition that
citizens have a natural right to expatriate themselves; 5 4 that admiralty
courts of the United States have in personam as well as in rem jurisdiction over maritime torts;' 55 that the Nonintercourse Act was not intended to prohibit the sale of United States vessels to neutral foreigners
or to apply to such vessels after a bona fide sale and transfer to a foreigner. 56 Other decisions refer to Charming Betsy as establishing a rule
of damages in maritime cases, 1 57 and scattered cases follow Charming
"any person or persons." Chief Justice John Marshall observed that this phrase was "broad enough
to comprehend every human being" but concluded that the statutory language "must not only be
limited to cases within the jurisdiction of the state, but also to those objects to which the legislature intended to apply them." Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631. The statute, therefore, could not
apply to a person committing the proscribed acts on a foreign ship while on the high seas.
152. That is, the applicability of the Nonintercourse Act was determined by reference to the
standards under international law for state-to-state claims, and these norms were quite distinct
from the embargo that was the point of the statute.
153. See, e.g., The Mary and Susan, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 25, 54-55 (1816) (holding that "shipments made by merchants, actually domiciled in the enemy's country at the breaking out of a war,
partake of the nature of enemy trade, and, as such, are subject to belligerent capture"). Charming
Betsy was distinguished because it discussed the application of the Nonintercourse Acts and not
the capture of a belligerent vessel. Id. at 55 n.2; accord The Frances, 9 F. Cas. 673 (D.R.I. 1813)
(No. 5034), aff'd, 12 U.S. (8Cranch) 363 (1814); cf. Rogers v. The Amado, 20 F. Cas. 1107, 1110
(E.D. La. 1847) (No. 12,005) (citing CharmingBetsy for the proposition that "a citizen residing in
a foreign country might acquire the commercial privileges attached to his domicile, and thus be
exempt from the operation of a law of his original country restraining commerce with another
foreign country").
154. See Savorguan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491, 497 (1950) (stating that "[t]raditionally
the United States has supported the right of expatriation as a natural and inherent ight of all
people"); see also Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 F. 556, 558-59 (E.D. La. 1893); Right of Expatriation, 8
Op. Att'y Gen. 139, 153-55, 167-69 (1856). The Charming Betsy court specifically had reserved
opinion on this issue. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 120; cf. United States v. Wong Kim
Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 658 (1898) (declaring that Charming Betsy reflects the assumption prior to the
fourteenth amendment "that all persons born in the United States were citizens of the United
States").
155. Mauro v. Almeida, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 473, 486 (1825).
156. Sands v. Knox, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 499, 502 (1806); Maley v. Shattuck, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch)
458, 483-85 (1806).
157. The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1881); Conard v. The Pac. Ins. Co., 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 110, 262,
274 (1832); The Mary J. Vaughn, 16 F. Cas. 991, 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1867) (No. 9217), aff'd, 81 U.S. (14
Wall.) 258 (1871); The Lively, 15 F. Cas. 631, 633-34 (D. Mass. 1812) (No. 8403); see also 3 Op.
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Betsy in consulting treaties and the practice of states in determining
the law of prize."' 8
The significance of Charming Betsy and its interpretive mandate
became clearer, however, as the international clash of statutes increased
and the international choice of law became a more pressing concern. In
a critical line of Supreme Court decisions, especially after World War
II, CharmingBetsy assumed a largely jurisdictional cast. In these cases,
the legitimate reach of a domestic statute was determined at least partially by reference to international notions of comity or jurisdiction, a
reference made legitimate by citation to Charming Betsy itself."' 9 Justice George Sutherland, for example, cited the case when he opposed
the Court's conclusion that the prohibition laws applied to foreign
steamship companies operating between foreign and United States
ports.1 "' In his dissenting opinion, Justice Sutherland noted:
The general rule of international law is that a foreign ship is so far identified with
the country to which it belongs that its internal affairs, whose effect is confined to
the ship, ordinarily are not subjected to interference at the hands of another state

Att'y Gen. 216, 220 (1837).
The case also was cited as establishing the proper procedure for determining damages. The
amount of damages was determined by the clerk of the court with the assistance of "two intelligent
merchants." See The Galatea, 9 F. Cas. 1073, 1075 (S.D.N.Y. 1872) (No. 5185) (citing Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 69).
158. See, e.g., The Panama, 176 U.S. 535 (1900) (finding no general exemption for mail ships
under the international law of prize); The Pizarro, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 227 (1817) (recognizing that
neither treaty nor state practice erects a per se rule of condemnation for the spoliation of papers);
Burke v. Trevitt, 4 F. Cas. 746, 748 n.4 (D. Mass. 1816) (No. 2163) (noting that the effect of
probable cause as a protection from damages depends on whether the seizure is on land or the high
seas).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Hensel, 699 F.2d 18 (1st Cir.) (upholding the legitimacy,
under statute, of searches by United States officials of foreign-flag vessels on the high seas), cert.
denied, 461 U.S. 958 (1983); FTC v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (upholding the enforceability of investigatory subpoena served by registered mail
upon alien corporation); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 n.32
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (recognizing the extraterritorial applicability of United States antitrust law), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); National Maritime Union of Am. v. NLRB, 267 F. Supp. 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1967) (recognizing the extraterritorial applicability of United States labor law).
The principle that statutes should be construed consistently with international law has not
automatically triggered a citation to Charming Betsy. See, e.g., MacLeod v. United States, 229
U.S. 416 (1913).
The statute should be construed in the light of the purpose of the Government to act within
the limitation of the principles of international law, the observance of which is so essential to
the peace and harmony of nations, and it should not be assumed that Congress proposed to
violate the obligations of this country to other nations, which it was the manifest purpose of
the President to scrupulously observe and which were founded upon the principles of international law.
Id. at 434. References to the Charming Betsy principle, therefore, are not equivalent to references
to Charming Betsy.
160. Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 132 (1923) (Sutherland, J., dissenting).
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in whose ports it is temporarily present." '

CharmingBetsy in his view obliged the Court to interpret the reach of
the act in light of this international principle.
That approach ultimately prevailed in a series of cases denying the
applicability of various domestic statutes to foreign seamen. In Lauritzen v. Larsen,6 2 for example, the Court addressed the issue whether
the Jones Act, sa which provided a cause of action in United States
courts for "any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of
his employment,' 6 4 applied to a Danish seaman who had been hired in
the United States and negligently injured on a Danish vessel in Cuban
waters. The Court viewed the issue as a "simpl[e]. .. problem of statutory construction rather commonplace in a federal system by which
courts often have to decide whether 'any' or 'every' reaches to the limits
of the enacting authority's usual scope or is to be applied to foreign
events or transactions."' 5 Reversing the decisions of the lower courts,
the Supreme Court held the Jones Act inapplicable, resting its result on
traditional criteria for resolving conflicts of jurisdiction among sovereigns: "By usage as old as the Nation, [shipping laws of the United
States written in. all-inclusive general terms] have been construed to apply only to areas and transactions in which American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law.'1 6 In
giving content to these "prevalent doctrines," the Court recognized the
existence of
a non-national or international maritime law of impressive maturity and universality. It has the force of law, not from extraterritorial reach of national laws, nor from
abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation, but from acceptance by common

consent of civilized communities
of rules designed to foster amicable and workable
16
commercial relations.

7

The Court went on to articulate the factors that inform the decision to
161. Id. (citations omitted).
162. 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
163. Jones Act, ch. 250, § 20, 41 Stat. 988, 1007 (1920) (codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §
688 (1982)). Enacted in 1920, the Jones Act provides a cause of action for any seaman who suffers
personal injury during the course of his or her employment. The cause of action sounds in negligence and may be maintained against the seaman's employer. In the event of death, the seaman's
personal representative has a statutory cause of action for wrongful death, including survival damages. In addition to suit for personal injury, the plaintiff may sue and recover damages for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure under general maritime law. The Jones Act also
preserves the option for the plaintiff to sue in federal admiralty jurisdiction or at law with the
right of trial by jury in either state or federal court. See N. HEALY & D. SHARPE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMIRALTY

164.
165.
166,
167.

456 (2d ed. 1986); T. SCHOENBAUM,

ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW

Jones Act, supra note 163, § 20, 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1982).
Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 578-79 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 581-82 (footnote omitted).

§ 5-6 (1987).
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apply domestic statutes in these circumstances, ever mindful "of the
necessity for mutual forbearance if retaliations are to be avoided."16
The Court subsequently described these factors governing the choice of
law in maritime torts as "'the relevant interests of foreign nations in
the regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern
of the international community.' "1169 In Lauritzen these "interests"
weigh against the application of the Jones Act on the facts presented; if
1 0
the facts of the case changed, that result would change. 7
In Lauritzen, as in Charming Betsy, the Court's interpretation of
international norms essentially truncated the applicability of domestic
statutes that had been couched in broad terms. In this respect, Lauritzen represents a now common approach, as shown by McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras.7 1 In McCulloch the Court
similarly held that the jurisdictional provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act do not extend to the maritime operations of foreign-flag
ships, legally owned by foreign subsidiaries of a United States corporation, which employ alien seamen, who are represented by a foreign
union. Here, too, the Court noted the "well-established rule of international law that the law of the flag state ordinarily governs the internal
affairs of a ship"' 2 and concluded that the National Labor Relations
Board was without jurisdiction to order an election under the circumstances. Explicitly recognizing the gravitational force173 of the Charming Betsy principle, the Court declared that any other result would
"arouse[] vigorous protests from foreign governments and create[] in'7 4
ternational problems for our government.'
Lower federal courts frequently have followed this doctrinal path.
On the strength of Charming Betsy, courts have assumed that Con168. Id. at 582. These factors were articulated as: the place of the wrongful act; the law of the
flag; allegiance or domicile of the injured; allegiance of the defendant shipowner; place of contract;
inaccessibility of foreign forum; and the law of the forum. Id. at 583-92.
169. Hellenic Lines Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306, 312 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Romero v. International Terminal Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1959)).
170. In HellenicLines, for example, a Greek seamen employed on a Greek-owned and Greekflag vessel was allowed to recover under the Jones Act, in light of the shipowner's "substantial and
continuing" contacts with the United States. Hellenic Lines, 398 U.S. at 310. These contacts distinguished Hellenic Lines from Lauritzen and demonstrated the fact-dependence of the Lauritzen
criteria. Charming Betsy, not surprisingly, appears only in the dissent. Id. at 313 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
171. 372 U.S. 10 (1963).
172. Id. at 21 (citations omitted).
173. The gravitational force metaphor appears in R. DWORKIN, supra note 46, at 112, and in

G.

CALABRESI,

supra note 39, at 129.

174. McCulloch, 372 U.S. at 17; accord Windward Shipping v. American Radio Ass'n, 415
U.S. 104, 110 (1974) (stating the Court's "reluctance to intrude domestic labor law willy-nilly into
the complex of considerations affecting foreign trade, absent a clear congressional mandate to do
SO").
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gress, in enacting the Marijuana on the High Seas Act" 5 and the smuggling statutes," 6 intended to limit its exercise of the power to define
and punish felonies committed on the high seas in conformity with the
international law of jurisdiction. 177 Other decisions have made it clear
that, in the absence of congressional override, the executive's investigatory powers are limited by international norms governing jurisdiction to
enforce.17 8 Moreover, courts have held that subject matter jurisdiction
under various regulatory statutes reflects the international principles of
comity protected in Charming Betsy, subject again to explicit congressional expansion. 1 9 In these cases, comity generally though not invariably' 80 has required that domestic legislation not apply.
B.

Charming Betsy As a JurisdictionalImperative

Taken together, the results in these cases suggest that the Charming Betsy principle operates as a doctrine of diffidence in conflicts
cases. In operation, it simply limits the application of domestic statutes
in extraterritorial concerns. Both Lauritzen and McCulloch, for example, followed a principle of accommodation as a rationale for not apply175. Pub. L. No. 96-350, 94 Stat. 1159 (1980) (current version at 46 U.S.C. appendix §
1903(a) (Supp. IV 1986)).
176. Id. at 1159-60, 46 U.S.C. appendix § 1903(a)(d).
177. See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 843 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1988) (smuggling statutes);
United States v. Marino-Garcia, 679 F.2d 1373 (11th Cir. 1982) (smuggling statutes), cert. denied
sub noma. Pauth-Arzusa v. United States, 459 U.S. 1114 (1983); United States v. James-Robinson,
515 F. Supp. 1340 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (Marijuana on the High Seas Act).
178. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Nahas, 738 F.2d 487, 493-94 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction under the Commodity Exchange
Act, 7 U.S.C. § 15 (1982), to enforce an investigatory subpoena served by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission upon a foreign citizen in a foreign nation); FTC v. Compagnie de SaintGobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1304, 1323 n.130 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding the FTC to be
without jurisdiction to enforce an investigatory subpoena served upon a French corporation by
registered mail).
179. See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814 n.32 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (evaluating the extraterritorial application of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 17 (1988)), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969); United States v. Firestone Tire & Rubber 'Co., 518 F.
Supp. 1021, 1032 n.9 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (assessing the extraterritorial effect of regulations pursuant
to the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 337); National Maritime Union of Am. v. NLRB, 267 F.
Supp. 117, 120 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (discussing the extraterritorial reach of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
180. See, e.g., Pacific Seafarers, 404 F.2d at 804 (considering comity to support the applicability of the Sherman Act). The comity respecting treaty obligations also may be insufficient to
override domestic law. See Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 484 U.S. 694 (1988)
(holding the Hague Service Convention inapplicable when a domestic subsidiary of a foreign parent is served as its agent); Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522 (1987) (limiting the Hague Evidence Convention to define the optional, but not exclusive, means of obtaining foreign evidence from litigant within the United States court's
jurisdiction).
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ing the forum's substantive rule of decision or statutory provision.18 1 In
this application of essentially jurisdictional norms, CharmingBetsy and
its progeny might be viewed as providing a specialized rationale for the
rebuttable presumption that all legislation is territorial,18 2 and not as
offering an affirmative warrant for applying more substantive international standards in the construction of domestic statutes. So conceived,
Charming Betsy would amount only to an innocuous endorsement of
13
international comity in all its breadth and apparent indeterminacy.
In this interpretation, however, there are layers of irony. First, the
Court's analysis in Charming Betsy actually had little to do with comity, if that term is given its modern connotation as a prudential or voluntary restraint on a power that is established at law. Second, comity,
far from being an expression of international legal principle, has been
characterized repeatedly in the twentieth century as distinctly not law
and therefore presumably not a proper application of the Charming
Betsy principle. Finally, the Supreme Court's most recent application
of that principle demonstrates that it need not operate as a consideration in the choice of law at all, much less as a counterweight to the
textually-defensible application of a domestic statute beyond the territory of the United States."" For these reasons, it is fundamentally misleading to reduce CharmingBetsy to a restatement of abstention-based
rules of comity.
181. Similarly, in MacLeod v. United States, 229 U.S. 416 (1913), the Court declined to interpret a congressional statute to apply in areas beyond the territory or control of the United
States. The statute could not be interpreted as a ratification of presidential action that would be at
odds with customary norms governing the rights of occupying forces. Id. at 433-35.
182. See, e.g., Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (The Eight Hour Law);
Sandberg v. McDonald, 248 U.S. 185, 195 (1918) (Seaman's Act of 1915); American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909) (Sherman Antitrust Act). But see Laker Airways v.
Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (antitrust laws); United States v.
Alcoa, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (antitrust laws); see Grippando, Declining to Exercise ExtraterritorialAntitrust Jurisdictionon Grounds of InternationalComity: An Illegitimate Extension of
the Judicial Abstention Doctrine, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 395 (1983).

183. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
Comity is a recognition which one nation extends within its own territory to the legislative,
executive, or judicial acts of another. It is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience,
and expediency. . . . [I]t is a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due
regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of persons protected by
its own laws.
Id. at 440; see also Macalister-Smith, Comity, in 7 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
(1984) (acknowledging that "[b]y definition, the rules of comity lack a legal nature").
184. See infra notes 226-48 and accompanying text.
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1. An Anachronism in the Interpretation of Charming Betsy
Comity is an idea with its own intellectual history. 8 5 Unlike the
recent courts that apply comity in the apparent spirit of Charming
Betsy, however, the Supreme Court in that case did not find jurisdiction proper first and then offer reasons based in prudence for declining
to exercise it.' The Court pursued none of the interest-balancing or
reasonableness inquiries that characterize the modern comity jurisprudence. 81 Moreover, because there seems to have been no doubt that the
Nonintercourse Act would have applied to a United States national operating in Caribbean waters, even on a foreign vessel, there was no issue
of extraterritoriality-the issue which, above all others since World War
II, has framed the comity analysis. 8s Rather, in Charming Betsy, the
Supreme Court invoked international standards to determine whether
185. Distinct phases in the evolution of the comity doctrine may be discerned. See Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law-of-Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L.
REV. 189 (1942). Professor Maier, in particular, has described the modern emergence of a
politicized notion of comity that departs significantly from its ancient conceptualization as a legal
principle, especially in the works of Joseph Story. Maier, ExtraterritorialJurisdictionat a Crossroads:An Intersection between Publicand PrivateInternationalLaw, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 28185 (1982). See generally Lorenzen, Huber's de Conflictu Legum, 13 ILL. L. R.v. 199 (1918);
Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV.9 (1966).
186. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom, Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)
(Uranium Antitrust Litigation); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1976).
187. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia I), 691 F.2d 1384, 1389
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); United States v. Vetco, Inc., 644 F.2d 1324,
1331 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1098 (1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Field), 532 F.2d
404, 408-09 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901-04 (2d Cir.
1968). Section 40 of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, which framed the analysis in these cases, erected a multifactor test for the resolution of international conflicts of jurisdiction through reciprocal accommodation. That provision states:
Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce rules of law and the rules they
may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a person, each state is required
by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise of its enforcement
jurisdiction, in the light of such factors as (a) vital national interests of each of the states, (b)
the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would impose
upon the person, (c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the .territory
of the other state, (d)the nationality of the person, and (e) the extent to which enforcement
by action of either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 40.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, articulating similar and additional factors, indicates that the essential comity analysis consists in a flexible and comprehensive test of
reasonableness under all the circumstances. No longer obliging states simply to "consider" these
moderating factors, the Restatement (Third) declares that "a state may not exercise jurisdiction to
prescribe law with respect to a person or activity having connections with another state when the
exercise of such jurisdiction is unreasonable." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 403(1).
188. Comity analysis does appear in cases raising issues other than the extraterritoriality of
regulatory statutes, traditionally including the act of state doctrine, foreign sovereign immunity,
and the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. See Maier, supra note 185.
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Shattuck was under the diplomatic protection of the United States and,
therefore, within the explicit and intended reach of the statute. Even if
subject matter jurisdiction and comity converge today at some level of
abstraction, the original analysis in Charming Betsy is not an example
of that phenomenon.
2. The Inadequate Conception of Comity As Law
Treating Charming Betsy as a case determining the jurisdictional
reach of statutes in light of international comity raises a more significant problem. The meaning and status of comity has been the subject
of recurrent theoretical and diplomatic dispute, and it is ironic that
Charming Betsy, with its injunction to construe statutes in conformity
with international law, is used to vindicate what is in fact a highly contested proposition in international discourse.
In the typical modern case in which comity is an issue, a foreign
national has challenged the extraterritorial reach of United States trade
or commercial regulation, especially antitrust law"8 9 or securities regulation 90 or export controls.' 9 ' Most scholarly commentary on the meaning
of comity has responded to the resulting body of decisions in these regulatory areas, 92 but it is plain that jurisdictional reach is a potential
189. See, e.g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988). For judicial construction of
the extraterritorial application of the antitrust statutes, see Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide
& Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962) (stating that "[a] conspiracy to monopolize or restrain
the domestic or foreign commerce of the United States is not outside the reach of the Sherman Act
just because part of the conduct complained of occurs in foreign countries"); Pacific Seafarers, Inc.
v. Pacific Far E. Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (stating that "[iut is plain that where
American foreign commerce is affected foreigners may be held under our antitrust laws for restraints thereon"). But see Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 (1986)
(stating that "[r]espondents cannot recover antitrust damages based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market, because American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive
conditions of other nations' economies"). See generally Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.,
549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Leasco Data Processing Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 415.
190. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a-78jj (1988). For judicial construction of the extraterritorial application of the securities laws, see Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Tamari v. Bache &
Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 871 (1984); Bersch v. Drexel
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 US. 906 (1969).
191. See, e.g., Dresser Indus. v. Baldridge, 549 F. Supp. 108 (D.D.C. 1982).
192. With respect to securities regulation, see Ryan, InternationalEnforcement of Insider
Trading: The Grand Jury Process, Court Compulsion and the United States-Switzerland Treaty
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 247 (1988); Symposium, Can the
InternationalSecurities Markets be Regulated?, 14 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 25],1988). With respect
to trade controls, see Atwood, The Export Administration Act and the Dresser Industries Case, 15
LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1157 (1983); Marcuss & Richard, ExtraterritorialJurisdiction in United
States Trade Law: The Need for a Consistent Theory, 20 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 439 (1981);
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issue with respect to any legislative scheme phrased in broad terms and
not geographically limited in its application. Even a partial addendum
would include tax, 9 3 government investigations,"" environmental pro19
tection,19 5 civil discovery, 9" and antidiscrimination and labor law. 7
History offers little hope that these extraterritoriality issues will be
resolved according to generally applicable principles or a fortiori according to norms recognized as binding international obligations. The
analysis of extraterritoriality varies with the regulatory interest asserted, obliging courts in case of conflict to assess the reasonableness of
exercising jurisdiction in light of the respective governmental interests
of the United States and the foreign state. Not surprisingly, the extraterritorial application of the antitrust laws differs from that of the securities laws or the rules of federal procedure, 98 though in all such
cases the court assertedly acts as a passive referee in balancing competing sovereign policies. The mark of its apparent passivity is the emergence of a powerful but vacuous rhetorical habit: phrasing the
dispositive issue as jurisdictional lays the predicate for applying United
States law in a transnational context.' 9 Viewing a case as raising essenNote, Predictabilityand Comity: Toward Common Principlesof ExtraterritorialJurisdiction,98
HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1316-18 (1985). With respect to antitrust laws, see Hood, The Extraterritorial
Application of United States Antitrust Laws: A Selective Bibliography,15 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
765 (1982).
193. See, e.g., Palmer, Toward Unilateral Coherence in Determining Jurisdiction to Tax
Income, 30 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1989).
194. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia I), 691 F.2d 1384 (11th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1977); J. BRUNN9E, AcID RAIN
AND OZONE LAYER DEPLETION: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND REGULATION 124-32 (1988); Handl, State
Liability for Accidental Transnational Environmental Damage by Private Persons, 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 525 (1980); Note, The United States EnvironmentalProtectionAgency's Proposalfor AtSea Incinerationof Hazardous Wastes-A TransnationalPerspective, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
157 (1988).
196. See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S.
522 (1987); Societe Internationelle v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958); Minpeco S.A. v. Commodity
Servs., Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
197. Compare, e.g., Boureslan v. Aramco, 857 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir.), on reh'g en banc, 58
U.S.L.W. 2468 (5th Cir. Feb. 20, 1990) (No. 87-2206) with Bryant v. International School Servs.,
Inc., 502 F. Supp. 472 (D.N.J. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 675 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1982). See
generally McNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
349 (1989). In response to the courts' conclusion that Congress did not intend for the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1986, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. V 1987), to apply extraterritorially, Congress amended the act to include "any individual who is a citizen of the United States
employed by an employer in a workplace in a foreign country." Id. § 630(f); cf., e.g., Cleary v.
United States Lines, Inc., 728 F.2d 607 (3d Cir. 1984). Other federal labor statutes explicitly or
apparently are limited in their territorial application. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act, 29
U.S.C. § 213(f) (1982); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(7), 653(a) (1982);
Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C. 276a(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987).
198. See Note, supra note 192, at 1312-16.
199. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 608 n.12 (9th Cir. 1976).
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tially issues of comity seems to tilt the analysis in favor of the foreign
200
state interest.
The question remains whether comity and the values it represents
are in any meaningful sense either "law" or an authoritative algorithm
for formulating "law." The two Restatements of Foreign Relations Law
have contributed to the tenacity of this question. The Restatement
(Second) of 1965, for example, declared that each state that faces an
international conflict of jurisdiction is "required by international law to
consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise" of its jurisdiction in
the light of multiple factors including nationality, territoriality, and the
vital national interests of each state. 20 1 The Restatement (Third) of
1986 transforms the good faith obligation to "consider moderat[ion]"
into an apparent prohibition on any exercise of jurisdiction that would
be "unreasonable" under all the relevant circumstances, which include
but are not limited to the earlier factors.20 2
Both Restatements purport to restate international law,20 3 but this
common claim, controversial at the time the Restatement (Third) was
adopted formally,20 4 has provoked criticism. In application, the Restatement (Second) failed to offer a "global frame of reference" and, therefore, inadequately respected the systemic, international interests in
predictable and stable standards for the resolution of jurisdictional disputes. °5 It tended to favor parochialism 0 6 and did not reflect the prac200.

See, e.g., Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale,482 U.S. at 522. In this respect,

the jurisdiction/comity polarity in determining the extraterritorial applicability of United States
law corresponds with the tension between fairness and power in assessing personal jurisdiction

within the states of the union. See, e.g., Brilmayer, JurisdictionalDue Process and PoliticalTheory, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 293 (1987); Trangsrud, The Federal Common Law of PersonalJurisdiction,
57 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 849 (1989).
201. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, § 40.
202. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 403(1). Arguably the Restatement (Third) obliges

states in conflict only to "evaluate" their respective interests: "[A] state should defer to the other
state if that state's interest is clearly greater." Id. § 403(3). By its terms, however, this obligation

in paragraph 3 only arises "[w]hen it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise
jurisdiction over a person or activity," and therefore does not vitiate the prohibition in paragraph
1 against unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction. Id.
203. The Restatement (Second) "represent[ed] the opinion of the American Law Institute as

to the rules that an international tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in
accordance with international law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 5, at xii. The Restatement
(Third) changed this reference from an "international" tribunal to an "impartial" tribunal. REsupra note 3, at 3. The commentary to § 403 declares that reasonableness
"has emerged as a principle of international law." Id. § 403 comment a.
204. See AM. LAW INST., PROCEEDINGS OF THE 63RD ANNUAL MEETING 94-108 (1986); Maier,
supra note 135, at 467-69.
205. Maier, supra note 185, at 295.
206. Gerber, Beyond Balancing: InternationalLaw Restraints on the Reach of National
Laws, 10 YALE J. INT'L L. 185, 205-06 (1984).
STATEMENT (THIRD),
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tice of states. °7 The modern reasonableness test, to the extent that it is
different, has been hailed as progress of a sort,208 but not necessarily as
an accurate statement of international jurisdictional obligations. To the
contrary, the Restatement (Third) has been criticized precisely because
it seems to exceed precedent and practice both in the United States
and abroad. 0 '
Of course, this failure of the Restatements does not by itself imply
that international law imposes no limits on a state's jurisdiction,2 10 and
there have been efforts to bring established and obligatory norms, like
noninterference or the sovereign equality of states, into the jurisdictional analysis.21 ' Some commentators have suggested principles to
207. Mann, The Doctrine of InternationalJurisdictionRevisited, 186 RECUEi DES Cours 9,
20 (1984) [hereinafter Mann, JurisdictionRevisited]; see also Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction
in InternationalLaw, Ill RECUEIL DES CouRs 1 (1964) [hereinafter Mann, Jurisdiction].
208. See, e.g., Maier, supra note 185.
209. The principal domestic authority on which the Restatement (Third) rests its approach
is Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), but the Timberlane
court explicitly noted that its approach was not defined or required by international law. Nor does
state practice unequivocally support the result or the analysis in Timberlane, not least because it
seems to reserve a unilateral power for domestic courts to assess the public policy interests of
foreign sovereign states. See Meessen, Antitrust Jurisdiction under Customary International
Law, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 784-86, 802 (1984); Rosenthal, JurisdictionalConflicts Between Sovereign Nations, 19 INT'L LAW. 487, 488-89, 502-03 (1985). Nor have the domestic courts invariably
endorsed a reasonableness test as a part of international law. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena,
Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 952 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (stating that "[tihere is ... no rule of
international law holding that a 'more reasonable' assertion of jurisdiction mandatorily displaces a
'less reasonable' assertion" (footnote omitted)); accord AVC Nederland B.V. v. Atrium Investment
Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1984).
210. Many commentators have argued that international law imposes some limitations on a
state's jurisdiction to prescribe. See, e.g., 3 J. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1965
(1935); Lowenfeld, Public Law in the InternationalArena: Conflict of Laws, InternationalLaw,
and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES Cours 315, 329 (1979); Meessen,
InternationalLaw Limitations on State Jurisdiction,in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS
AND RESPONSES THERETO (C. Olmstead ed. 1984); Nussbaum, Rise and Decline of the Law of Nations Doctrine in the Conflict of Laws, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 189, 199 (1942).
211. See, e.g., E. NEREP, EXTRATERRITORIAL CONTROL OF COMPETITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW 551-55 (1983); L. SOHN & T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 64344 (1973); Gerber, supra note 206; Mann, JurisdictionRevisited, supra note 207, at 47; Meessen,
Antitrust Jurisdiction Under Customary InternationalLaw, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 783, 784 (1984).
Professor Gerber, for example, argues that the Supreme Court's comity analysis in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522 (1987), "is implicitly based on
concepts of customary international law ... To assess whether particular action is intrusive, ...
one must determine the sphere of protection to which the state is entitled, and this sphere of

protection is established by international law." Gerber, InternationalDiscovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 530-31 (1988).
Not all commentators are convinced that the norm of noninterference is meaningful in this
context. See, e.g., Abbott, Collective Goods, Mobile Resources, and ExtraterritorialTrade Controls, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 117, 141 (Summer 1987). For an analysis of the suggestion that
the norm against intervention has not survived the Cold War intact, see Schwenninger, The 1980's:
New Doctrines of Intervention or New Norms of Nonintervention?, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 423
(1981).

1150

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1103

guide the jurisdictional inquiry, which might pass muster as customary
obligations.212 Even constitutional principles have been offered to resolve international conflicts of jurisdiction.213 Each of these perspectives, however, encounters an overarching ambiguity in the
international law of jurisdiction, namely, whether the rights implicit in
the recognized categories of prescriptive jurisdiction 14 can be transformed into limitations on the exercise of such power. On one hand, it
might be said that the right of each state to exercise prescriptive jurisdiction is limited necessarily by the equal correlative rights of all other
states. This argument provides a plausible account for the pattern of
protest engendered by aggressive exercises of jurisdiction by the United
inStates,215 the promulgation of foreign blocking statutes and antisuit 211
junctions, 21 6 the general eschewing of similar policies by other states,
and the pattern of treaty arrangements to resolve jurisdictional
disputes. 18
212. The best analysis along these lines is Maier, supra note 185.
213. Brilmayer, The ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law: A Methodological and
ConstitutionalAppraisal, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11 (Summer 1987).
214. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, § 402(1) (territorial jurisdiction); id. § 402(2) (nationality jurisdiction); id. § 402(3) (protective jurisdiction); id. § 404 (universal jurisdiction). The
increasing applicability of the passive personality principle in United States law is noted in id. §
402 reporter's note 3.
215. See, e,g., 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 101
(1981); European Communities, Comments on the U.S. Regulations Concerning Trade with
U.S.S.R., 21 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 891 (1982); Gordon, ExtraterritorialApplication of United

States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980).
216. Gerber, supra note 206, at 188, 219-20.
217. See, e.g., Vitta, The Impact in Europe of the American "Conflicts Revolution," 30 AM.
J. COMP. L. 1, 2-3 (1982).
218. See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States
of America and the Government of Canada as to Notification, Consultation and Cooperation with
Respect to the Application of National Antitrust Laws, Mar. 9, 1984, reprinted in 23 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 275 (1984); see also The United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, May 25, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 2019, T.I.A.S. No. 8302. Similar bilateral treaties have
been concluded between the United States and Italy, the Netherlands, and Turkey. Multilateral
efforts to define principles and procedures to resolve jurisdictional disputes also have been undertaken. See, e.g., The Hague Convention on The Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, construed in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatialle v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
On the relevance of treaties in the creation of customary norms, see Case Concerning Military
and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicar. v. U. S.), 1986 I.C.J. 4, 97, 98-100
(Merits Phase, June 27, 1986); Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta), 1985 I.C.J.
13, 29-30 (Merits Phase, June 3, 1985); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (FRG v. Den., FRG v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 37-46.
The scholarly debate continues on the circumstances under which treaties can generate customary law. See M. VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 183-98 (1985);
Akehurst, Custom as a Source of InternationalLaw, [1974-1975] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 42-52; Baxter, Treaties and Custom, 129 RECUEIL DES COURS 25-102 (1970); D'Amato, Custom and Treaty: A
Response to Professor Weisburd, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 459 (1988); Weisburd, supra note 16.
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On the other hand, a traditional strand of international legal theory undermines the inference from these data that comity operates as
an obligatory prohibition on the extraterritorial application of statutes
or on all other offensive forms of prescriptive jurisdiction. A standard
reading of the seminal Lotus case 2 9 requires the party asserting the
limitation on the independence of states to show that states forego a
form of jurisdiction, or protest its exercise, out of a sense of legal obligation.22 ° In one famously opaque passage, the Permanent Court of International Justice stated:
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that States may not extend
the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property, and acts outside their territory, [international law] leaves them in this respect
a wide measure of discretion which is only limited in certain cases by prohibitive
rules; as regards other cases, every State
remains free to adopt the principles which
2 21
it regards as best and most suitable.

Given the arguably mixed pattern of responses to United States jurisdictional claims,22 2 Professor Richard Falk's judgment of twenty-five

years ago-that "the prohibitive impact of international law upon the
discretion of a state to limit its legal competence is marginal" 223-may
remain valid. Comity, in this view, would remain a characteristic of a
process by which international legal norms might emerge but not be a
rule of law or even a source of rules of law. Indeed, in this perspective it
is possible to reject the customary legal status of a practice precisely on
the ground that it reflects comity, and not opinio juris or legal
219. S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 9.
220. Id. at 28. The court stated:
Even if the rarity of the judicial decisions to be found ...

were sufficient to prove ...

the

circumstance alleged ... it would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained
from instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being
obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on [states'] being conscious of having
a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international custom. The alleged fact
does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a duty;
Id. For contrasting assessments of the contemporary relevance of the Lotus decision, compare
Mann, Jurisdiction,supra note 207, at 33-35, with Kuyper, European Community Law and Extraterritoriality:Some Trends and New Developments, 33 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 1013, 1014 (1984),
and Weil, International Law Limitations on State Jurisdiction,in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO 32-33 (C. Olinstead ed. 1984).
221. S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. at 19.
222. Some states have adopted United States jurisdictional policies, even after objecting to
them. See Gerber, The ExtraterritorialApplication of the German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 756 (1983); Juenger, Constitutional Control of Extraterritoriality?:
A Comment on Professor Brilmayer's Appraisal, 50 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 39, 40-1 (Summer 1987).
223. R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DoMEsTIc COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 39 (1964).
Even those who argue that the reasonableness test in the Restatement (Third) expresses international law have difficulty articulating the substance of the putative norm and may reduce it to a
wholly procedural or remedial status. See Meessen, Conflicts of JurisdictionUnder the New Restatement, 50 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 47, 59-60, 68-69 (Summer 1987).
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obligation.2 4
But these controversies about the legal status of the comity doctrine, and more generally about the limits imposed by international law
on a nation's jurisdiction, should not obscure a simple and significant
truth. Despite the conceptual difficulties, courts typically have viewed
Charming Betsy, with its injunction to interpret acts of Congress consistently with international law, as a rebuttable directive to limit the
extraterritorial application of domestic statutes. Comity is treated as
though it were law. This treatment is remarkable if for no other reason
than its departure from the traditional standard of proving the existence and content of customary norms. But it also suggests that the
more defensible application of the Charming Betsy principle lies in
more settled matters, outside the disputed context of comity, choice-oflaw, jurisdiction, and extraterritoriality.
3.

The Courts' Endorsement of Nonjurisdictional Interpretive Uses
of International Law

Perhaps the most important irony in the modern treatment of this
ancient case is that although courts generally may view the Charming
Betsy principle as the exemplar of comity analysis, recent decisions of
the Supreme Court establish that such an interpretation radically un224. See A. D'AMATo, supra note 18, at 84. Ultimately, the ambiguous status of comity may
simply reflect the power of formulation: comity as an obligation to "think twice" or to consult
before acting or to weigh the community's interests in an effective legal system may enjoy a different legal status from comity as an obligation not to exercise jurisdiction in well-defined circumstances. Judge Fitzmaurice recognized this difference in dicta appearing in his separate opinion in
Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Company (Belg. v. Spain), 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 3.
It is true that, under present conditions, international law does not impose hard and fast rules
on States delimiting spheres of national jurisdiction. . . It does however . . . involve for
every State an obligation to exercise moderation and restraint as to the extent of the jurisdiction assumed by its courts in cases having a foreign element, and to avoid undue encroachment on a jurisdiction more properly appertaining to, or more appropriately exercisable by,
another State.
Id. at 105 (Fitzmaurice, J., dissenting). A similar distinction appears in 2 E. NEREP, ExTRATERRITORIAL CONTROL OF COMPETITION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 558 (1983) (distinguishing the "weighing
of state interests" as a process "compelled by international customary law," from the "weighing of
state interests standard in and of itself" as a substantive rule of international law). The ambiguity
also may substantiate the imprudence of relying on judicial resolutions of disputes that ultimately
reflect the self-conception and self-interest of the United States, foreign states, and possibly the
community of nations as well. It is tempting to leave such issues to diplomatic adjustment rather
than to expect courts, operating in the realm of law and principle, to assess conflicting sovereign
interests. Durack, Australia, Conflicts and Comity, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH:
PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 41, 48 (J. Lacey ed. 1983); Juenger, supra note 222, at 46 (preferring
"soft," nonjudicial approaches to resolving jurisdictional conflicts); Maier, supra note 98, at 581-82.
225. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-63 (1820); Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880-85 (2d Cir. 1980). The unsettled customary environment for comitybased jurisdictional issues has been regulated to some extent by treaties. See supra note 218.
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derstates the potential impact of that case. In particular, Weinberger v.
Rossi22 6 and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca22 7 suggest a broad endorsement of
international principle in the interpretation of statutes.
In Weinberger the Court addressed an apparent conflict between
an executive agreement, which gave local nationals preference in employment on United States military bases in the Philippines, and a subsequent statute, which prohibited employment discrimination against
United States citizens by the military unless permitted by "treaty."
The narrow interpretive issue was whether the word "treaty" as used in
the statute included only those agreements within the constitutional
treaty power 2 8 or if it extended to executive agreements as well. The
narrowest articulation of the Court's holding is that the word "treaty"
does include such agreements, a conclusion as to which international
law itself is virtually silent.2 2 9 The statute was construed to preserve the
obligation expressed in the executive agreement.
This result is superficially congruent with that in Lauritzen and
McCulloch: some international consideration limited the applicability
of a domestic statutory regime. But as a reaffirmation of the relevance
of international law in the construction of statutes, Weinberger v. Rossi
is considerably more significant. The Court noted that thirteen executive agreements, each providing for preferential hiring of local nationals, were in effect at the time the statute was enacted, and it was
unwilling to infer that Congress would repudiate those agreements sub
silentio: "We think that some affirmative expression of congressional intent to abrogate the United States' international obligations is required
in order to construe the word 'treaty' in [the statute] as meaning only
Art. II treaties. 2 ° The Court did not think that Congress was powerless to repudiate these agreements as a constitutional matter had it chosen to do so. Rather, the Court recognized that the statute, read
restrictively to mean only formal treaties, might compromise the foreign
relations of the United States by repudiating existing agreements
through implication. The Court considered itself unauthorized to declare the abrogation of those agreements in the absence of a clear legislative statement to that effect.
Plainly, the international norms preserved in Weinberger were
neither jurisdictional in content nor maritime in context. Unlike the
law-of-the-flag principle in Lauritzen and McCulloch, the respect for
226.
227.

228.
229.
LAW 898
230.

456 U.S. 25 (1982).
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.2.
J. BRIERLY, THE LAW oF NATIONS 317 (6th ed. 1963); 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL
(H. Lanterpacht ed. 1955).
Weinberger, 456 U.S. at 32.
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international norms in Weinberger did not allocate prescriptive authority among sovereigns along territorial lines. Rather, the case announced
a principle of employment law that accommodated both a statute and a
limited number of international agreements, maximizing the respective
scope of operation for each body of law. At its most abstract, the case
implemented a flexible version of the international standard that states
are bound by their promises, pacta sunt servanda, in the form of a
clear statement requirement: international agreements will be honored
in the construction of statutes, unless Congress provides a clear statement of its repudiatory intent.
It is critical to observe that the international standard respected in
Weinberger was not the territorial comity at work in Lauritzen and
McCulloch. The statute involved did not implement the international
agreements, and the agreements themselves, though obviously the product of accommodation, did not announce legal principles of interstate
accommodation for the courts to apply in resolving conflicts of jurisdiction. Weinberger suggests instead that international obligations are inertial; they subsist until expressly contradicted by legislation, 3 1 and
that these obligations exert a "gravitational .force" ' 2 that is neither
merely territorial nor limited to the statutes which implement them.
Standing alone, Weinberger might be a weak authority for an interpretive mandate requiring substantive as well as jurisdictional reference
to international principles. But Weinberger seems representative of the
Supreme Court's modern conception of the Charming Betsy principle.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca3 3 reaffirms the propriety of consulting nonjurisdictional, international standards in the interpretation of domestic
statutes.
In Cardoza-Fonseca the Court addressed the Refugee Act of
1980,3' which established a statutory basis for the granting of asylum
in the United States in accordance with international refugee law. For
the definition of "refugee" Congress had turned explicitly to the 1951
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees"' and its 1967 Proto231. See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 512 (1947) (emphasizing that the court will "not readily assume" that Congress "had a purpose to abrogate" treaty obligations).
232. See supra note 173.
233. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
234. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Before the
Act, the only provision of United States law that specifically addressed asylum for refugees appeared in the Attorney General's administrative regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 108.1 (1976).
235. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189
U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The United States became a party to the Convention in 1967 by acceding to the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,
opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
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col,2 36 to which the United States was a party. At issue in CardozaFonseca was the meaning of the term "well-founded fear of persecution," which is used to define "refugee" in the 1951 Convention. 3 7 The
specific question in Cardoza-Fonsecawas what burden of proof this international definition implied: what must the asylum applicant prove to
acquire refugee status under United States law?
The government interpreted the "well-founded fear" criterion to
require a showing by each individual applicant that persecution was
more likely than not. Under this clear probability standard, an individual's fear could be "well-founded" *only if the chances for persecution
were better than even or amounted to a "realistic likelihood." The
Court rejected the government's strict standard, concluding that the international term of art, "well-founded fear of persecution," excuses an
asylum applicant from proving that the chances of persecution are more
likely than not. The Court evidently concluded that a fear can be wellfounded long before the feared event becomes likely."3 8
The Court resolved the issue in Cardoza-Fonsecain part by reference to the plain language of the statute: Congress deliberately used the
international term of art in defining the appropriate asylum standard.
A consistent refrain in the legislative history of the Refugee Act is Congress's understanding that it finally was bringing United States law into
conformity with the internationally accepted definition of the term
"refugee., 2 39
The Court even went beyond this observation, relying on international evidence, and especially the travaux preparatoiresof the 1951
Convention and its subsequent interpretation by the Office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).2 40 Consistently with the travaux, the UNHCR's Handbook emphasized that the
subjective fear of the applicant, not the hypothetical likelihood of future events, is the central element of the refugee standard. Although
the UNHCR's Handbook does not purport to state binding principles of
236. 1967 Protocol, supra note 235.
237. The Convention, liberalized to some extent by the 1967 Protocol, defines a "refugee" as
a person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of
that country." Refugee Convention, supra note 235, art. 1. In the Refugee Act, Congress tracked
this international language and made clear that the Attorney General in his or her discretion could
grant asylum to any individual satisfying these criteria. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, §
201(a), 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1988)).

238. Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 431 (quoting A.

GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES

180 (1966)).
Id. at 436-41.

IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

239.
240.

UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM'R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA

FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS

(1979).
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asylum law, it is the most authoritative and articulated interpretation
of the Convention and Protocol at the international plane. 41
The Court thus resolved an issue not addressed in the Convention
itself, and its resolution was guided by the common understanding and
practice of states as interpreted by the UNHCR. 4 z In other words, the
statute was interpreted not in accordance with jurisdictional norms but
under substantive principles of international refugee law. Although
Charming Betsy was not cited in the opinion, its directive that international and domestic law be reconciled when "fairly possible" was plainly
in operation, and Cardoza-Fonsecatherefore cannot be squared with
any view of the Charming Betsy principle that limits its application to
cases in which United States jurisdiction to prescribe overlaps that of
another state. It accommodates no competing jurisdictional claim of another state. Cardoza-Fonseca,therefore, cannot be considered an application of comity, unless that term is freed of its contemporary
connotation and equated with international law generally. 4
Of course, Cardoza-Fonsecaand Weinberger might be interpreted
as justifying the substantive, nonjurisdictional use of international law
in the construction of statutes only when a treaty provides the relevant
standard or when the statute in question implements or incorporates a
treaty obligation of the United States. The substantive use of the
Charming Betsy principle would be limited in this view to statutes
linked by congressional action to international norms. The "law of nations" that guides the interpretation of statutes under Charming Betsy
would refer only to that narrow portion of customary law which estab241. United States courts and the Board of Immigration Appeals periodically have turned to
the Handbook for guidance. See, e.g., Ananeh-Firempong v. INS, 766 F.2d 621 (1st Cir. 1985);
Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1984); McMullen v. INS, 658 F.2d 1312 (9th Cir.
1981); Ellis v. Ferro, 549 F. Supp. 428 (W.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Vigil, Interim Dec. 3050 (B.I.A. Mar.
17, 1988) (Nio. A26787128). Cardoza-Fonsecamarks the first time that the United States Supreme
Court has placed its approval on the Handbook, significantly enhancing the relevance of those
guidelines to future asylum adjudications.
242. In particular, the Court traced the international definition of "refugee" to the 1946 Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (IRO). Whether a refugee or displaced person
was included under that Constitution depended on an evaluation of the validity of that person's
objections to returning to his or her country of origin. One of the valid objections included "fear,
based on reasonable grounds of persecution because of race, religion, nationality or political opinion." Cardoza-Fonseca,480 U.S. at 437. The travaux of the subsequent 1951 Convention made
clear that its framers intended to adopt the prior IRO standard, a point of near-dispositive significance in Cardoza-Fonseca,because the IRO merely required that an applicant for refugee status
show a "plausible and coherent account of why he fears persecution." Id. at 438 n.20. Certainly
nothing in the Convention or its history required an applicant for refugee status to show that
persecution is more likely than not. See Cox, "Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted." The
Sources and Applicationof a Criterionof Refugee Status, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 333, 338-40, &
n.29 (1984).
243. In his general analysis of the "public values" approach to statutory interpretation, Professor Eskridge makes this mistake. See Eskridge, supra note 54, at 1073 n.303.
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lishes jurisdictional competence. 4"
But these limitations, though initially plausible, are not persuasive.
Cardoza-Fonsecaundermines the interpretive relevance of the distinction between treaty and customary norms. Despite the disparate constitutional settings in which treaty and custom operate in the United
States,245 the Court's analysis in Cardoza-Fonsecacannot be confined
usefully in one category or the other. A treaty provided the dominant
framework for the Court's reasoning and for Congress's prior political
act of conforming domestic law to international law. But equally
plainly, the congressional commitment to international standards appeared only in legislative history and not in any provision expressly implementing the Protocol,2 46 and the Court was not confined to the
"plain language" of the treaty or its semantic penumbra. To the contrary, the Court consciously consulted materials that are not included
in the treaty, including predecessor conventions and an interpretation
by the UNHCR that followed the Refugee Convention by almost thirty
years and that described itself as nonbinding. Thus, in interpreting the
statute, the Court consulted authoritative forms of evidence that were
neither conventional nor customary. The principles that prevailed in
Cardoza-Fonsecaarose out of a customary interpretation of treaty obligations: the decision suggests that a common understanding of the
treaty language had arisen as to the burden of proof, which a party can
be expected to honor 47 in the absence of a limiting prior understanding
or an explicit repudiation as allowed by the treaty itself.4 8
244. See Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L. REv.
819, 836-37 (1989).
245. See Friedlander, Should the United States Constitution's Treaty-Making Power Be
Used as the Basis for Enactment of Domestic Legislation?, 18 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 267 (1986);
Trimble, supra note 6.
246. Even the legislative history of the Refugee Act is ambiguous. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
Before the Refugee Act, the Refugee Protocol constrained the interpretation of the Attorney General's discretion to withhold deportation. See Coriolan v. INS, 559 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977) (suggesting that the interpretive significance of the treaty was not dependent upon the existence of
implementing legislation); Kashani v. INS, 547 F.2d 376 (7th Cir. 1977). Contra Bertrand v. Sava,
684 F.2d 204, 218-19 (2d Cir. 1982) (recognizing that provisions of the Protocol are not a source of
individually enforceable rights until implemented by Congress); but see INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, n.22 (1984) (explaining and resolving the difference between domestic statutory law and the
Protocol).
247. Whether nonparties also would be bound by that common understanding was not before
the Court in Cardoza-Fonseca.The impact of the Court's analytical approach on other questions
of asylum law is explored below. See infra Part IV(B)(1).
248. This notion that the distinction between customary and conventional international law
is of limited value in the interpretation of statutes has a tolerable analogy in the history of federal
common law. As Professor Martha Field has demonstrated, at a time when United States courts
were convinced that "[t]he common law could be made a part of our federal system only by legislative adoption," Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 658 (1834), the process of statutory interpretation frequently allowed the incorporation of common-law standards even without express
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This evidentiary practice is not surprising: a conventional or customary norm may be relevant in statutory interpretation even when
there is no claim that the statute in question implements or executes
that obligation. That is, even when there is no indication that Congress
intends to harmonize domestic law with international standards, the
statute will be so construed. In Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,4 9
for example, the Tenth Circuit interpreted the statutory detention and
exclusion powers of the Attorney General in light of the customary
norm prohibiting prolonged and arbitrary detention, declaring that
"[n]o principle of international law is more fundamental than the con2 50
cept that human beings should be free from arbitrary imprisonment.
The evidence for the court's conclusion was the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, 251 a declaration of the United Nations General Assembly and the American Convention on Human Rights, 2 which had
"legislative adoption." Field, supra note 45, at 885 n.5, 894 n.50. The line between statutory construction and common lawmaking gradually weakened, in spite of the mutually exclusive ideals of
legislative supremacy on one hand and the overriding power of the common law on the other. As
noted by the Supreme Court, "The code of constitutional and statutory construction which. . . is
gradually formed by the judgments of this court. . . has for its basis so much of the common law
as may be implied in the subject, and constitutes a common law resting on national authority."
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478-79 (1888); see also P. BATOR, P. MISKHIN, D. SHAPIRO & H.
WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 770 (2d ed. 1973).
The analytical costs are high if statutes and the common law are kept hermetically separate. Even
when their very different political origins and degrees of textuality are acknowledged, these two
modes of law shade into one another in the act of statutory interpretation. See J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW

§ 366, at 162 (1909) (stating that "statutes do not interpret them-

selves; their meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with the meaning declared by the courts,
and no other meaning, that they are imposed on the community as Law" (emphasis omitted)). For

a postrealist and positivistic assessment of Gray, see J.

HURST, DEALING WITH STATUTES

32-33

(1982).
Without venturing further than necessary into the controversy surrounding international law
as federal common law, it seems equally clear that customary and conventional law exhibit a similar interpenetration: a treaty's meaning can be constrained by uniform state practice under the
treaty so long as that practice is combined with opinio juris.
249. 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981).
250. Id. at 1388. The Tenth Circuit noted that principles of international law had been used
historically to solidify the plenary power of Congress over the exclusion and deportation of aliens,
and suggested that symmetry required similar resort to international principles to define fairness.
Id. (citing Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)). The role of international law in
the interpretation of constitutional norms like fairness is beyond the scope of this Article, except
to note that a similar role in the interpretation of statutes would seem proper.
251. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 3 U.N. GAOR, c. 3 Annexes (Agenda Item 58)
at 535, 536-41, U.N. Doc. A/177 (1948). Though not binding at its inception, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is regarded generally as an authoritative declaration of states' human rights
obligations under the United Nations Charter and customary international law. See Sohn, The
New InternationalLaw: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.L.
REV. 1, 16-17 (1982) (asserting that "[t]he Declaration, as an authoritative listing of human rights,
has become a basic component of international customary law, binding on all states, not only on
members of the United Nations").
252. American Convention on Human Rights, opened for signature Nov. 22, 1969, OEA/Ser.
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been signed but not ratified by the United States. It must be emphasized that nothing in the immigration statutes implemented those obligations. 53 In the court's view, however, and consistent with Charming
Betsy, statutes and substantive customary norms will not be treated as
mutually exclusive unless no other construction is fairly possible.
This inclusive approach to international materials contrasts with
the "pathological" view2 54 in this way: The latter would note conclu-

sively that United Nations declarations do not create rights enforceable
by individuals and that this rule is true a fortiori of signed, unratified
treaties of the United States, which might not be self-executing in any
event. Even if these instruments were normatively significant, in this
pathological view the rights which they create could be trumped by executive and congressional power over aliens. The failure of Congress to
implement a non-self-executing treaty would be fatal to a domestic
claim under that treaty, and United Nations declarations and unratified
treaties would have no evidentiary weight. Consistent with this approach, the holding in Rodriguez-Fernandez has been rejected specifically by other courts that frame the issue in the stark terms of a contest
between international law and congressional or executive supremacy. 55
But framing the issue as a contest inverts the proper order of analysis. Under Charming Betsy, courts should first attempt to read the
statute conformably with international law, as in Rodriguez-Fernandez,
K/XVI/1.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 1, OAS T. S. No. 36 (1970). The American Convention on
Human Rights was adopted by the Organization of American States in 1969 and entered into force
in 1978.
253. By 1986, Congress had "explicitly rejected a provision for indefinite detention in the
Immigration Act on at least four occasions." Helton, The Legality of Detaining Refugees in the
United States, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 353, 379 n.176 (1986). There was no explicit
incorporation of the norm against indefinite detention in the statutes at issue in RodriguezFernandez.
254. See supra note 24.
255. See, e.g., Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that the detention decision of Cabinet official constitutes a controlling act that displaces putative norms of international law); accord Singh v. Nelson, 623 F. Supp. 545 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Ishtyaq v. Nelson, 627 F.
Supp. 13 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). The Supreme Court's remand in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985),
provided no authoritative resolution of the issue.
Professor Lobel has demonstrated that this view of executive power is an unprincipled departure from precedent, which generally has viewed the executive foreign affairs power as inherent in,
and therefore limited by, international law. See Lobel, Covert War and Congressional Authority:
Hidden War and Forgotten Power, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1035, 1070-74 (1986). Contra Weisburd,
supra note 124. This debate appears to be an intramural one in the pathological mode: the courts
in Garcia-Mir,Ishtyaq, and Singh approached the issue as one of congressional or executive power
to trump international law. The admitted power to do so preempted the effort to read statutes,
executive actions, and international law as harmoniously as possible. Insisting on a clear congressional repudiation of the norm, or holding that executive power to violate the implied will of Congress was at its lowest ebb, see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring), would have been more consistent with Charming Betsy.
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and give international undertakings such as signed, unratified treaties
and United Nations declarations whatever evidentiary weight they deserve in the overall assessment of state practice and opinio juris. If after this assessment the norm is sufficiently obligatory and defined so as
to be in irreducible conflict with the statute at issue, only then is it
proper to apply the supremacy axioms, including inter alia the latterin-time rule and the techniques of nonjusticiability. Though the applicability and meaning of the norm against indefinite detention or any
other putative norm may be disputed, foregoing such an analysis altogether takes a particularly narrow and ahistorical view of the public
values at work in the Charming Betsy principle. That is, the inverted
order, to the extent that it assumes a world in which international law
is either controlling or irrelevant, gives intermediate forms of state expression, such as the act of the executive in signing a treaty or voting
for a United Nations resolution and the congressional action of affirming even abstract international standards, inadequate weight. The
inverted order, therefore, serves neither the monist value of respect for
international norms nor the dualist value of respect for the diplomatic
actions of the political branches.256
Clearly, recent decisions do not view the Charming Betsy principle
as a vehicle only for the domestic application of international considerations of comity. And these examples, in which substantive norms of
international law have channelled, if not determined, the interpretation
of federal legislation, can be multiplied to include interpretations of
federal legislation such as the Communications Act of 1934,257 the Federal Tort Claims Act,25 8 and to some extent Title VII of the Civil Rights
256. See infra Part IV(C).
257. In Reston v. FCC, 492 F. Supp. 697 (D.D.C. 1980), plaintiff brought an action under the
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 1982), to compel the disclosure of tapes of certain
radio transmissions made from Guyana to the United States. The FCC refused to make the tapes
public, citing § 605 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 605 (1982), which
barred the disclosure of amateur broadcasts not intended for use by the general public. Finding an
ambiguity in § 605, the court consulted the legislative history of the Act, and concluded that disclosure on the facts presented was prohibited. Reston, 492 F. Supp. at 703-07. Citing Charming
Betsy, the court then reinforced its conclusion, noting the treaty obligation of the United States
not to divulge, "without authorization,. . . information obtained by the interception of radio communications." Id. at 707; see International Telecommunications Convention of Malaga-Torremolinos, Oct. 25, 1973, 28 U.S.T. 2495, T.I.A.S. 8572, art. 82. The importance of confidentiality was
reinforced in the International Radio Regulations, Dec. 21, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 2377, T.I.A.S. No. 4893,
art. 17. The government's interpretation of the Communications Act conformed to this international obligation.
258. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-2680 (1982). The Federal Tort Claims Act constitutes a
waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States to specific categories of claims but does not
apply to "any claim arising in a foreign country." Id. § 2680(k). In Beattie v. United States, 756
F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984), the court was required to determine whether Antarctica qualified as a
"foreign country." The district court, noting that the position of the United States government was
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Act of 1964.259 As in Rodriguez-Fernandez,none of the statutes in these
cases "implemented" the treaty or the customary norm that was invoked by the court in the act of interpretation, and extraterritorial jurisdiction was not the dispositive issue. Plainly, though conflicts and
comity remain a primary field of operation for the Charming Betsy
principle, its impact cannot be limited to those concerns.
In summary then, the Charming Betsy principle, under which
United States courts are directed to interpret statutes consistently with
international law, has come to include both customary law and treaties
in its reference to "international law.

2 60

The relevance of a treaty in

the interpretation of a statute is not limited necessarily to those cases
in which the statute implements the treaty. Even when an apparently
implementing statute is before the court, as in Cardoza-Fonseca,there
may be a customary understanding of the conventional norm that channels the interpretation of text. In this narrow but significant connection, the Charming Betsy principle undermines the traditional
distinction between customary and conventional law. Finally, the principle is not limited to jurisdictional considerations or to accommodating
overlaps in nations' respective spheres of legislative competence. In"somewhat equivocal," Beattie v. United States, 592 F. Supp. 780, 781 n.3 (D.D.C.), afl'd, 756 F.2d
91 (D.C. Cir. 1984), consulted the Antarctica Treaty, signed on Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794,
T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 71. Under article IV of that treaty, according to the court, the
contracting parties agreed not to assert any territorial claim in Antarctica or to establish rights of
sovereignty there, but their existing claims were not extinguished. On that and other evidence, the
district court concluded that Antarctica was not a "foreign country" within the meaning of the
Federal Tort Claims Act. Beattie, 592 F. Supp. at 781. That conclusion was affirmed on appeal,
Beattie, 756 F. 2d at 106, over the dissent of Judge Scalia who interpreted the treaty and United
States claims on the continent differently. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
259. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-2000e(17) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). In Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v.
Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176 (1982), the Supreme Court held that American subsidiaries of Japanese
corporations were subject to United States statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin. Such companies were not entitled to invoke article VIII(1) of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the United States and Japan, Apr. 2, 1953, 4 U.S.T.
2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863, under which "companies of either Party shall be permitted to engage,
within the territories of the other Party, accountants and other technical experts, executive personnel, attorneys, agents and other specialists of their choice." Id.; see Sumitomo Shoji, 457 U.S.
at 181. The remand of the case makes it clear that American branches of Japanese companies do
come within article VIII, requiring additional interpretation of the statute and the treaty. See
MacNamara v. Korean Air Lines, 863 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 349 (1989).
See generally Lewis & Ottley, Title VII and Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation Treaties:
PrognosticationsBased upon Sumitomo Shoji, 44 OHIO ST. L. REV. 45 (1983); Note, Yankees Out
of North America: Foreign Employer Job DiscriminationAgainst American Citizens, 83 MICH. L.
Rav. 237 (1984).
260. The Restatement (Third) affirms this conclusion and explicitly combines customary and
conventional international law into a unified statement of Charming Betsy and its progeny:
"Where fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United States." RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 3, § 114, at 62.
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stead, it operates to inform the substantive interpretation of federal
statutes.
IV.

EXEMPLARY APPROACHES TO THREE RECURRING PROBLEMS IN THE
APPLICATION OF THE CHARMING BETSY PRINCIPLE

A.

Introduction: Two Easy Cases, Three Riddles

In assessing the substantive impact and utility of the Charming
Betsy principle, the ground of controversy is bounded by two categories
of cases in which the application of that principle has become relatively
simple. In one category are those statutes that Congress explicitly crafts
to conform to international standards by implementing a treaty obliga26 2
26
tion of the United States ' or incorporating a customary norm.

These statutes address the full range of substantive matters within the
common concern of states, and they obviously can have a considerable
commercial and political impact. But they also have an interpretive
consequence: the pedigree of the statute, combined with the explicit
consent of Congress to be bound by international standards, empowers
a court to consult materials outside the four corners of the statute itself. The courts have construed such statutory terms in light of the language of the treaty,2 63 or its travaux preparatoires,or the subsequent
practice of states under the treaty,2 64 as well as the traditional indicia of
customary international law. 261 Courts and commentators may disagree
261. The examples of such implementation are too numerous to catalogue here though the
range of examples can be suggested. See, e.g., The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208
(1988) (implementing the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3);
The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1537a, 1538(c) (1988) (implementing the Convention on
Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, 56 Stat. 1354, T.I.A.S.
No. 981); The Diplomatic Relations Act, 22 U.S.C. § 254a-e (1988) (implementing the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, April 18, 1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S.
95; The Federal Aviation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n)(1) (1982 & Supp. V 1987) (referring to crime as
defined in the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192).
262. For example, the Secretary of State may act to protect a United States flag vessel and
its crew, if it is seized by a foreign country on the basis of jurisdictional claims not recognized by
the United States or "exercised in a manner inconsistent with internationallaw as recognized by
the United States." 22 U.S.C. § 1972(1) (1988) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Neutrality Act of
1794, 18 U.S.C. § 960 (1988), specifically was enacted to assure that the United States met its
obligations under the law of nations. See United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1, 51-53
(1897); see also 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 821 (1988) (incorporating aspects of customary humanitarian
law); id. § 1651 (criminalizing piracy as defined by the law of nations); 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982)
(providing jurisdiction over an alien's actions for torts committed in violation of the law of
nations).
263. Reed v. Wiser, 555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
264. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243 (1984).
265. Customary law is not necessarily evidenced by anything in a treaty or by subsequent
state practice under a treaty. Subsequent state practice may be evidence of a customary under-
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about the particular underlying obligation or the scope of the parties'
agreement, but few criticize the interpretive license itself. Indeed, as a
canon of construction, it has its own line of authority, running through
266
Charming Betsy.
Equally simple though doctrinally opposed is that category of statutes in which Congress explicitly and consciously repudiates preexisting
international norms. As noted, the courts of the United States generally
have accepted the power of Congress to override the requirements of
international law and have sustained the domestic validity of such statutes when Congress expresses its intent to do So. 2 6 7 Strictly speaking,
these cases fall within only a small and relatively settled part of the
Charming Betsy principle: by hypothesis in each such case it is not
"fairly possible" to reconcile the legislation with the law of nations. The
more complex directive to accommodate statutes with international
norms is not implicated because there is little doubt about how a
United States court will rule when Congress by statute deliberately and
expressly overrides some aspect of international law.
These opposite abstract categories comprise relatively easy cases in
a system of legislative supremacy like that of the United States because
they presume congressional consciousness and a clear statutory choice.
These cases, however, hardly begin to test the full impact of the
Charming Betsy principle as a canon of statutory interpretation. That
requires an assessment of the hard intermediate cases, including those
instances in which Congress's understanding or intent is implicit or inferred. This assessment may happen in a variety of circumstances. For
example, the incorporation or the repudiation of international norms
standing, but it is not included in the traditional indicia catalogued by Justice Horace Gray in The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
266. See, e.g., Moser v. United States, 341 U.S. 41, 45 (1951); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503
(1947) (construing Trading with the Enemy Act not to impair the right of German national, under
preexisting treaty, to inherit property in the United States); United States v. Gue Lim, 176 U.S.
459 (1900); Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U.S. 536, 539-40 (1884) (holding the subsequent
immigration statute not to affect the right of a resident alien, under a preexisting treaty, to reenter
the United States).
267. South Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (sustaining and enforcing
provision in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 that required the revocation of the
treaty-based right of any designee of the South African government to provide air service to the
United States); cf. Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929
(D.C. Cir. 1989). In its acknowledgement that Congress may not trump international obligations in
all instances, the court stated:
Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against murder and slavery may
well . . . restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains it. If Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement of our citizens or of other
individuals, that policy might well be subject to challenge in domestic court under international law.
Id. at 941.
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may appear only in the legislative history and not in the statute itself.
The admitted inconsistency between the statute and a treaty or a customary norm may appear to be inadvertent or uninformed. Congress
may provide that the statute is to be interpreted in light of "laws and
treaties" but may not expressly include customary international law.
The question will then arise whether this specification of "laws and
treaties" should be interpreted as an exercise of Congress's power to
override and thereby exclude custom. As shown below, the Charming
Betsy presumption that statutes comport with international law offers a
preliminary approach to these issues.
Other variables complicate the substantive interpretation of domestic statutes in light of international standards. The subject matter
of certain statutes naturally may appear to involve international persons or transactions, such as the trade, extradition, or immigration statutes. In contrast, other legislation may appear to be wholly unrelated to
international law, such as the bulk of the criminal code, wealth transfer
and grant programs, or the bankruptcy law. Courts could limit the applicability of CharmingBetsy to only statutes with an international dimension, but no categorical rule of "subject matter appropriateness"
can be simultaneously helpful and plausible.
Equally important, the Charming Betsy principle does not clarify
what the law of nations is at a given moment. Apart from the evidentiary problem of proving what international law requires, a putative obligation may have a normative status that is neither entirely binding
nor utterly irrelevant. The court may be requested to consider norms
that do not fit comfortably into the classical dichotomy of treaties and
custom. The United States may have signed but not ratified a particular treaty, and the court will be uncertain what weight, if any, should be
given to that agreement in the interpretation of related statutes. The
parties may raise issues about which there is theoretical or diplomatic
dispute, such as the persistent objector doctrine2 68 or the domestic impact of jus cogens, the set of peremptory international norms.269 Even a
court committed to giving international law its due under Charming
Betsy may encounter considerable difficulty determining what "international law" requires in these circumstances.
In summary, three types of exemplary difficulties arise in the application of the CharmingBetsy principle: the problem of inferred intent,
the problem of statutory appropriateness, and the problem of relative
268. Stein, The Approach of the Different Drummer: The Principle of the Persistent Objector in InternationalLaw, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 457, 459 (1985).
269. See Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 623-30 (1988).
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normativity in international law. As shown below, these problems pose
limits but not fatal obstacles for the operation of the canon.
B.
1.

The Problem of Inferred Intent

Silence, Inconsistency, and Preemption

The essential problem in applying the Charming Betsy principle is
not determining whether it can operate in the face of congressional silence. That principle has been portrayed as "[t]he plainest evidence
that international law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress. 2 70 The claim that a statutory ambiguity
should be resolved in conformity with international principles is not
foreclosed by the failure of Congress to incorporate those principles in
the statute itself. A common-law presumption does not require implementation by Congress before it can operate in the courts, and United
States jurisprudence is replete with examples of statutory interpretation in light of principles that are not incorporated either implicitly or
explicitly by Congress. 27 1 The essential difficulty is determining when
Congress is "silent" in the first place: what inferences can be drawn
from an ambiguous legislative history? How explicit must repudiation
be?
Charming Betsy is relevant to these inquiries. The presumption of
congressional compliance with international law is sufficiently powerful
to affect not only the interpretation of ambiguous statutes but the interpretation of ambiguous legislative history as well. In Cardoza-Fonseca, for example, the Court found a clear congressional intent in the
Refugee Act, but the Court's assurance obscures the fact that Congress
actually described its action in different ways at different times. On one
hand, as emphasized by the Court, Congress plainly intended finally to
bring United States refugee law into conformity with the internationally-accepted definition of the term "refugee" set forth in the 1967
United Nations Refugee Convention and Protocol. 272 Elsewhere in the
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added); see also
supra note 5, § 3 comment j (establishing that the relevance of an international norm is not dependent upon its affirmative incorporation by Congress into statutory form).
271. Thus, in The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388 (1815), Chief Justice John Marshall stated
that, in the absence of legislation, customary international standards would govern the ownership
of a vessel seized as prize. Id. at 422. Other examples are cited in Eskridge, supra note 59, at 105155.
272. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436-37 (1987). The report of the conference committee, for example, stated that the Act incorporated the definition of "refugee" "with the understanding that it is based directly upon the language of the Protocol and it is intended that the
provision be construed consistent with the Protocol." S. REP. No. 590, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 20
(1980); see also H.R. REP. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980); S.REP. No. 256, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4 (1979); H.R. REP. No. 608, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1979).
270.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND),
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legislative record, however, Congress expressed its belief that the Refugee Act would not alter the existing standard for asylum.

73

The execu-

tive branch, when testifying on the proposal that eventually became the
Refugee Act, similarly had noted that "[f]or purposes of asylum, the
provisions in this bill do not really change the standards. 2 7 4 If the

Court had interpreted this history to mean ,that the pre-1980 practice of
the United States was substantively in compliance with the Refugee
Convention and the 1967 Protocol, the Court's reliance on the travaux
preparatoiresand the UNHCR Handbook would have been irrelevant,
and the dissent would have prevailed. The actual result reflects a predisposition to interpret a7 5mixed legislative history to maximize respect
2
for international norms.

Cardoza-Fonsecamakes it clear that the intent of Congress to conform domestic law to international standards will justify the courts' resort to treaty-based standards even if nothing in the
"plain language" of a statute implements or incorporates that treaty by name. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. at 436-37. Subsequent decisions under the Refugee Act have used precisely that interpretive technique to articulate rights for asylum applicants well beyond the burden of proof. See, e.g.,
M.A. A26851062 v. INS, 858 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988) (consulting international understandings,
especially the UNHCR Handbook, to determine if conscientious objectors in El Salvador may
qualify for asylum in the United States), reh'g granted en banc, 866 F.2d 660 (1989) ; OrantesHernandez v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1488 (C.D. Cal. 1988) (consulting international law to identify
rights of asylum applicants, including the right to receive notice of the procedures for applying for
asylum).
273. S.REP. No. 256, supra note 272, at 9 (stating that "[t]he substantive standard is not
changed; asylum will continue to be granted only to those who qualify under the terms of the
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees").
274. The Refugee Act of 1979: Hearingson H.R. 2816 Before the Subcomm. on International
Operations of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979) (statement of
David Martin, Department of State). Similarly, in its argument to the Supreme Court in CardozaFonseca, the government stressed the administrative continuity in the standards governing the
withholding of deportation and asylum, see, e.g., In re Dunar, 14 I. & N. Dec. 310 (B.I.A. 1973), an
administrative practice of which Congress was presumptively aware when it passed the Refugee
Act.
275. Indeed, the Charming Betsy principle so favors the perpetuation of international obligations that congressional intent to override them, even when it is crystalline, may be insufficient in
the absence of express provisions of repudiation. In United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695
F. Supp. 1456 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), for example, Congress undoubtedly was aware that the Antiterrorism Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-5203 (1988), would place the United States in breach of its prior obligations under the Agreement Between the United States and the United Nations regarding the
Headquarters of the United Nations, June 26, 1947, G.A. Res. 169 (II), 61 Stat. 756, T.I.A.S. No.
1676, 11 U.N.T.S. 11. The legislative history was replete with discussions of the potential conflict.
See Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. at 1460, 1466-71. Ironically, the very constancy of
these references created an ambiguity for the court: in the face of such explicit expressions of
concern and intent, the legislation itself never made the override explicit. Id. at 1469. Therefore
the statute did not accomplish what Congress and the parties to the litigation thought was its sole
purpose.
The Palestine Liberation court's reasoning, though seemingly extreme, is consistent with a
line of authority disapproving implicit repeals of conventional obligations. Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984) (acknowledging that "[tihere is ... a firm
and obviously sound canon of construction against finding implicit repeal of a treaty in ambiguous
congressional action"); Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
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Cardoza-Fonseca thus illustrates an important interplay between
the interpretive mandate of CharmingBetsy and the power of Congress
to override international law. The presumption of compliance affects
the courts' determination of when it is "fairly possible" to reconcile a
statutory and an international norm in the first place, and therefore,
when the supremacy axioms come into play. The CharmingBetsy principle is designed to prevent inadvertent violations of international law,
and before accepting apparent violations as congressional policy, the
court should assure itself that apparent violations were intended. If the
violations were inadvertent, the court should interpret the statute sufficiently narrowly to avoid the violation. Thus, a court fully respecting
both congressional supremacy and the Charming Betsy principle may
insist that an attempted legislative override be explicit, comprehensive,
and conscious. This approach is not purely textual: a court may recognize a statutory override of international law only when there is both
evidence of an intent to override the norm and a text that is irreconcilable with the norm.
In contrast, a court that stresses only the power to repudiate will
frame the burden of proof quite differently, giving controlling weight to
the fact of textual inconsistency between international law and the statute in question. The court will tend to downplay the Charming Betsy
principle and stress instead the famous dicta in The Paquete Habana:
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered
by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right
depending upon it are duly presented for their determination. For this purpose,
where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations ....
176

The notion of a "controlling legislative act," when combined with the
power of Congress consciously to legislate in violation of international
law, has been interpreted to mean that even a superficial inconsistency
must be resolved in favor of the statute. This pattern of resolving a
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (stating that "[aibsent explicit statutory language, we have been
extremely reluctant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights"). No other court, however,
similarly has required a statutory provision to identify and expressly override a particular treaty or
customary norm. Cf. Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (requiring only "some affirmative
expression of congressional intent to abrogate the United States' international obligations"); Diggs
v. Shultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (stating that "no amount of statutory interpretation
now can make the Byrd Amendment other than what it was as presented to the Congress, namely,
a measure which would make-and was intended to make-the United States a certain treaty
violator"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931 (1973); Farr Man & Co. v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 908,
915 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982) (interpreting amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act as "a demonstrative effort on the part of Congress to continue to provide preferential treatment for certain
imports, despite the recognition of the most-favored-nation provisions included in our international treaties").
276. 175 U.S. 677, 700 (emphasis added).
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possible conflict implies that courts need not try to reconcile international and statutory norms in the same subject area: the international
standards are either superfluous because they are congruent with the
domestic statute or they are irrelevant because they are superceded by
the domestic statute. This view has led some courts prematurely to reject or suspend international argumentation.
In American Baptist Churches v. Meese,27 for example, the court
faced the claim that Salvadoran and Guatemalan aliens in the United
States enjoy the right to temporary refuge, a customary2 78 right not to
be deported until the cessation of armed hostilities and human rights
abuses in their homelands. The court opened its analysis with a correct
but pathological premise: "Congress is not constitutionally bound to
abide by precepts of international law, and may therefore promulgate
valid legislation that conflicts with or preempts customary international
law. '279 The court then concluded that Congress actually had exercised
that preemptive power with respect to the norm of temporary refuge in
passing the Refugee Act of 1980.280 In the court's view, that statute oc277. 712 F. Supp. 756 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
278. See Helton, Ecumenical, Municipal, and Legal Challenges to United States Refugee
Policy, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 493, 514-17 (1986); Perluss & Hartman, Temporary Refuge:
Emergence of a Customary Norm, 26 VA. J. INT'L L. 551 (1986) (demonstrating that the norm of
temporary refuge satisfies both the state practice and the opinio juris criteria of customary international law).
The plaintiffs in American Baptist Churches also argued that the norm of temporary refuge
was a conventional obligation as well, citing articles 1, 3, and 45 of the 1949 Geneva Convention
Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; see American Baptist Churches, 712 F. Supp. at 769. The
court concluded that the convention was not self-executing and therefore could not be the source
of rights in domestic courts. Id. at 770. The court appears not to have considered the possibility
that the conventional obligations may have become customary norms. On the issue of the extent to
which that has occurred, see Meron, The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L
L. 348, 357-58 (1987).
279. American Baptist Churches, 712 F. Supp. at 771; see also United States v. Merkt, 794
F.2d 950, 964 n.16 (5th Cir. 1986) (asserting that "[i]n enacting our refugee statute,. . . Congress
was not bound by international law"), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987). The Board of Immigration
Appeals reached a similar conclusion in In re Medina, Interim Dec. 3078, at 17 (B.I.A. Oct. 7,
1988) (No. A26949415).
280. American Baptist Churches, 712 F. Supp. at 771. The American Baptist Churches
court concluded: "In this case, Congress has specifically rejected the asserted norm of temporary
refuge. Congress clearly intended that implementation of the new standards set forth in the statute would itself bring the United States into full compliance with its obligations under international law." Id. The evidence for this conclusion was the legislative history of the act, which
according to the court showed that "[t]he Refugee Act of 1980 was enacted by Congress in order to
'bring United States law into conformity with our international treaty obligations.' Specifically, the
Act 'incorporated the internationally accepted definition of refugee contained in the U.N. Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.'" Id. at 767 (quoting S. REP. No. 256, supra
note 272, at 4). "Yet, Congress did not include within the 1980 Act any reference to a right of
temporary refuge for aliens fleeing general conditions of violence or internal armed conflict. We
thus conclude that Congress rejected the norm of temporary refugee asserted here." Id. at 771.
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cupied the field of refugee rights in the United States. The failure of
Congress to include the norm of temporary refuge in the legislation was
held to preclude the plaintiffs' claim. In response to the argument that
Charming Betsy obliged the court to construe domestic statutes in light
of international standards wherever possible, the court declared that
"the only 'possible construction' of the Refugee Act of 1980 is that it
was intended to provide the exclusive means for obtaining refugee status in this country."2 '
In collapsing the notion of temporary refuge into the refugee doctrine, the court led itself into fundamental error. Even without defending the customary legal status of the norm, it is clear that the norm
cannot be equated with, or defined by reference to, international standards governing "refugees," as that term of art is understood. "Conventional refugee law parallels, but is incongruent with, the norm of
temporary refuge."28' 2 The norm of nonrefoulement,28 3 the cornerstone
of international refugee law, is triggered by individualized persecutiQn,
or the well-founded fear of persecution, on such grounds as religion,
political opinion, or race. By contrast, the obligation of temporary refuge arises out of generalized conditions of violence and human rights
violations in the country of origin: "The applicability of the norm does
not, therefore, depend upon the presence of a subjective individualized
fear or upon an objective membership in a particular social group. 2 84
Similarly distinct is the scope of relief under the two norms; asylum
brings with it affirmative obligations of assistance and assimilation that
are considerably more structured than the simple, temporary grant of
physical refuge.28 5 Moreover, the doctrinal origins of the two norms are
281. Id.
282. Perluss & Hartman, supra note 278, at 597. Perluss and Hartman continue:
Seekers of temporary refuge flee not from individualized persecution but in fear of their lives:
they seek protection and security from conditions of generalized violence. Unlike a refugee, a
person fleeing internal armed conflict generally does not seek to disestablish his ties of nationality or allegiance to his country on a temporary or permanent basis. Nor does such a person
seek ordinarily to obtain durable asylum in or to acquire the nationality of the country of
temporary refuge .... His need for relief, and therefore for temporary refuge, lasts only until
his government can ensure him de facto protection.
Id. at 597-98 (footnotes omitted).
283. Nonrefoulement is the obligation of a state not to return a refugee to any territory
where he or she has a well-founded fear of persecution.
284. Perluss & Hartman, supra note 278, at 583-84 (footnote omitted).
285. See, e.g., Report on the Resettlement of Refugees, Exec. Comm. of the High Commissioner's Programme, U.N. Doc. A/AC.96/609, at 6 (1982) (stating that protection for those who do
not qualify as refugees under the convention "may be correspondingly limited in time, pending a
change of circumstances in their country of origin"); Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, U.N. Doc. E/1985/62, at 22 (1985) (noting that persons escaping "serious
danger resulting from unsettled conditions or civil strife" are protected by the principle of
nonrefoulment, even though they are not "refugees").
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not equivalent: judging from the practice of states in applying the
norm, and its exposition by international organizations, agencies, and
scholars, the norm of temporary refuge arises out of humanitarian law
and international human rights law, rather than the refugee doctrine.
These distinctions, which were ignored in American Baptist
Churches, undermine the court's interpretation of the Refugee Act;
they transform the stated intention of Congress to conform domestic
law with international refugee standards into a silence with respect to
customary norms arising out of other doctrinal sources. Congress had
no reason to address in the Refugee Act, obligations that do not arise
out of the 1967 Protocol; therefore, that Act cannot be regarded as
preclusive or inconsistent legislation with respect to international
norms grounded in some other source. In this light, the Refugee Act left
the norm of temporary refuge alone, free to emerge as it has through
state practice and expressions of opinio juris since 1980.286
Thus, far from an explicit repudiation of the norm of temporary
refuge, the Refugee Act is, by definition of the norm itself, silent on its
status. There is no necessary inconsistency between the Act's comprehensive coverage in refugee matters and the plaintiffs' claims to temporary refuge. Under the CharmingBetsy principle, the court was obliged
to engage in a careful assessment of the evidence that such a norm exists and applies to Salvadorans and Guatemalans in the United States,
and that no other controlling executive or legislative act displaced that
norm. 287 The court's view of the Refugee Act as inconsistent, rather
than silent, provides a thin rationale for the decision and potentially
286. The American Baptist Churches court's assessment of congressional action after 1980 is
equally flawed. The court stressed the fact that a conference committee abandoned a provision
that would have suspended temporarily the deportation of Salvadorans and Guatemalans. American Baptist Churches, 712 F. Supp. at 771 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5840, 5854). The court also noted that Congress
had rejected proposals for extended voluntary departure status for specific Central Americans. Id.
(citing S. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) and H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)). But the
inference that failure to pass a law is tantamount to enacting its opposite is absurd. Especially in a
context in which international standards apply, that inference inverts Charming Betsy to suggest
that Congress by not acting repudiates an asserted norm of international law. "Legislative
acts"-controlling or otherwise-can be passed only by both houses of Congress and presented to
the president for signature. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2).
287. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), forecloses the argument that the government's action or its position in the litigation is a sufficiently controlling executive act to override
the asserted customary norm. In that case, the executive branch had stated its willingness to conduct the war against Spain in conformity with the law of nations. But its interpretation of these
obligations, based on its action in the war and its stance in the litigation, was not considered
persuasive, let alone determinative on the issue of whether fishing vessels could be seized as prize.
If, as is assertedly the case with respect to the norm of temporary refuge, the United States had
acted in conformity with the norm up to the litigation in question, the court's disposition should
uphold the norm. Any other result allows sub silentio violations of international law by the executive branch, a power presumptively denied to Congress by Charming Betsy.
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constrains the ability of the United States to assist in the development
and recognition of the norm."'

The Supreme Court's disposition of Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.2 89 provides a useful contrast. During the
Malvinas/Falklands Island war, Argentina attacked a neutral vessel carrying oil in the domestic trade of the United States. The alien plaintiffs,
owner and timecharterer of the vessel, alleged that the attack on the
high seas violated international law, and the Second Circuit held that
the Alien Tort Claims Act provided subject matter jurisdiction. 90 The
Second Circuit also decided that nothing in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) displaced the prima facie propriety of jurisdiction
under the Alien Tort Claims Act, because sovereign immunity could not
attach to claims for violations of international law: "If sovereign acts
were immunized today from scrutiny under international law, the exception would nearly swallow the rule. For example, the emerging international law prohibition of genocide ...

would make little sense, even

in theory, if sovereign states were not covered by the prohibition." '9 1
According to the Second Circuit, nothing in the FSIA altered this analysis because that statute was intended to restrict sovereign immunity
for the commercial acts of a sovereign and did not create an immunity
for noncommercial violations of international law. To the contrary, the
Second Circuit stated that it "would consider it odd to hold that, by
enacting a statute designed to narrow the scope of sovereign immunity
in the commercial context, Congress, though silent on the subject, intended to broaden the scope of sovereign immunity for violations of international law." 292 The Second Circuit apparently reasoned that the
288. Some evidence suggests that the United States applies the norm of temporary refuge in
its interactions with foreign states. See, e.g., Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1982,
Part 5: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 315 (1981) (warning that forced repatriation by Thailand and
Pakistan would prejudice relations with the United States); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON THE WORLD REFUGEE SITUATION, REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR

1984, at 95-96

(Aug. 1983) (noting that forced repatriation by Costa Rica of Central American nationals displaced
by war would not be appropriate, even though these individuals were not conventional dr statutory
refugees and were instead in "temporary asylum status"). In 1987, the United States declared that
the forced repatriation of Hmong tribesmen by Thailand constituted "a serious breach of human
rights." Thai Officials Deny Violating the Rights of Laos Tribesman, N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1987,
at 13, col. 1; see also Britain Demands Return to Vietnam of Boat People, N.Y. Times, June 14,
1989, at 1, col. 5 (reporting that the Deputy Secretary of State declares that the United States
"will not consider forced repatriation as falling within the rubric of 'acceptable under international
practices' ").
289. 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989).
290. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 426 (2d Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989).
291. Id. at 426 (citation omitted).
292. Id. at 427.
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Alien Tort Claims Act provided a jurisdiction not displaced by the
FSIA, because Congress knew that jurisdiction on these facts would be
sustained and did nothing about it.
Both halves of the argument were flawed: it seems doubtful that
Congress was aware in 1976 that jurisdiction over foreign acts of war
would be sustained under an obscure provision of the First Judiciary
Act. Even if Congress were aware of that fact, it is not "fairly possible"
to construe as silence the facially comprehensive and preemptive language of the FSIA29' and its legislative history.29 4 As noted by the Supreme Court in reversing the Second Circuit's decision, "[T]he text and
structure of the FSIA demonstrate Congress'[s] intention that the FSIA
be the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in our
courts. ' 295 When Congress intended to vitiate immunity for violations
of international law, it did so explicitly, 296 a fact which bars the judicial

construction of a more universal exception for international wrongs
generally.
In its treatment of the Charming Betsy principle, the Second Circuit decision in Amerada Hess is the opposite of that in American Baptist Churches, but it is equally implausible. On its surface, the appellate
result in Amerada Hess vindicated an established norm of customary
law, the protection of neutral shipping on the high seas, by interpreting
the FSIA to preserve the courts' jurisdiction over such claims. Charming Betsy and its progeny support the form of this analysis although
the Second Circuit ironically may have approved an exercise of jurisdiction in violation of international law.2 97 The critical failing was that it
accomplished this result by construing as silence text and legislative
history that could not logically bear such a construction.
The CharmingBetsy principle thus offers grounds for rejecting the
spurious finding of either preemption, as in American Baptist
Churches, or silence, as in the Second Circuit's disposition of Amerada
Hess. The former displays a flippancy towards putative customary
293. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1604 (1982); see also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461
U.S. 480, 493 (1983).
294. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976); S. REP. No. 1310, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12 (1976) (stating that the FSIA "sets forth the sole and exclusive standards to be
used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by foreign states before Federal and State
courts in the United States" and "prescribes .
the jurisdiction of U.S. district courts in cases
involving foreign states").
295. Amerada Hess, 109 S. Ct. at 688.
296. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982).
297. The Second Circuit should have considered state practice before it embraced its
cramped notion of sovereign immunity. It would have discovered that virtually no doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity in foreign states, in the International Law Commission deliberations, or
in the evolution of the Restatement (Third) supported the general exception for violations of international law.
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norms that risks a violation of international law, and the latter shows
inadequate respect for the language and the intent of Congress. Charming Betsy prohibits the inference of repudiation from congressional silence, but it is clear that a preemptive intent, combined with
unavoidable inconsistency, does not qualify as silence.
2. Statutory Directives to Consider "Other Laws and Treaties"
A narrower version of the inferred intent problem arises when Congress directs that statutory provisions be construed in conformity with
other, designated types of law.2"' For example, the courts occasionally
have endorsed the inference that the explicit specification of "laws and
treaties" implicitly excludes customary international law from consideration. 29 9 The specification of "laws" in this view refers only to statutes,
and possibly court decisions, and the specification of "treaties" exhausts other relevant international sources of norms. According to this
line of analysis, one of the intent canons of construction, "the expression of one implies the intent to exclude others," 300 trumps the Charming Betsy accommodation canon directing that statutes be construed in
light of international law wherever possible.
But these two canons operate in mutually exclusive circumstances.
The exclusio canon has been considered reliable only when there is evidence of comprehensive legislative attention to alternatives, including
the specific alternative urged before the court.301 It is, therefore, espe298. The Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1988), provides that each fishery management plan approved by the Secretary of Commerce shall
be "consistent with the national standards, the other provisions of this chapter, and any other
applicable law." Id. § 1853(a)(1)(C). This language was construed to include treaties in Washington State Charterboat Assoc. v. Baldrige, 702 F.2d 820, 823 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1053 (1984). Compare id. with Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, ch. 25, tit. I, § 22
(1933) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 624(f) (1988)) (stating that "[n]o trade agreement or
other international agreement heretofore or hereafter entered into by the United States shall be
applied in a manner inconsistent with the requirements of this section").
299. See, e.g., United States v. Aguilar, 871 F.2d 1436 (9th Cir.), modified, 883 F.2d 662 (9th
Cir. 1989). In determining the deportability of an alien, the Attorney General is directed by statute
to consider "the provisions of this Chapter [the Immigration and Nationality Act], or olf any other
law or treaty." Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, tit. II, § 242(b), 66 Stat. 163, 209 (1952)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988)). The phrase "immigration laws" is defined
elsewhere in the statute as "all laws, conventions, and treaties of the United States relating to the
immigration, exclusion, deportation, or expulsion of aliens." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(17) (1988). Without
discussion, the Ninth Circuit in Aguilar concluded that "laws and treaties" did not include customary norms. Aguilar, 871 F.2d at 1454.
300. The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is "closely related to literalism and the
plain meaning rule," 2A J. SUTHERLAND, supra note 34, § 47.25, at 209, and is subject to related
criticisms.
301. See, e.g., National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(stating that the exclusio canon "stands on the faulty premise that all possible alternative or supplemental provisions were necessarily considered and rejected by the legislative draftsmen"), cert.
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cially unreliable as a counterweight to the Charming Betsy principle,
which presumes compliance in the absence of such evidence. If Congress were aware of a customary norm and nonetheless enacted contrary
legislation, the exclusio canon properly could operate, but the Charming Betsy principle would not: as noted, the Charming Betsy interpretive mandate can be overcome by an express intent to repudiate
existing international standards. On the other hand, in the absence of
extrinsic evidence of such an intent, the preconditions for the application of the exclusio principle would not be satisfied, and the inference
of exclusion would violate the presumption against implied repeals.
Treating the specification of "laws and treaties" as an exclusion of
customary law also contradicts the substantial case law and commentary that portrays custom as a pocket of federal common law. 2 That
designation is significant because federal common law has been held to
be "law" within the meaning of the federal question jurisdictional statute"'3 and for other purposes,30 4 including the interpretation of federal
statutes. 0 To the extent that the congressional preservation of "laws
and treaties" does not exclude federal common law generally, it should
not qualify as an affirmative repudiation of relevant norms of customary international law.
On the other hand, the force of the syllogism-federal common law
is "law," customary international law is federal common law, therefore,
denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974); R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 282 (1985). In
the absence of such evidence, the exclusio maxim attributes an implausible omniscience to the
legislature.
302. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964); Henkin, supra note
13, at 1559. The British origins of this rule date to the eighteenth century. See, e.g., Triquet v.
Bath, 3 Burr. 1478, 97 Eng. Rep. 936 (1764); 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 67 (1st ed. 1769) (recognizing that "the law of nations (wherever any question arises
which is properly the object of its jurisdiction) is here adopted in its full extent by the common
law, and is held to be a part of the law of the land"). See generally Jay, supra note 244, at 819.
303. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1982); see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 354 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048 (1987)
(upholding jurisdiction under § 1331 of conversion claim on the ground that it raised "as a necessary element, the question whether to honor the request of a foreign government that the American courts enforce the foreign government's directives to freeze property in the United States
subject to future process in the foreign state"). Professor Charles Alan Wright concludes that
"'federal common law,' when it exists, is among the 'laws of the United States' referred to in the
jurisdictional statute, and that, except in the admiralty field [Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959)], there is federal question jurisdiction of claims based on federal common law." C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17, at 97 (4th ed. 1983) (footnotes
omitted).
304. See, e.g., County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (recognizing
that federal common law creates right of action).
305. Professor Eskridge, in particular, has demonstrated the considerable penetration of
common-law principles into such statutory regimes as the Civil Rights Act, the Taft-Hartley Act of
1947, the Sherman Act of 1890, the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, and a variety of
jurisdictional or procedural statutes. Eskridge, supra note 59, at 1051-55.
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customary international law is "law"-may be more apparent than real
in the context of statutory interpretation. Most of the decisions establishing that federal common law is "law" assess that branch of federal
common law consisting of court decisions, not customary international
law, and it is not self-evident that all forms of federal common law
should be treated identically. Custom may be federal law in that it is
distinct from state law, but custom is not federal law in origin, because
it arises out of international practice and not the constitutional politics
of article I. It is, therefore, one thing to suggest that a federal court, in
filling federal statutory gaps, should consult common-law rules developed by domestic judges over generations. It is quite another to suggest
that the work of international organizations, the practice of states, and
evidence of opinio juris are proper referents for the interpretation of
statutes the drafters of which may have been entirely unfamiliar with
international developments.
In part, the propriety of consulting international sources when interpreting domestic statutes is suggested by the original understanding
among the Framers of the Constitution that the law of nations and the
common law were "laws" of the United States. Neither the law of nations nor the common law is mentioned in the supremacy clause of the
Constitution s or the jurisdictional provisions of article 111.307 Nevertheless, impressive evidence suggests that the founding generation understood that the law of nations was supreme over state law and that
the specific provisions of article III subsumed the categories of jurisdiction under that branch of law.308 By contrast, the status of federal law
generated under the Constitution, including congressional statutes and
treaties, required explicit protection through the supremacy clause and
by a federal judiciary. Given the national experience with such federal
law under the Articles of Confederation,3 0 9 express treatment of "laws
and treaties," unlike the law of nations or the common law, was essential. Though this analysis has generated some controversy,3 10 it clearly
undermines the inference that modern statutory references to "laws
306. U.S. CONST. art. VI (providing that laws "made in Pursuance" of the Constitution "shall
be the supreme Law of the Land").
307. U.S. CONST. art. III.
308. Dickinson, Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation, 26 AM. J. INT'L L.
239, 253 (1932); Jay, supra note 244, at 819; Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133
U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1985).

309. See F.

McDONALD,

Novus

ORDO SECLORuM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTI-

TUTION 155-56 (1985); THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 191-93 (A. Hamilton) (J. Hamilton ed. 1866); id.
No. 33, at 257-58.
310. Recent scholarship has suggested the pitfalls of injecting eighteenth-century precepts
into twentieth-century analysis. See Jay, supra note 244, at 820-21; Weisburd, supra note 124, at
1210-12.
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and treaties" implicitly exclude customary international law. The internal values of the Charming Betsy principle do not favor inferences of
repudiation from silence or congressional unawareness and thus require
a more articulate repudiation of international law than the court's inference that "laws and treaties" excludes customary international law.
In summary, the Charming Betsy presumption treats as a kind of
"silence" those statutory provisions that do not reflect either some explicit consideration of customary norms or a clear intent to preempt or
preclude consideration of all other sources of legal standards. If the textual and historical evidence establishes either of these preconditions,
the court need not apply the Charming Betsy presumption that the
statute conforms to international law. In the absence of such evidence,
however, there is no reason based in legislative supremacy to preclude
consideration of such international norms as may exist and be relevant.
C.

The Problem of Statutory Appropriateness

The hypothesis that customary and conventional international law
is relevant in the substantive interpretation of domestic statutes cannot
be tested directly: it is not possible to explore every hypothetical intersection between international law and the fifty titles in the United
States Code. But it is possible to demonstrate the implausibility of a
blanket rule defining categories of inherently domestic statutes that are
beyond the reach of the international system and, therefore, exempt
from the CharmingBetsy principle. In any given case, no threshold test
of subject matter appropriateness should displace a careful assessment
of the status and meaning of the international norms invoked by the
parties or discovered by the court.
First, as a theoretical matter, a blanket rule would presume a category of defined subjects that are within states' exclusive domestic jurisdiction. The existence of such a category in the abstract is impossible to
deny, appearing by name in the Charter of the United Nations 311 and
multilateral pronouncements on the rights and duties of states. 1 2 Our
hypothetical blanket rule of inappropriateness would reflect the perpet311. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (stating that "[n]othing contained in the present Charter
shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement
under the present Charter").
312. See, e.g., United Nations Draft Declarationof the Rights and Duties of States, June 9,
1949, 4 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 10) at 8, U.N. Doc. A/925, art. 1 (1949) (stating that "[e]very State
has the right . . . to exercise freely, without dictation by any other State, all its legal powers,
including the choice of its own form of government"); see also Montevideo Convention on the
Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.I.A.S. No. 881, 165 L.N.T.S. 19; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, Dec. 12, 1974, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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uation of territorial sovereignty as the foundation of international law
and would exclude from international scrutiny certain types of decisions including those in legislative form.
But the history of international law in the twentieth century has
been the steady if incremental exclusion of issues and behaviors from
the protective ambit of exclusive domestic jurisdiction and the demonstration that such jurisdiction does not comprehend an inert and unchanging set of state competences. 1 3 As demonstrated by the rise of
universal organizations and of regional integration as well as the emergence of international human rights law, exclusive domestic jurisdiction
does not mean today what it meant at the turn of the century or even
at the end of World War II. And the move "from an essentially negative
code of rules of abstention to positive rules of cooperation"3 14 leaves
little confidence in a stable notion of exclusive domestic jurisdiction for
the future.
In essence, the distinction between domestic and international concern is a function of diplomatic history rather than principle. In the
Tunis-Morocco Nationality Cases3 1 5 the Permanent Court of International Justice recognized that "[t]he question whether a certain matter
is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially
relative question; it depends upon the development of international relations." ' By their behavior, states determine what is and what is not
within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction. A blanket rule of appropriateness would be necessarily provisional, constantly subject to dis313. Higgins, Intervention and InternationalLaw, in

INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS

29,

31-32 (H. Bull ed. 1984) (recognizing that nineteenth-century notions of domestic jurisdiction are
antiquated by contemporary developments).
The transformation from domestic to international concern can be rapid. See, e.g., 15 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 452 (1946) (Connally Amendment to the United States' acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice under article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute). The
amendment withheld consent to jurisdiction over matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States of America as determined by the United States of America." Id. at 453. A
contemporary account suggests that the amendment was necessary because, without it, "the Court
might invade such fields as immigration, the tariff and the control of the Panama Canal." 0. LisSITZYN, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

64 (1951). Although these "fields" were then thought to

be within the exclusive domestic jurisdiction of the United States, each has become the subject of
international concern since 1946 and to that extent can no longer lie within the exclusive category.
This observation does not deny the continuing relevance, indeed the dominance, of exclusive
domestic jurisdiction in modern international law discourse. See Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1
(1989). The argument, however, is that in giving content to such a concept one cannot define a
priori types of statutes that are immune from the Charming Betsy principle on the grounds of
exclusive domestic jurisdiction.
314. W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (1964).
315. Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (Fr. v. Gr. Brit.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. B)
No. 4 (Feb. 7).
316. Id. at 24.
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placement by the conduct and agreement of states. Moreover, such a
rule, reflecting judicially-imposed constraints on legitimate international discourse, would limit unduly the political branches in their dealings with foreign nations, especially in the attempt to develop new
law.3 17 The more traditional and intrinsically judicial course is to assess
the evidence that an international norm exists and the scope of such a
norm, rather than to erect some per se barrier to such an analysis in
interpreting certain types of domestic statutes.
The implausibility of an appropriateness test also may be inferred
if one posits a gradient of statutory types, distinguished by the degree
to which customary or conventional international law may be relevant
in the act of interpretation. At one end of the gradient would be all
statutes in which international standards are expressly or implicitly incorporated, as to which the Charming Betsy principle plainly would apply.3 18 At the other extreme would be the putative category of statutes
within a state's exclusive jurisdiction as to which Charming Betsy
would be irrelevant by hypothesis. Between these extremes would be
statutes that affect international persons or foreign affairs but that do
not refer explicitly to customary or conventional international law (including international criminal offenses, international trade statutes, and
the arbitration acts) and statutes that overlap international concerns.
In determining where on this gradient a particular statute or a particular statutory issue belonged, a court would consider evidence of international concern in the form of treaties, custom, declarations,
guidelines, and the like. Though the court may conclude that there is
no international law for it to apply, that conclusion should follow its
assessment of international practice, not its predisposition to ignore international developments on the ground that they are ultra vires. The
317. Justice Joseph Story recognized the importance of such normative evolution. In United
States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832 (D. Mass. 1822) (No. 15,551), he stated:
It does not follow, . . that because a principle cannot be found settled by the consent or
practice of nations at one time, it is to be concluded, that at no subsequent period the principle can be considered as incorporated into the public code of nations. Nor is it to be admitted,
that no principle belongs to the law of nations, which is not universally recogni[z]ed, as such,
by all civilized communities, or even by those constituting, what may be called, the Christian
states of Europe. Some doctrines, which we, as well as Great Britain, admit to belong to the
law of nations, are of but recent origin and application, and have not, as yet, received any
public or general sanction in other nations. .
Id. at 846.
318. Thus, for example, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), gives federal
district courts jurisdiction over "any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Section 894 of the Internal Revenue Code,
states that "[t]he provisions of this title shall be applied to any taxpayer with due regard to any
treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer." I.R.C. § 894(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1990).
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court must recognize that a different issue under the same statute, or
even the same issue later in time, will be assessed differently. For example, a question of statutory construction under the federal procurement
statutes may implicate issues arising under the Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1 9 and the interpretive task
of the court will be to assess the relevance and status of the norm,
rather than to respect some threshold abstract test of domestic jurisdiction. Again, the dominant factor is not a per se test of appropriateness
but the evidence that relevant international norms exist. The very facts
that would determine that there were standards to apply under the
Charming Betsy principle would override the barrier of exclusive domestic jurisdiction. A test of statutory appropriateness, therefore,
would be superfluous, even if it were plausible.
D. The Problem of Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw
The application of the Charming Betsy principle may be complicated by the fact that international legal standards emerge and have
varying normative status over time. This difficulty is not new: the pure
ideal of international law as consisting exclusively of binding legal
norms governing international relations always has been an oversimplification.32 0 Especially since World War II, and increasingly since the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,3' 2

normative types in

international discourse have proliferated. Sometimes designated "soft
law," these putative norms go beyond the traditional rhetoric dominated by the distinction between rights and obligations that are either
binding or nonbinding.
There are multiple examples of this phenomenon. The resolutions
of international organizations and guidelines articulated by international conferences, even when confessedly neither constitutive nor declaratory of law, nonetheless are given weight in the decisions of
international courts and arbitral tribunals. 22 The doctrine of jus cogens
319. 1980 U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.97/18 (1980), reprinted in 19 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 668 (1980). The United States deposited its instrument of ratification on Dec. 11, 1986. The Convention entered into force for the
United States on Dec. 11, 1987.
320. 1 P. GUGGENHEIM, TRAITE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 1 (2d ed. 1967) ("le droit
international public. . . est l'ensemble des norms juridique qui r~gissent les relations internationales") (translated as "public international law is the set of legal norms that regulate international
relations" (translation by Author)). The long-standing difficulty of distinguishing between lex lata,
the established law, and lex ferenda, the emerging law, undermines any simple dichotomy between
relevant binding law and irrelevant aspiration.
321. Vienna Convention, supra note 106.
322. See, e.g., Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R. 389, 483-95
(Arb. 1977), reprinted in 17 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1, 27-31 (1978).
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erects a hierarchy of norms, distinguishing peremptory from merely
customary obligations. 2 3 The International Court of Justice has defined
circumstances under which a treaty provision can come to bind nonsignatories. 32 4 Intergovernmental institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade3 25 or the Helsinki Commission 26 rest on
legal foundations that are neither strictly conventional nor strictly customary. States that have signed but not ratified a treaty nevertheless
may be under an obligation "to refrain from acts which would defeat
the object and purpose of [that] treaty." s 7 States commonly frame
their conventional obligations as exhortations to commit "best efforts"
or "to cooperate" to some specified end. Each of these examples suggests a range of normativity in international law, which vastly complicates the basic task of defining a state's entitlements and obligations;
indeed the "blurring of the normativity threshold"3 2 has been criticized
as expanding claims for international law beyond its consensualist29 base
and making it incomprehensible and illegitimate in the process.
Does the CharmingBetsy principle transfer this theoretical dispute
323. Vienna Convention, supra note 106, arts. 53, 64; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 3, §
102 comment k. Referring to jus cogens norms, the Restatement (Third) recognizes that "[s]ome
rules of international law are recognized by the international community of states as peremptory,
permitting no derogation.. . . Such a peremptory norm is subject to modification only by a subsequent norm of international law having the same character." Id. See generally Suy, The Concept
of Jus Cogens in Public InternationalLaw in CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, 2
PAPERS & PROC. 17 (1967); Virally, R6flexions sur le "jus cogens," 1966 ANNUAIRE FRANgAID DROIT
INT'L 5; Whiteman, Jus Cogens in International Law, With a Projected List, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 609 (1977).
324. The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
4, 28, 37-46.
325. See J. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 59-60 (1969).
326. Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323
(1975), reprintedin R. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS 470.1 (1986). The Helsinki Accords do not have the force of a treaty and often are equated to declarations of the United
Nations. Nevertheless, in 1976, Congress created a joint executive-congressional commission to further the objectives of the Accords. Act of June 3, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-304, 90 Stat. 661 (codified as
amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3009 (1988)).
327. Vienna Convention, supra note 106, at art. 18.
328. Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413, 415
(1983). Professor Prosper Weil argues:
While prenormative acts do not create rights or obligations on which reliance may be placed
before an international court of justice or of arbitration, and failure to live up to them does
not give rise to international responsibility, they do create expectations and exert on the conduct of states an influence that in certain cases may be greater than that of rules of treaty or
customary law. Conversely, the sanction visited upon the breach of a legal obligation is sometimes less real than that imposed for failure to honor a purely moral or political obligation.
Id.
329. See, e.g., Baxter, InternationalLaw in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
549 (1980); Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms-A Meaningful Distinction in InternationalRelations?, 11 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 65 (1980); Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Non-Binding
InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296 (1977); Weil, supra note 328, at 441.
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into the courts of the United States? Must a domestic court consider
this "soft" international law in the interpretation of domestic statutes?
Can it do so without usurping a political function? In approaching these
questions, the starting point should be the recognition that Charming
Betsy and its progeny offer no internal criteria for determining the content of the law of nations. No burden of proof is defined, and the presumption on its face seems to require statutory conformity only with
norms that qualify as "law." It would be no apparent violation of that
principle if a court chose to ignore standards that had not achieved international legal status. 3s
It is perhaps surprising, therefore, that some courts have consulted
standards that do not readily qualify as the law of nations and have
done so in apparent accord with the values implicit in the Charming
Betsy principle. This practice has been especially true in cases raising
human rights issues, as well as cases determining the extraterritorial
reach of statutes on the basis of international comity s 31 In human
rights cases, for example, when the content of customary international
law was at issue, some courts have given evidentiary weight to declarations and guidelines as well as treaties that had been signed by the
32
United States but never ratified.
The court's eagerness to find help wherever it can in difficult issues
of interpretation may explain and justify these uses of soft law. Equally
plausible, the use of soft law may illustrate the monist and dualist values jointly at work in the CharmingBetsy principle. In the dualist paradigm, for example, the courts take seriously the prospect of
embarrassing the political branches of government caused by giving inadequate recognition to emerging principles of law. Embarrassment
may follow even if these standards are intended as precatory guidelines
with no pretense that they express law or may yet become law. The
330. See, e.g., Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (distinguishing law from aspiration).
331. See supra Part III(B).
332. See, e.g., Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382, 1388 (10th Cir. 1981) (citing

the American Convention on Human Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as
support for customary principle prohibiting prolonged arbitrary detention); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 883-85 (2d Cir. 1980) (consulting the American Convention on Human Rights and

the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, inter alia, to determine the customary
prohibition on torture); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (recogniz-

ing the Universal Declaration, American Convention, and the Civil and Political Covenant as evidence of a customary norm against summary execution), reh'g granted in part and denied in part,
694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Lareau v. Manson, 507 F. Supp. 1177, 1187-89 n.9 (D. Conn.

1980) (discussing the United Nations Minimum Standard Rules Governing the Treatment of Prisoners), modified, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981), aff'd in part and modified in part, 651 F.2d 96 (2d

Cir. 1981). See generally R.

LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS

440.6-.7 (1986)

(collecting federal and state court cases discussing the principal human rights instruments).
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courts of the United States are in no position to deny the significance of
United States positions taken on international matters, even if these
matters do not yet approximate law. The courts should acknowledge
that embarrassment is not limited to violations of law, but can include
departures from formal principles achieved by consensus in international settings. Unless compelled by statutory directive to override
these principles, there is no reason to ignore them altogether on account
of their "softness." Indeed, the decision to consult such principles at all
reflects a greater sensitivity to the separation of powers than a per se
rule that allows potential norms to be only dispositive or irrelevant.
Thus the embarrassment rationale opens the door to the consideration
of norms that have not yet achieved the status of law.
The evidentiary value to be given those standards should reflect
the monist rationale. That is, in determining how much weight to give
informal declarations or principles, it is relevant for the court to assess
how the international community as a whole regards the standards. International courts and arbitral tribunals proceed in this way, either dismissing principles as aspirations of a limited group or relying on them
as expressions of widespread understandings. Domestic courts applying
the Charming Betsy principle should take a similar role in determining
where on the normativity gradient a putative standard rests.
There may be no international standards, hard or soft, to apply in
a given case, and the interpretive light cast by the international standard may be lost in the glare of statutory detail. Inevitably the weight
to be given international pronouncements will reflect the common-law
powers of the court. As noted by Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
"[I]nternational law, or the law that governs between states, has at
times, like the common law within states, a twilight existence during
which it is hardly distinguishable from morality or justice, till at length
the imprimatur of a court attests its jural quality."'33 The Charming
Betsy principle allows the courts to assess both the meaning and the
status of international standards that do not achieve the status of international law. The variety of legal experience in the international legal
system provides no prophylactic grounds for ignoring principles that
are not yet binding.
V. OBJECTIONS TO THE LEGITIMACY OF THE ENTERPRISE
This part of the Article responds to the objection that it is illegitimate-and not merely difficult-for a court to give the law of nations a
significant role in the interpretation of domestic statutes. Illegitimacy
in this context is a class of three separate objections. First, it may be
333. New Jersey v. Delaware, 291 U.S. 361, 383 (1934).
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argued that the Charming Betsy principle is inherently countermajoritarian: it involves a quasi-legislative function rather than the interpretation of domestic, judge-made common law. Second, it arguably
violates the constitutionally-grounded principle that the judiciary is not
competent to adjudicate issues of foreign affairs, including international
law. In this respect, it raises the prospect of an intolerable interference
with the prerogatives of the political branches. A final objection arises
out of critical legal scholarship: the interpretive or hermeneutic technique at work in Charming Betsy amounts to an intellectual deus ex
machina, a contrived solution to an insolvable puzzle, a facile but unsatisfying escape from the embarrassment of radical indeterminacy.
A.

Illegitimacy Round I: The Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty

A court's turn to international standards may be challenged as an
illegitimate exercise of judicial power. Like any public values approach
to statutory construction, the affirmative obligation expressed in the
Charming Betsy principle raises the "counter-majoritarian difficulty. 3 3 4 It is arguably illegitimate for unelected and unaccountable
judges to substitute their subjective judgment for the law, which reflects the will of the majority. Though generally raised in the context of
constitutional adjudication, this counter-majoritarian objection has a
distinct analogue in disputes over statutory construction: judicial subjectivism undoes the deal implicit in every legislative enactment33 5 and,
therefore, cannot be reconciled with the dominant ideal of legislative
supremacy expressed in the Constitution and protected by the separation of powers. Specifically, as Justice Antonin Scalia has argued, the
court cannot enforce some unenacted legislative intent, a premise that
leads him to ignore extratextual legislative materials found useful, if
33 6
not dispositive, by other members of the Court.
This objection arguably should apply a fortiori in the Charming
Betsy context, where, without even the dubious support of legislative
history, a congressional understanding is presumed as a prophylactic
measure against both international discord and encroachments on the
political branches' prerogatives. In this view the Charming Betsy principle should not oblige the courts of the United States to apply foreign
norms. The Second Circuit in United States v. Aluminum Corp. of
334. A. BICKEL, supra note 102, at 16.
335. Easterbrook, supra note 54, at 540 (observing that "[ailmost all statutes are compromises"); Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciaryin an Interest-GroupPerspective, 18 J.
L. & EcoN. 875, 894 (1975) (arguing that judges should enforce only the deal negotiated in the
process of legislation).
336. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Americas33 noted with respect to United States antitrust laws that "the
only question open is whether Congress intended to impose the liability
and whether our own Constitution permitted it to do so: as a court of
the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. ' 3 S Even if the

court acknowledged "the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers,"33 9 the opinion does not suggest that
the supremacy of Congress could be displaced by foreign or international law.
In this form, the counter-majoritarian objection is inapposite, even
if it were sound in its premise. 4 A proper appreciation of Charming
Betsy does not require the courts of the United States to reconcile domestic statutes with the laws of foreign nations. Certainly nothing in
that case undermines the territorial sovereignty of nations, including
the United States, and foreign laws standing alone do not give rise to
the kind of international norms embraced by the CharmingBetsy principle. For example, "general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations" may be cognizable as international law, 341 but the details of a
foreign statutory regime, even if consistent in form from nation to nation, generally are not thought to qualify as "principles" in this sense.
Nor could foreign laws give rise to customary law except to the extent
that they constituted a "general practice accepted as law, ' ' 34 2 and then

it could apply in the United States not as the law of a foreign state but
as the law of nations that is "part of our law. ' 343 Furthermore, when a
statute is interpreted in light of conventional practices, as in CardozaFonseca, it is not some foreign law that constrains the interpretation of
the statute, but a congressionally-acceptable reference to an international standard.
In this context, the counter-majoritarian objection is undermined
337.
338.

148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
Id. at 443.

339. Id.
340. The "counter-majoritarian" objection itself has been criticized for equating legislative
supremacy with majority will, see Popkin, supra note 73, at 566, and as perverting the real locus of
sovereignty in United States political culture, see Radin, A Short Way With Statutes, 56 HARV. L.
REv. 388, 388-409 (1942). In addition, it would seem that the counter-majoritarian difficulty proves
too much in the context of statutory interpretation: even assuming an adequately representative
legislature, only a court that actually consists of the legislature itself could both interpret a statute's inevitable gaps and do so in conformity with the majority will. Although there is nothing selfcontradictory about such an arrangement, it is plainly not our system.
341. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38(1)(c). See generally W. FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 188-210 (1964); McNair, The General Principlesof Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 33 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. (1957).
342. I.C.J. STAT. art. 33(1)(b). Mere parallelism among foreign statutes would not ipso facto

qualify as custom. J.
343.

KUNz, THE CHANGING LAW OF NATIONS

342 (1968).

See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
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by the fact that the Congress always can correct the courts' "mistakes"
in articulating international law under the Charming Betsy principle.
The judicial interpretation of statutes, unlike the interpretation of the
Constitution, is always "subject to overrule or alteration by ordinary
statute."""4 Thus, Congress enjoys a majoritarian corrective for the antimajoritarian exercise of judicial power. This response is only partial,
however, because it rests on a counter-factual assumption, namely that
Congress has sufficient information, time, and political will to oversee
and modify the courts' statutory work product in its totality. The economic theory of legislation suggests that this assumption is naive s 5 and
that the oversight power of the legislature is of more theoretical than
practical comfort.
It is significant then, that a court applying the Charming Betsy
principle is constrained by factors that are not necessarily present in
other modes of common lawmaking. For example, the Charming Betsy
principle obviously operates only in the interpretation of a statute and
is constrained by the limits of fair reconcilability. Contrary to the
troubling view that international law is ipso facto incorporated into domestic law, the interpretive model presupposes some prior, relevant political act by Congress. If the majority wishes by legislation to violate
international law, nothing in the CharmingBetsy principle thwarts that
will except to require that it be expressed clearly. The court's articulation of a "clear statement" rule sets a condition for expressing majority
will: it puts Congress on notice that the judiciary will interpret unclear
statutes to preserve international law. But the clear statement rule does
nothing to frustrate the effectuation of a majority will that is expressed
plainly; indeed, clear statement rules can violate majoritarianism only if
the court is powerless to define the terms of its discourse with the legislature. The judiciary would be obliged to follow the legislature's understanding of a rule that is in the court's view unclearly expressed, and
that result is absurd.
In addition, the Charming Betsy principle protects majoritarian
values better than any competing interpretive presumption about domestic statutes and international law. An opposite presumption, that
acts of Congress are presumably in violation of international law, is
plainly unworkable and empirically wrong. The nonpresumption, that
344.
345.

J. ELY, supra note 81, at 4.
Macey, supra note 54, at 227 (arguing that "[finterest group theory treats statutes as

commodities that are purchased by particular interest groups or coalitions of interest groups that
outbid and outmaneuver competing interest groups" (footnote omitted)). See generally M. OLSON,
THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982); R. PosNE, supra note 301, at 271 (describing the importance of interest groups in affecting the legislative process); Kalt & Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279 (1984).

1186

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1103

norms of international law are presumably irrelevant to acts of Congress unless a contrary intent appears, has a superficial plausibility. It
reflects a profoundly dualist perspective. But it sacrifices the presumption of respect for both the political branches and the international
community in exchange for a dubious simplicity: it provides guidance in
only the easy cases. In a case like Lauritzen, in which the issue is
whether the statute will be construed to violate international standards,
a presumption of irrelevance either offers no answer at all or collapses
into the discredited presumption of violation. If the court attempts,
through Judge Posner's technique of "imaginative reconstruction,"3 46 to
determine how the Congress would have resolved an interpretive issue
like Lauritzen, it seems unlikely in the abstract that a majority would
intend to override international norms if a saving construction can be
sustained.
The counter-majoritarian objection fails for a final reason. The inquiry and analysis required by the Charming Betsy principle are constrained by the essential fact-dependency of international law,
especially customary international law. Although the evidence that a
court will consult in determining the law of nations is not majoritarian
in any legislative sense, the court is not free to follow utterly subjective
expressions of principle or values located somewhere in the international system. Norms of international law properly are deemed legislative facts, 347 constrained by historical and diplomatic reality. 48 The
346. See R. POSNER, supra note 301, at 286-93; Posner, supra note 56, at 817-22.
347. The distinction between legislative and adjudicative facts was developed in Davis, An
Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 404-07
(1942). It was articulated by the Advisory Committee on Proposed Rules as follows:
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts of the particular case. Legislative facts, on the other
hand, are those which have relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether
in the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or in the enactment of a
legislative body.
FED. R. EVID. 201 advisory committee's note (a).
348. International law traditionally has been distinguished from domestic laws of foreign
states in this regard: prior to the promulgation of FED. R. Cxv. P. 44.1, foreign law was treated as a
question of fact, with significant consequences for both the standard of review on appeal, see Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985); United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.
364, 395 (1948); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a) (establishing "clearly erroneous" standard of review of findings of fact); and the acceptable forms of evidence, see Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 and the "Fact"
Approach to Determining ForeignLaw: Death Knell for a Die-HardDoctrine, 65 MICH. L. RE.
615, 649-56 (1967).
International law was treated differently. Thus in The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170 (1871),
having declared that the Court would take judicial notice of a particular rule of international law,
Justice William Strong stated that "[f]oreign municipal laws must indeed be proved as facts, but it
is not so with the law of nations." Id. at 188; see also The New York, 175 U.S. 187 (1899). The
British courts adopt a similar position, as expressed by Stephenson, L.J., in Trendtex Trading
Corp. v. Central Bank of Nig., [1977] 2 W.L.R. 356, 1 All E.R. 881 (C.A.).
But rules of international law, whether they be part of our law or a source of our law, must be
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court must buttress its articulation of the law of nations with the general practice of states and evidence of opinio juris, requirements that
are sufficiently demanding to erase the prospect of complete judicial
creativity in principle. The CharmingBetsy canon, in other words, does
not alter the structured inquiry into whether an international norm exists. Illegitimacy is accordingly a less trenchant problem in the interpretive context of Charming Betsy than it is in the incorporationist
context, in which it has proven a constant theme of positivist
scholarship.3 49
B. Illegitimacy Round II: Prudence and the Political Question
Doctrine
A separate version of the legitimacy objection suggests that the
Charming Betsy principle, if taken seriously, allows the courts to usurp
a political function. To the extent that it invites judicial consideration
of international issues, the canon politicizes the courts, raising the prospect of a premature or embarrassing statement of international principles and potentially undermining the important power of the national
35 0
government to alter customary international law by violating it.
This argument rests on the theory that the nation must speak with
one voice in foreign affairs. International law in this view is a subspecies
of foreign affairs, collapsing inevitably into international politics: when
the political branches determine or articulate the United States' international obligations under either customary or conventional law, they
inherently are making decisions about the conduct of United States foreign policy. The court in Finzer v. Barry 5' made this equivalence exin some sense "proved", and they are not proved in English courts by expert evidence like
foreign law: they are "proved" by taking judicial notice of "international treaties and conventions, authoritative textbooks, practice and judicial decisions" of other courts in other countries which show that they have "attained the position of general acceptance by civilised
nations.. .. "
Id. at 379, 1 All E.R. at 902 (quoting The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, 497).
Rule 44.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure altered the conception and treatment of
foreign law and did not address international law: "The court, in determining foreign law, may
consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party
or admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The court's determination shall be treated as a
ruling on a question of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 44.1. It now appears that international law and foreign
law are to be proved and treated similarly: as legislative facts conceptually, but as matters of law
with respect to the methods of proof and the standard on review. See Baade, Proving Foreign and
InternationalLaw in Domestic Tribunals, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 619 (1978).
349. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 6.
350. Henkin, supra note 13, at 1568. In Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110
(1814), Chief Justice John Marshall noted in dictum that the President and the Congress, acting
together, can violate customary international law. Id.; see also The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388
(1815).
351. 798 F.2d 1450 (D.C. Cir. 1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. Boos v. Barry,
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plicit: "Defining and enforcing the United States' obligations under
international law require the making of extremely sensitive policy decisions, decisions which will inevitably color our relationships with other
nations. 3

52

Judicial resolution of international issues, whether or not

deemed to be matters of law, is thought here to undermine an essential
coherence in the United States' dealings with foreign countries. In this
view, the political question doctrine s " should bar the importation of
broad conceptions of international law into the interpretation of domestic statutes. The Charming Betsy principle can be criticized as adding
no justiciable standards to those approved under the stricter, incorporationist paradigm.
But the Supreme Court also has established that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies
beyond judicial cognizance. '"' Lower courts have eschewed broad applications of the political question doctrine in cases raising issues of international law. s55 These decisions establish that it is not the mere
possibility or likelihood of controversy that renders a question "political." Instead, under Baker v. Carr,3 56 the mark of nonjusticiable political questions is that they "[i] turn on standards that defy judicial
application, or [ii] involve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably
committed to the executive or legislature . . . [or] [iii] uniquely de485 U.S. 312 (1988).
352. Id. at 1458; accord Greenham Women Against Cruise Missiles v. Reagan, 755 F.2d 34,
37 (2d Cir. 1985); Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d
1196, 1204-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom. Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities
Serv. Oil Co., 442 U.S. 928 (1979); In re Korean Air Lines Disaster, 597 F. Supp. 613, 616-17
(D.D.C. 1984).
353. The classic list of circumstances in which the political question doctrine may come into
play appears in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962):
Promineht on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id. at 217.
354. Id. at 211.
355. McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REv. 241, 256 (1981)
(arguing that "the recent history of the doctrine has been one of judicial indifference and scathing
scholarly attack"). Academics have attacked the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine in the
international context. See, e.g., Franck & Bob, The Return of Humpty-Dumpty: ForeignRelations
Law after the Chadha Case, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 912 (1985); Gordon, American Courts, International
Law and "Political Questions" Which Touch Foreign Relations, 14 INT'L LAW. 297, 312 (1980);
Henkin, Is There a "PoliticalQuestion" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
356. Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
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mand single-voiced statement of the Government's views. 3 57 These

three categories of nonjusticiability suggest limits on the Charming
Betsy principle but pose no per se obstacle to its reappreciation and
application.
1. Judicially Manageable Standards
At base, the reluctance to exercise a broad power of abstention reflects the courts' capacity and willingness to distinguish between law,
which is justiciable in spite of the admitted consequences for United
States foreign relations, and politics, which are nonjusticiable altogether. Consistent with Baker, the courts may decline to abstain when
there are judicially manageable standards to apply, even when those
standards originate in international law or implicate issues of diplomacy: "[W]hereas attacks on foreign policymaking are nonjusticiable,
claims alleging noncompliance with the law are justiciable, even though
the limited review that the court undertakes may have an effect on foreign affairs. ' 358 The contemporary critique of the broad distinction between law and politics argues that the courts cannot in principle apply
the distinction with consistency but this potential inconsistency has not
erected some blanket rule of abstention in cases raising issues of international law.3 59 To the contrary, the courts seem to employ a distinction

between law and politics that is evident3 60 though elusive.3 6'
357. Id. at 211.
358. DKT Memorial Fund, Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 810 F.2d 1236, 1238 (D.C. Cir.
1987), on remand, 691 F. Supp. 394 (D.D.C. 1988), afj'd in part and rev'd in part, 887 F.2d 275
(D.C. Cir. 1989).
359. Compare Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding disputed issue justiciable despite potential international repercussions) with Goldwater v. Carter, 444
U.S. 996 (1979) (holding disputed issue nonjusticiable).
360. The case of Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d
929 (D.C. Cir. 1988) is instructive. In that case, the plaintiffs challenged the continued funding of
anti-Sandinista forces by the United States in spite of the decision by the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) declaring such action to be in violation of international law. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment of June
27, 1986). The district court dismissed the case on the ground that it raised a nonjusticiable political question, namely the conditions under which the executive branch would choose to comply
with a decision of the ICJ. See Committee of United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan,
No. Civ. A. 86-2620, slip op. (D.D.C. Mar. 24, 1987), aff'd on other grounds, 859 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
But the court of appeals rejected this approach, noting that the political question doctrine,
with its "shifting contours and uncertain underpinnings" and its "susceptib[ility] to indiscriminate
and overbroad application," could not trump rights grounded in law:
Such basic norms of international law as the proscription against murder and slavery may
well ... restrain our government in the same way that the Constitution restrains it. If Congress adopted a foreign policy that resulted in the enslavement of our citizens or of other
individuals, that policy might well be subject to challenge in domestic courts under international law. . ..
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Applying that distinction in the Charming Betsy context need not
be the occasion for jurisprudential speculation about the nature of law
or language. There is instead an empirical basis for the distinction in
the very fact of disagreement among nations as to the existence and
meaning of an international norm. The Supreme Court has established
that the rationale for abstention is particularly powerful when there is
dissension among states, progressively weakening with the evidence of
agreement:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is for the
judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the
application of an agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the national interest or
with international justice.362

Thus, the inevitable linguistic difficulty of determining whether there
are judicially manageable standards to apply becomes, in the Charming
Betsy context, a largely historical inquiry into state conduct, rather
than a legislative inquiry into the meaning of statutory or constitutional
terms.
This result hardly renders all CharmingBetsy cases per se justiciaReagan, 859 F.2d at 941. The court of appeals ultimately dismissed the complaint, holding that the
violation of an ICJ judgment was fundamentally different from the violation of basic human rights:
There is no question that, in the second half of the twentieth century, the protections
afforded individuals under international law have greatly expanded. . . . Notwithstanding
these changes, however, the expanded law of nations does not encompass the principles that
appellants advance in this lawsuit. No principle of jus cogens protects citizens from harm that
may result from their own government's contravention of an ICJ decision.
Id. at 953. In doing so, the court held in essence that there was no law for it to apply to allegations
based on a nation's disregard of an ICJ judgment, noting that "the harm that results when a
government disregards or contravenes an ICJ judgment does not generate the level of universal
disapprobation aroused by torture, slavery, summary execution, or genocide." Id. at 942.
Irrespective of whether the court properly assessed the United States' obligation to adhere to
an ICJ judgment as a matter of international law, it distinguished between what it perceived as
law and what it perceived as politics. As a result, the customary standards of human rights were
preserved as limits on deference and nonjusticiability. See Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida Dep't of
Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986) (making the same distinction in international context); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971) (distinguishing law from politics in
domestic setting).
361. Compare Ramirez de Arelano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc)
(holding justiciable a claim for damages and injunctive relief against the United States for the
expropriation of land in Honduras for the training of the Nicaraguan resistance), vacated on other
grounds, 471 U.S. 1113 (1985) with Chaser Shipping Corp. v. United States, 649 F. Supp. 736
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding a claim against the United States for the destruction of private property
caused by the mining of Nicaraguan resistance to be a nonjusticiable political question), aff'd
mem., 819 F.2d 1129 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
362. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964); see also Kalamazoo
Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1984) (citing cases), on remand, 616 F. Supp. 660 (W.D. Mich. 1985); RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 3, § 443 comment c.
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ble, but it does suggest a partial identity between the justiciability of an

issue and the applicability of the Charming Betsy principle. That is,
the Charming Betsy canon applies when there is a customary or conventional standard that is relevant to the interpretation of a statute or
that is potentially violated by a proffered interpretation of a statute.
The canon need not apply when there is no international norm, and the
political question doctrine need not apply when there is. The Charming
Betsy principle and the "judicially manageable standards" prong of the
political question doctrine therefore apply in mutually exclusive
settings.
2.

Textual Commitment

At the same time, it is clear that the Charming Betsy principle will
not convert a question "textually committed" to a coordinate branch of
government into a justiciable case or controversy. An otherwise nonjusticiable controversy about the political branches' war powers,36 3 for example, will not be rendered justiciable solely because a statute exists to
which some international standard may be relevant. 64 The same is true
of other textually committed constitutional powers, such as imrieachment, 6 5 and obligations, such as the guarantee of republican government. 36 There is, of course, no textual commitment of international
363. See, e.g., J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980)
(asserting the "[tlhe federal judiciary should not decide constitutional questions concerning...
whether executive action (or inaction) violates the prerogatives of Congress or whether legislative
action (or inaction) transgresses the realm of the President"); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 39-66, 77-79 (1972); Franck, supra note 22, at 640; Koh, supra note 22; cf. Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 997, 1007 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (disapproving abstention when the
issue is whether the constitution delegates a power to the executive or not, as distinct from the
legality of a particular exercise of an exclusive and political power).
364. In Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923), for example, the Court rejected
the argument that the statutory authority of the Alien Property Custodian lapsed with the end of
hostilities after World War I. Although a proclamation of peace had issued, arguably incorporating
international obligations governing peaceful relations among states, the Supreme Court concluded
that "the power which declared the necessity is the power to declare its cessation, and what the
cessation requires. The power is legislative." Id. at 57. Professor Wright views the case as an example of textual commitment, noting that "the Court will not review the determination of the political departments as to when the exigencies produced by war have ended." C. WRIGHT, supra note
303, § 14, at 80.
365. Under the Constitution, the House of Representatives has "the sole Power of Impeachment," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5, and the Senate has "the sole Power to try all Impeachments,"
id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. There is some controversy whether these sole powers render all impeachment
questions nonjusticiable. Compare Gunther, Judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The
Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 30 (1974) (excluding judiciary from
impeachment issues) with R. BERGER, IMPEACHMENT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM (1973) (em-

powering judiciary to address some impeachment-related issues).
366. Under the Constitution, "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a Republican Form of Government." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, cl. 1. Challenges under the guarantee
clause to both state action, see Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849), and congressional
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legal issues to a coordinate political branch, and it seems unlikely after
Powell v. McCormack"' that such a commitment will be inferred from
the narrowly-defined foreign affairs powers that are conferred expressly.
Here too, the political question doctrine is unlikely to erect a prophylactic bar to the application of the Charming Betsy principle, though a
textual commitment argument may be plausible in any particular case.
3.

The "One-Voice" Orthodoxy

The prospect of multiple voices is similarly an inadequate rationale
for abstention. To summarize the criticism of the orthodoxy as a limitation on adjudication of international legal issues, 368 the one-voice ideal
presumes a rigid and unified model of executive power that has not
been sustained in other separation-of-powers contexts.3 69 It provides no
guidance in the common circumstances in which Congress and the executive branch "speak" at odds;370 or when private initiatives add to the
implausibility of a univocal foreign policy;3 7 ' or when there are multiple
executive voices over time-some incoherent, some contradictory, some
action, see Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867), have been held nonjusticiable. Professor
Louis Henkin articulates and criticizes the view that the guarantee clause is a textual commitment
of an issue to a coordinate political department. Henkin, supra note 355, at 609.
. 367. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). In Powell, the Supreme Court addressed U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5,
providing that "Each House shall be the Judge of the. . . Qualifications of its own Members." The
Court declared that this language was "at most a 'textually demonstrable commitment' to Congress to judge only the qualifications expressly set forth in the Constitution." Powell, 395 U.S. at
548. Because the House of Representatives refused to seat Adam Clayton Powell on grounds other
than these constitutional qualifications, the Court held the issue justiciable. The result in Powell
and other cases has suggested to at least one commentator that the textual-commitment prong of
the political question doctrine is "virtually meaningless." Lobel, supra note 3, at 1156 n.425.
368. See Steinhardt, supra note 120.
369. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), suggests that the Supreme Court has chosen the
balancing methodology of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), and
CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986), over'the formalism of Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986),
and INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). In Morrison, the Court rejected the argument that a
statute authorizing court-appointed independent prosecutors violated the President's constitutional authority to exercise the executive power of the United States, especially the prosecutorial
function. The court's willingness to allow an intrusion into the executive preserve of criminal enforcement undermines the model of a coherent and unified executive branch. A similar intrusion
into foreign affairs when there is no comparable textual allocation of exclusively presidential
power, therefore, also should be allowed. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (providing for presidential appointment of inferior executive officers).
370. See Forsythe, Congress and Human Rights in U.S. ForeignPolicy: The Fate of General
Legislation, 9 HUMAN RIGHTS Q. 382 (1987); see also South Afr. Airways v. Dole, 817 F.2d 119, 121,
125-26 (D.C. Cir.) (referring to congressional directive to the executive branch to "terminate the
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Government of the Union of South
Africa"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 896 (1987).
371. This tendency has been most notably true in the Iran-Contra scandal. See Koh, supra
note 22.

1990]

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

1193

less than authoritative. 72 To the extent that the one-voice orthodoxy
translates into a simple-minded form of executive domination, it also
posits a legislative power without accountability, 7 an anomaly under
constitutional principles that cannot be resolved on the simple assertion
that the conducting of foreign affairs is different. 74 Nor is this perspec37 5
tive consistent with the cases as a whole.
That is not to say that the one-voice orthodoxy has no explanatory
power in foreign affairs cases. To the contrary, it faithfully captures one
aspect, but only one aspect, of our juridical history. One-voice concerns
are especially powerful in the purist debate about when international
law trumps domestic law and vice versa. The conflict between the two
orders of law raises the prospect of multiple voices. In cases of conflict,
the supremacy axioms identify the one voice that counts in a particular
372. The one-voice orthodoxy offers no criteria for determining the legal status of an executive position that changes over time: which conduct contributes to the creation of a norm, which
merely violates, and which "unmakes" the norm, which, being essentially political, may be juridically irrelevant? If the orthodoxy erects a "later-in-time" rule of executive domination, it actually
undermines long term executive power and allows violations of international law sub silentio.
Steinhardt, supra note 120.
373. In contributing to the emergence of customary law, the executive plainly is engaged in a
legislative act, though it is by comparison with other legislative acts somewhat attenuated and illdefined. But in the United States political system, legislative acts of any stripe are subject presumptively to some form of effective oversight. Court decisions "creating" common law can be
overturned by statute. Congressional enactments can be either vetoed or judicially reviewed. Administrative regulations can be overturned by either the legislature or, generally, the judiciary.
Exceptions to this rule, for example when Congress precludes judicial review of a statute or certain
administrative rules, are subject, nonetheless, to a measure of oversight in the form of the President's veto or, in theory, the popular vote. It is anomalous to posit an exercise of power that is
both legislative and immune from effective review, but this step is precisely what the "one-voice"
orthodoxy in foreign affairs does. Whether expressed as a doctrine of nonjusticiability or as a conclusive presumption on the merits, the one-voice orthodoxy prevents Congress and the people from
"overturning" the executive practices that contribute to the law in question. If an attempt were
made to do so, the one-voice orthodoxy would provide grounds for criticizing the interference
rather than recognizing its oversight function.
374. Courts have rejected the full implications of Justice George Sutherland's theory in
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936), of investing the executive with
extensive and exclusive power in foreign affairs, radically unconstrained by the structural limitations that are applicable in domestic matters. See, e.g., American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 657 F.2d 430, 438 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting the characterization that
"denominating the President as the 'sole organ' of the United States in international affairs constitutes a blanket endorsement of plenary Presidential power over any matter extending beyond the
borders of this country").
375. Among the cases in the last decade to reject the executive's exclusive legislative or interpretive power in foreign affairs are Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (rejecting executive interpretation of international treaty governing diplomatic relations); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S.
421 (1987) (rejecting executive interpretation of refugee convention); Wardair Can., Inc. v. Florida
Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1 (1986) (rejecting executive interpretation of bilateral treaty). In The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), the Court rejected the executive's interpretation of the customary law governing the seizure of prize. If the one-voice orthodoxy genuinely reflected United
States jurisprudence, these cases-and the authority on which they rest-would be inexplicable.
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setting and amplify it.
By contrast, the one-voice orthodoxy is unlikely to undermine the
interpretation of statutes in light of international law. The Charming
Betsy principle offers no authority for a court to contradict a clear legislative statement. It only insists that congressional departures from international law be express, so that they will not be misunderstood or
contradicted. The one-voice orthodoxy might be implicated by the
Charming Betsy principle in the narrow circumstance in which a statute incorporates or is silent with respect to a particular norm, and the
executive branch explicitly has disapproved of the norm. In considering
the silent statute, the court might give evidentiary value to the executive position in determining what the law of nations requires and conclude that the putative norm is irrelevant in interpreting the statute.
But the canon of construction cannot resolve a clear conflict between
the executive and the congressional understandings of international
law. It operates in principle to construe the statute consistently with
international law. But the case-perhaps erroneouslys6 -may be considered nonjusticiable or controlled on the merits by executive suggestion, and we are left with the irony that the hypothetical conflict
assumes what the one-voice orthodoxy denies. In the end, this narrow
potential conflict offers no broad-gauged obstacle to a renewed appreciation and invocation of the Charming Betsy principle by courts and
advocates.
C. Illegitimacy Round III: The Critical Criticism of Hermeneutical
Technique
Not all of the plausible attacks on the legitimacy of the renewed
vision of CharmingBetsy reflect the liberal ideals of this Nation's politics. Those attacks dominate to the extent that the renaissance of interpretive theory, the rise of hermeneutical technique, seems to elevate the
judiciary into a position of creative dominance. A very different objection suggests that it is simply too facile for a court to rely on an interpretive guideline to understand a concrete statute and a relevant
international norm. It is not enough to say "go forth and interpret."
The argument rests on the observation that the turn to interpretation has been one strategy for confronting the "formalist fallacy": the
erroneous reduction of legal analysis to deductive and neutral methods
capable of producing determinate results in any legal contest.3 7 Herme376. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of Customary InternationalLaw
by the Executive Unconstitutional?,80 Nw. U.L. REv. 321, 363 (1985).
377. In an attempt to show the continuum between law and politics, Professor Roberto Unger distinguishes this usual meaning of formalism from his more general definition of formalism as
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neutics, by admitting a "looser and more contestable rationality, 3 78
avoids the pretense that law is deterministic and acknowledges that
there may be multiple defensible answers to any legal question. Its proponents argue that the application of hermeneutics improves legal analysis by forcing judges and advocates to pitch legal controversy as
matters of principle, justifying interpretations of precedent or statute
on gradients of "fit" and "honor, ' 37 9 rather than as "either/or" clashes
among doctrines portrayed as compelling and necessary. The skeptic
who first provoked hermeneutics might dismiss it as advice to think too
softly-and too arrogantly 3S50-about law.
From the critical perspective, hermeneutics simply may hide a particularly insidious version of formalism. A judge's adoption of a particular interpretation is inevitably "a function of power and not of
proof."' 381 Moreover, the more conscious of alternatives the courts may
be, the more the choice of one interpretation over another may be
viewed, fallaciously, as immune from a broader political critique. 82
This realization brings us full circle: Part II addressed the legal realist
objection that canons of construction are meaningless. This second version of the objection suggests that it is too simple to rely on hermeneutics to resolve any of the recurring tensions in law, including the
relationship between international and domestic law. Even sophisticated legal reasoning is hegemonic.
It seems appropriate, perhaps inevitable, that our assessment of
the plausibility of the critical criticism is a function of axioms rather
than reasons. A paradigm that admits only the extremes of formalism
"a commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of, a method of legal justification
that can be clearly contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes
that people call ideological, philosophical, or visionary." Unger, The CriticalLegal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 564 (1983).

378. Id. at 582.
379. R. DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 57, 77. Professor John Denvir phrases these criteria as
"complexity" and "sense." Denvir, Justice Brennan, Justice Rehnquist, and Free Speech, 80 Nw.
U.L. REV. 285, 313-14 (1985).
380. Cf. Chevigny, Why the Continental Disputes Are Important: A Comment on Hoy and
Garet, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 207-08 (1985) (urging modesty in the re-vision of legal controversy).
381. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A PreliminaryDefense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L.J. 821, 823 n.6 (1985).
382. See Kennedy, supra note 76. In this respect, the formalist objection collapses into the
objectivist fallacy, under which law is criticized for presuming the existence of a natural and necessary order of social arrangement and right. Unger, supra note 377, at 578. Hermeneutics is thought
to offer a response to this objection in that
[t]he social order is no longer a pre-existing given, but a social creation of which law is an
important constituent; the judge no longer studies the text to discover meaning, but helps
give it meaning. . . . Nor is there one possible meaning as the result of a judicial reading;
hermeneutics admits to the existence of a multiplicity of possible interpretations.
Denvir, supra note 379, at 290.
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and indeterminacy leaves the apparent choice between dueling implausibilities: mechanical law and no law. Begin instead with "rich theories
of adjudication,"38 3 in which judges seek guidance from a variety of
sources, and absolute determinacy is exchanged for a dialectical technique that by hypothesis cannot be universally acceptable. In this respect, the decision to take the Charming Betsy principle seriously is a
mode of inclusive analysis, admitting multiple sources of potentially relevant considerations into a process of practical reasoning.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Charming Betsy principle stands at the intersection of three
unrelated but highly significant developments in law and legal scholarship. As a principle of statutory construction, its importance has risen
naturally with the increasingly statutory aspect of United States law.
Simultaneously, international law has come to comprehend more substantive matters of social and political life, suggesting that there is an
increasingly complex and detailed body of international norms that
may be relevant to a given statutory problem. Finally, legal scholarship
has focused increasingly on the deconstruction and reconstruction of interpretive theory. The Charming Betsy principle combines elements of
textualist and intentionalist paradigms, but it also, unlike most canons
of construction, turns on generalizable public values that give it shape
and legitimacy. In exploring the potential effect of the Charming Betsy
principle, this Article demonstrates that the public values approach to
statutory construction is a fruitful technique for the interpretation and
application of canons of construction and not just particular statutes.
What has here been called "the Charming Betsy principle" refers
of course to a constellation of principles at work in the legisprudence of
United States courts. In its simplest form, the presumption affects most
directly the interpretation of ambiguous text: ambiguity will not support the repeal of a treaty or the delegation of a power to violate international law. Jurisdiction and substantive violations of customary law
and treaties may not be inferred from a text that fairly supports any
other interpretation. In these respects, the Charming Betsy principle is
but a special example of the clear statement rules familiar in other
branches of law.
But the canon as applied imposes a test that is not merely textual;
383. Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 283 (1989). Professor Ken Kress states:
Critical scholars demand that for something to be law it must meet an impossibly high
standard. The consequence of critical scholars' unrealistic requirement for law is that there
can be no law. But this is too high a price to pay. For the most part, critical legal scholars
themselves refuse to accept this consequence of their deductive standard for legal truth.
Id. at 329 (citations omitted).
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it requires some congressional awareness or intent as well. That is, the
essential finding of inconsistency necessary to override an otherwise relevant international norm must take the form of consideration and repudiation. That consideration may be expressed as an intent to preempt
all competing standards, and if the resulting statute cannot be reconciled with an asserted norm of international law, the presumption of
conformity may be overcome. But in any case, whether reconciliation is
fairly possible or not is a function of both congressional intent and the
logical or normative incompatibility between the statute and the putative international norm.
That the Charming Betsy test is not strictly textual is shown by
Lauritzen and McCulloch, in which the court interpreted facially unambiguous language, which, if given its literal application, would
threaten the interests of the United States by placing the Nation in
violation of international standards or embarrassing the political
branches in their conduct of foreign relations. The twin rationales for
the principle, respecting both international law and the separation of
powers, can operate even in the absence of ambiguous text and guide its
judicial transformation away from naive literalism.
The principle also offers a touchstone for interpreting intent as it
may be revealed in a statute's legislative history. When congressional
intent can be interpreted in at least two ways, one preserving international standards and the other not, Cardoza-Fonsecasuggests that the
court should adopt the former view. Thus, in determining whether a
reconciliation is fairly possible, the Charming Betsy principle offers
guidance in cases when Congress acts with mixed or obscure motives.
The potential impact of this interpretive guideline has been lost in
the purist debate about the hierarchical relationship between domestic
law and international law. Especially when phrased narrowly as a controversy over the effective immunity of domestic officers from international standards, this debate has proven to be a largely intramural one,
somewhat removed from the broad day-to-day task of interpreting statutes and committed to the "either/or" logic of supremacy. As the international legal system addresses more substantive aspects of economic
and political life, however, the CharmingBetsy principle should take on
a heightened practical and theoretical significance.
Although the challenge falls in part to Congress, this Article is not
a plea for more legislative consciousness or "better" statutes. It is instead an alert to courts, advocates, and scholars that a potentially powerful idea has been under-appreciated and should be reconsidered in
light of contemporary international legal developments and the rise of
statutes in the law of the United States.

